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# Poverty and Gender in Latin America

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#### Abstract

Even if assumptions of the traditional income poverty measure -full income pooling and equal resource allocation- have strong implications and are not confirmed by the evidence, this measure is still widely used in gender poverty analysis. Alternative measures of poverty are scarcely considered, and not much is known about the gender bias introduced by this traditional measure. In this paper, we present different poverty measures at the individual and household levels and compare their results to that from traditional poverty measure, analyzing the potential extent of misclassification. Our analysis is based on household surveys for 16 Latin American countries (circa 2016). Our results indicate that departing from the conventional methodology has much more influence on women than men, worsening female indicators. Households emerge as crucial venues for income support for low income partnered women and for women with no access to any income. This last group still represents around a quarter of Latin American women, whose autonomy is seriously compromised due to this fact.

**Keywords:** income poverty, gender, Latin America **JEL Codes:** I32, J16, D31,

#### Introduction

The traditional approach to measuring poverty considers that all individuals within a poor household are poor, whereas all individuals in a non-poor household are not poor. The consideration of the household as the measurement unit for poverty implies that that there are no differences in intrahousehold resource allocation. Under these assumptions, per capita consumption -the ratio between total household consumption and the number of people in the household- is an adequate wellbeing metric for individual poverty estimation. In Latin America, this translates into the use of per capita income as a common measure of wellbeing and generally used to estimate monetary poverty, given that most regular household surveys collect information on this variable, while expenditure and consumption data are collected in specific surveys conducted every ten years approximately.<sup>1</sup> Poverty measured in this way, tends to result in slightly higher female rates, which give ground to commonplace generalizations about the female face of poverty. Due to the construction of the indicator, these gender differences reflect mostly differences in household composition, thant tend to be small as ther there is not an important gender imbalance within households. This practice may have implications in terms of our understandings about poverty and its determinants, as well as in terms of public policies, given that public resources are generally targeted on a household basis (Bennett and Sutherland, 2011; Ponthieux, 2010).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For the conceptual discussion about the use of consumption or income as a measure of well-being, see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001; Meyer and Sullivan, 2003).

The traditional measurement of poverty implies two crucial and distinct assumptions (Ponthieux 2013). First, that of full income pooling, the joint use of all resources within the household, justifying the consideration of total household income as the metric for total wellbeing. Second, that of equal resource allocation between the household members, justifying the use of per capita income as a measure for individual wellbeing. If any of these assumptions does not apply, the dynamics of intrahousehold decision making about resource pooling and allocation may have a direct and significant effect on the final level of wellbeing of each individual. Despite theoretical advances to understand within household decisions, measurement issues remain lagged behind, and the gap between research and statistical practice has increased over time (Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015).

To properly assess individual wellbeing, individualized data of consumption would be needed for all members of the household, a requirement that cannot be fulfilled (at least in the medium run) by expenditure surveys or other available data. Until more suitable data is available, different approaches to reflect gender gaps in poverty have been considered. One alternative consists on measuring poverty by sex of household head, or restricting the analysis of specific populations (for example men and women who do not live with other adults), in both cases keeping the pooling and sharing assumptions within the household. A second alternative is to assume different pooling and sharing rules within households. Finally, probably the more promising avenue is provided by a recent strand of literature that, in the framework of collective bargaining models, estimates resource allocation within the households based on data from expenditure surveys.

Studies with any of these approaches are scarce in Latin America. In this paper we argue that even without individualized consumption data, it is still feasible to conduct useful empirical research that sheds light about measurement of individual wellbeing, the possible methodological options and the involved variation in results. To do this, we use the first two of the three approaches summarized in the previous paragraph to reflect the potential impact that unequal sharing has on the measurement of poverty. First, we compare the traditional poverty measure with other measures such poverty by sex of the household's head and male and female poverty in single adult households. Then, we then depart from the income pooling assumption and calculate male and female poverty considering only earned income and a minimal pooling assumption. Our estimations are based on 16 Latin American countries and consider people aged 25 to 59 years old. A detailed comparison of female and male poverty magnitudes, overlapping under different assumptions, and of the changes in the ordering of countries according to these assumptions, grounds the reflection about the current limitations to individual wellbeing measurement gender gaps.

#### 1. Intrahousehold decision making and individual well-being

Economic literature has tried to model households' decisions, taking into account that individual interests may differ: the basic problem consists on how to aggregate utility functions (which may be similar or different) over the individuals that integrate the family. Attempts have gone from the basic unitary model to more complex bargaining models - cooperative and non cooperative- where individual preferences differ and outcomes are the result of strategic interaction between family members. The problem of how decisions about resources are taken within the household is crucial for individual poverty measurement: standard measures of poverty incidence (and of income inequality) assume equal sharing of resources within the household, neglecting intrahousehold inequality. This is consistent with the unitary approach (Becker, 1981) which implies income pooling and equal sharing of resources, an assumption which has failed verification on empirical grounds and received many criticisms (see

Bergstrom, 1989; Bergmann, 1995, among many others) giving place to the development of bargaining models.<sup>2</sup>

Bargaining models are based on game theory and imply that the outcome of intra-household resource allocation varies with individuals' bargaining power, depending on their access to extra household resources.<sup>3</sup> Cooperative bargaining models assume the existence of an enforceable and binding agreement on the members of the household to accept some particular bargaining position, examples are Chiappori's (1992) "collective model", McElroy and Horney's (1981) Nash bargaining models, and Lundberg and Pollak's (1993) separate spheres bargaining models. Non-cooperative bargaining models in turn allow for asymmetric information (household members may be unaware of each other's earnings, assets and use of time), enforcement problems (recourse to social norms is often the only way to enforce a cooperative solution) and inefficiency (the household may sacrifice something, income or public good provision, as a consequence of intra-family distribution of power). Under this logic, individuals act as autonomous sub economies, controlling their own income. Examples are Woolley (1988) and Rubenstein (1982).

More recently collective models have been developed, e general models that do not specify any process to reach the outcomes. These models are a flexible alternative for empirical applications which include both unitary and bargaining models as particular cases. Their outcomes can be understood as the result of a sharing rule being that distribute household income between members. Individuals choose to pool some resources and retain control over others. Collective models usually pass the test of their key assumption of collective rationality which implies that the outcome of the household decision making is efficient in a Pareto sense. Examples of these models include Bourguignon et al (1993), Browning et al (2006), among others.

The usual assumptions of pooling of all monetary resources and equal sharing within the household, besides being consistent with the unitary model of household behavior, are very convenient for empirical analysis, mainly due to the limitations of available data. But the literature tends not to find strong evidence to support these assumptions (see Bourguignon et al, 1993; Browning, 1995; Lundberg et al, 1997; Ward-Batts, 2008; Attanasio and Lechene, 2002; Lyngstad et al, 2010; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). The evidence suggests that the way in which household resources are spent and the welfare situation of family members depends on who generates and controls household resources (see Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Bussolo and De Hoyos, 2009; Duflo, 2003; among others).

Based on a thematic module introduced in the European household surveys to investigate intrahousehold allocation of resources, Ponthieux (2013) finds that income pooling is more frequent among married couples, couples with dependent children, or in which one partner is economically active, and less frequent among higher educated or richer couples. More dual earners couples, more family disruptions and re-compositions could lead to lower shares of full pooling households.<sup>4</sup> On the same line, Ponthieux and Meurs (2015) review different studies and conclude that the presence of children, a traditional division of labor and the need to monitor low resources seem to have a positive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A typical recent test consists on analyzing whether changes that exogenously redistribute income within households have any impact on household expenditure decisions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Donni and Chiappori (2011) provide a survey of non unitary models of household behavior.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In this study comprising 21 European countries, around 47% of adults living in multiperson households declared holding back at least some of their income from the pool. These represents around 38% of total households (Ponthieux, 2013).

influence on the probability of pooling resources. Moreover, anthropological and sociological evidence has also questioned the pooled income hypothesis underlying the unitary model both in developed and developing countries (Cuesta, 2006).

If the assumptions of income pooling and equal sharing do not always hold within household, traditional poverty measures may not be adequate as a way of revealing individual wellbeing. Trying to overcome these inadequacies, some studies explore alternative ways of bringing to surface the individual differences in wellbeing based on the traditional measure of poverty. In this context, the idea of feminization of poverty became usual in the literature, sometimes referring to the higher share of women in total poverty and others to the greater severity of women's poverty relative to men.<sup>5</sup> One of the main empirical approaches to study this topic consists on analyzing the poverty status of female headed households against that of male headed households (Bradshaw et al., 2018; Fukuda Parr, 1999; Liu et al, 2017; among others). Even when the idea of feminization of poverty is widespread, the evidence is mixed. Buvinic and Gupta (1997) present a meta analysis about this issue and find that in 38 out of 61 studies female headed households are found to be poorer than male ones. On a similar line, Lampietti and Stalker (2000) also conclude that the idea that poverty has a female face, based on poverty rates of female headed households, does not hold as a general pattern. Quisuming et al (2001) consider ten developing countries and find that only in two cases there is evidence of female headed households suffering more from poverty than male headed ones.

Other studies have concentrated in specific populations to reach an individual measure, for instance on 'single' adult households, that is households containing only one adult (Wiepking and Maas, 2005; Barcena and Moro, 2013; among others). This group includes widows and widowers, divorced men and women, and men and women living with children, but excludes men and women living together. This restriction of the analysis to households whose gender characteristics and intrahousehold allocation of resources are clearly identifiable tends to find that single women are most likely to be poor than single men. Both Wiekping and Maas (2005) and Barcena and Moro (2013), based on LIS data on single adults for multiple countries, confirm that the gender poverty gap is a consequence of the personal characteristics of the population, but they also test for country characteristics, indicating that the country is more relevant in terms of the gender biases in poverty.

Other departure from the traditional assumptions consists on exploring the gender differences in poverty when different pooling and sharing rules are imposed within the household. The extreme cases are the sole consideration of the individual earned income (Gornick and Jantii, 2010; Ponthieux, 2010),<sup>6</sup> or that all personal income is retained by the person who receives it and household income is equally shared (Davies and Joshi, 1994; Fritzell, 1999; Falkingham and Baschieri, 2009). Alternatively, other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In what seems to be the origin of the concept of feminization of poverty, Pearce (1978) referred to the fact that an increasing share of poor were women, emphasizing the situation of single mothers in US.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This approach should not be confused with the indicator of 'in work poverty' included in the European portfolio of social indicators, which combines an individual status (being in work) with a household status (being poor). This indicator leads to a gender paradox, as women turn out to be overrepresented in less favorable labor market positions but do not face higher risks of in work poverty (see Phontieux, 2010).

studies have made different assumptions regarding the allocation of resources within the household to illustrate about the sensitivity of estimates of welfare by gender to these assumptions. For a review on these studies see Ponthieux and Meurs (2015).

Another approach to individual wellbeing consists on the construction of individual-based multidimensional poverty measures, leaving aside consumption or income and considering other dimensions of well-being (see Cantillon and Nolan, 2001; Bessell, 2015; Espinoza-Delgado and Klasen, 2018; Klasen and Lahoti, 2016). In principle, assessing individual-based poverty seems to be more feasible in a non-income multidimensional framework than in a monetary one (Klasen, 2007), since attainments in many non-monetary dimensions, such as education and health, can be ascribed to individuals, and the information on these attainments are often available in the household surveys. In spite of this, most popular multidimensional poverty measures, are estimated at the household level (Duclos and Tiberti, 2016), being not sensitive to gender either. To overcome these difficulties and taking into consideration the documented inequality in time use patterns between men and women has led researchers to focus on the dimension of time and to estimate time poverty (Burchardt, 2008; Bardasi and Wodon, 2010; Zacharias, 2011; among others).

Of course, the appropriate way to reflect individual well-being would be the consideration of individualized consumption data, but unfortunately, this data is - generally speaking- not available in developed nor developing countries. In the absence of direct measures of intra household allocation of resources, some studies based on the collective model literature have approximated individual welfare through indirect estimations based on an identification strategy that relies on the existence of adult goods in different types of households – the Rothbarth approach. This method was initially designed to elicit the resources accruing to children, by comparing consumption in specific goods in households with and without children (Browning et al, 2013). Based on structural collective models and using household surveys which collect consumption data of one or more items in a way that can be "assigned" to individuals, demand functions can be estimated. These allows for teasing how resources are shared inside the household even if data on consumption of most items are collected at the household level. These studies tend to conclude that ignoring intra-household distribution of resources leads to a large underestimation of poverty. These estimations of individuals' share of resources are based on strong behavioral assumptions, and so their use should be validated before they can serve as tools for poverty monitoring (World Bank, 2018). Based on this methodology, Bargain et al (2014) for Cote d'Ivore find that children shares are small and decline with household size, and so child poverty, measured on the basis of individual allocations within households, is much larger than in traditional poverty measures which assume equal sharing. De Vreyer and Lambert (2017) for Senegal and Dunbar et al (2013) for Malawi also document within household inequalities in resources share. When comparing the prediction from collective bargaining models with real individualized consumption data for Bangladesh, Bargain et al (2018) find that the model performs well in predicting the allocation between parents and children, suggesting the robustness of the identification based on adult exclusive goods. Predicted sharing between adults is less accurate. World Bank (2018) presents estimates of intrahousehold differences in resource allocation and poverty in nuclear households in Bangladesh and Malawi, finding that intrahousehold differences in consumption and poverty are significant. Women and children are allocated a smaller share of the households' resources than men. Intrahousehold inequalities in resource allocation appear to be more pronounced for nonfood items than for core food items, hinting at a degree of solidarity within families.

Studies about gender and the measurement of poverty are not abundant in Latin America. Medeiros and Costa (2008) consider feminization of poverty as a relative concept based on women and men

differences at each moment. This implies that if poverty in a society is sharply reduced among men and only slightly reduced among women, the situation can be characterized as a feminization of poverty. They distinguish to two definitions of feminization of poverty: an increase in the difference in the level of poverty among men and women, or an increase in the difference in the level of poverty among female headed households and among male and couple headed households. In their analysis for eight Latin American countries representing regional large share of the population, they find a process of defemenization of poverty in many countries in the region in the 90s and early 2000s, and a refemenization of poverty from then on. ECLAC discusses gender and poverty using an indicator calculated as the ratio of women to men's poverty at a given moment in time, called *Feminity index of poor households* (see for example ECLAC, 2015, 2017).<sup>7</sup> As discussed in Bradshaw et al (2018), this indicator and its changes are very sensitive to the level of the base poverty rates. As a result, it tends to be higher among countries with lower levels of poverty, and to present significant increases even if the differences in changes of female and male poverty are relatively small.

More recently, some studies are trying to identify intrahousehold distribution of resources in line with collective models. Cuesta (2006) constructs non-cooperative allocation rules dominated by gender discrimination among household members for Chile. His estimates show a substantial worsening of poverty and inequality under such allocation rules, underlying the existence of potentially large consequences of extreme discriminatory practices within the household. On a similar line, Echeverria et al (2018) identify the fraction of total household expenditure that is devoted to children and adults in Argentina, exploiting the observability of assignable goods in expenditure surveys. Results indicate the existence of a positive gender bias in expenditure when children are females for all families, and document that children fare better when mothers have a higher bargaining power in the allocation process, measured by their employment status. For Brazil, Iglesias and Cohelo (2018) based on the estimation of resourse shares find that the share of household resources is slightly larger for men than for women.

Taken as a whole, these studies give an idea of the potential misclassification of individuals with respect to households' poverty classification: many poor individuals may not live in poor households. In the following sections, we present results from different poverty measures at the individual and household levels and compare them to the traditional one, analyzing the potential extent of misclassification in Latin American countries. The use of measures based on the traditional mechanism as a benchmark is not an indicative of its robustness or goodness but just a way of discussing our results.

## 2. Methodological aspects

Traditional poverty measures in Latin America are based on income and not on consumption, as periodical household surveys compile data on income. Household disposable income is measured as the sum of all incomes received by the household. Income from work and employment (including income from self employment, unemployment, sickness and other social security benefits) are collected at the individual level (and usually net of social contribution and direct taxes). Income from property and from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> This index is presented at ECLAC's Gender Equality Observatory, https://oig.cepal.org/en/indicators/feminity-index-poor-households

transfers (from other households and from the state) may be collected individually or collectively, depending on the country. Per capita household income is compared to an income threshold in order to classify households as poor or non poor.

## Poverty thresholds

At present, all countries in the region have their own national poverty thresholds, which are determined following the traditional approach of designing baskets whose size and composition allow to satisfy nutritional and other needs an reflect the consumption habits in a society (so called basic needs poverty lines).<sup>8</sup> Some decades ago, the beginning of the calculation of this national poverty lines in the region was influenced by the action of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which provided technical assistance for their estimation. ECLAC (1991) proposal was based on the idea of setting food energy requirements for the population, and then considering the total expenditure of people whose average caloric intakes meet their requirements. Besides orientating the estimation of national poverty lines in the region, ECLAC estimated comparable poverty lines for countries in Latin America. After estimating the indigence line for each country based on their expenditure surveys (cost of the basic food basket of the population that covers their nutritional needs), comparable poverty lines for the region were estimated by multiplying the indigence line by a constant factor (Orshansky coefficient, set at 2 for urban areas and 1.75 for rural areas).

More recently, ECLAC (2018) updated its methodology for the estimation of comparable poverty lines for the region. The more innovative element with respect to the previous estimation refers to the selection of the reference group, which is defined as the population that covers its nutritional and other basic needs. Additionally, the Orshansky coefficient is the one that emerges from each country data set, instead of being set as a constant for all countries. These updated ECLAC poverty lines are the ones considered for poverty measurement in this article.

The World Bank monitors poverty around the world, setting a poverty line of 1.9 US dollars per day per person (expressed in purchasing power parity, PPP). This value comes from poverty thresholds used for developing countries around the world and was identified by Ravallion el al (1991). Since 2017, the World Bank has been publishing poverty estimations based on two additional poverty lines, set at 3.2 and 5.5 US dollars (PPP) per person per day. These thresholds correspond to the median of official poverty thresholds for countries with medium low income and medium high income respectively (Jolliffe and Prydz, 2016). As shown in the table A.1 (in the annex). ECLAC poverty lines are, in general terms, relatively similar to national thresholds, and are also close to the medium threshold used by the World Bank (5.5 USD PPP).

# Poverty measurement and gender

In order to discuss the implications of poverty measurement in terms of gender, we construct poverty indicators both at the household and individual level, and we restrict our sample to population aged 25-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Brazil has no official poverty line, being an exception in the region.

At the *household level*, we do not change the pooling and sharing assumptions. We neglect intrahousehold inequality to reach an individual measure of wellbeing, considering per capita income to identify the proportion of the population living below a certain poverty threshold. We intend to show the boundaries and possibilities of the traditional measure for describing gender differences in individual wellbeing. With that purpose, we estimate the following poverty measures based on the per capita income: a) "Traditional measure", fot the whole population, by sex; b) "Poverty by headship", for the whole population, by sex of household head; c) "Poverty for single adults", for one-adult households, by sex.

At the *individual level*, we move away from the assumption of total pooling and equal sharing and consider two different pooling assumptions to illustrate the magnitude of the potential gender differences in wellbeing. In both exercises proposed, the basic idea is to consider people as if they lived alone, defining an individual-based indicator. As there is not enough information to develop an indicator which takes into account the pattern of income distribution within households, the indicators presented must be understood as an extreme reference that allows comparisons with the traditional indicator of poverty.

We consider two different pooling assumptions based on the literature: poverty in earned income (Ponthieux 2010, 2018) and minimal pooling (Fritzell 1999). The first indicator ("Earned income poverty") compares each individual's earned incometo the poverty threshold, identifying as poor those who would not escape from poverty if they were living alone and based on their own earnings. Earnings include income obtaind from any source of work (includes wages, self-employed income, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, etc.). This is an individual indicator, referring only to the person and their earnings. "Conceptually, it reflects the monetary outcome of the individual's economic activity and also the distribution of the aggregate primary income between individual, and between men and women." (Ponthieux 2018:81). This indicator is defined for all people, not just workers. Those who do not participate in the labor market will be defined as poor in earned income.

The second indicator ("Poverty minimal pooling") assures that the welfare of children remains unchanged in comparison with the traditional measure. We assume that each adult of the household contributes a proportional part of their income to support children, and the rest is kept for their selves. This implies that adults share resources with their children, but not with each other. Resources allocated to each individual (W) will depend on the proportion of income that the adults in the household (A) devote to children in the household (K). Also, we require that the relative personal income of men and women remains unchanged after they contribute to children's welfare. Thus, each contributes the same proportion of their income, that is  $c_m = c_f = c$ . Other household income that cannot be assigned to any adult ( $y_H$ ) is divided on per capita terms. The following equations reflect this pooling model:

$$W_M = (1-c)y_M + \frac{y_H}{(A+K)}$$
 (1)

$$W_F = (1-c)y_F + \frac{y_H}{(A+K)}$$
 (2)

$$W_K = \frac{cy_F + cy_M}{K} + \frac{y_H}{(A+K)}$$
(3)

As mentioned, children get the same amount of resources under this pooling model (equation 3) that under the traditional measurement of poverty:

$$W_{K} = \frac{cy_{F} + cy_{M}}{K} + \frac{y_{H}}{(A+K)} = \frac{y_{F} + y_{M} + y_{H}}{A+K}$$
(4)

This implies that:

$$c = \frac{K}{A+K}$$
(5)

That is, the proportion that each parent allocates to children is equal to the proportion of children among all members of the household (children and adults).<sup>9</sup> Our rules imply that, as men and women choose to pool some resources and retain the control over others, household decisions can be understood as the result of some bargaining process in the framework of a collective model. <sup>10</sup>

We compare the magnitude of poverty rates, and also analyze the degree of overlapping between the traditional measure of poverty and alternative measures at the individual level, as well as the changes in the rankings of Latin American countries under different measures.

#### <u>Data</u>

Our analysis is based on household surveys for 16 Latin American countries, circa 2016. Table A.2 (annex) shows the main characteristics of these surveys. Our estimations consider people aged 25-59, a standard practice in the literature, which implies important restrictions to the sample. This restriction is more acute when we calculate poverty for single adults, as shown in Table 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For example, if the household is formed by a child, a male who receives 1000, a female who receives 500 and they get a capital income of 300 (not assignable to any person), the male would have access to 766, the female to 433 and the child to 600.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> An extreme version of this minimal pooling is estimated in Meulders and O'Dorchai (2010), assuming that all people with no personal income, including children, would receive only their share of the non-individualized household income.

	1			
	% of bb with		% of single-	% of people
	neonle aged	% of people	adult (aged	aged 25-59
		aged 25- 59	25-59)	in single-
	25-59		households	adult hh
Argentina	78,5%	43,9%	20,2%	9,2%
Bolivia	80,2%	39,7%	21,7%	10,9%
Brazil	83,1%	47,8%	18,4%	8,8%
Chile	80,4%	45,1%	18,1%	7,9%
Colombia	85,5%	45,0%	22,0%	10,0%
Costa Rica	85,1%	46,7%	18,3%	8,4%
Dominican Rep.	82,9%	41,7%	26,5%	13,0%
Ecuador	83,9%	40,6%	15,8%	7,2%
El Salvador	84,4%	40,1%	16,8%	7,6%
Honduras	87,4%	37,0%	11,8%	5,1%
Mexico	85,3%	43,2%	14,6%	6,5%
Panama	83,5%	41,0%	20,0%	8,9%
Paraguay	83,9%	40,5%	17,3%	7,9%
Peru	82,5%	41,5%	15,1%	6,5%
Uruguay	70,5%	43,7%	25,2%	12,8%
Venezuela	89,0%	43,8%	16,1%	6,5%
Latin America	83,2%	44,4%	19,1%	8,6%

Table 1. Sample restrictions.

#### 3. Household-level poverty measurement

We first present results based on the traditional poverty indicator, using per capita income, assuming then full pooling and sharing of resources. The purple diamonds in Figure 1 represent the proportion of men and women between 25 and 59 years living in poor households using the traditional measure of poverty, for 16 countries in Latin America for the year 2016. Given the fact that there is not an important gender imbalance within households, gender differences on poverty incidence tend to be very small using this methodology, reflecting basically differences in household composition. Thus, all the data are quite aligned along the 45 degrees line, indicating similar incidence of poverty for men and women. In any case, the proportion of woman living in poor households is higher than that of men in all the Latin American countries analyzed (all the diamonds are over the 45 degrees line in Figure 1). The differences are statistically significant for all countries except for Honduras. Average poverty for the region (population-weighted) is 24% for woman and 21.6% for men; the county rankings for men and woman are very similar with Uruguay with the lower rates for both genders and Honduras with the highest.

A second option, also used in traditional poverty analysis, is to consider the incidence of poverty by the sex of the household head (orange squares in Figure 1). Some precautions should be taken when

considering these results. First, not all individuals among the poor in female-headed households are woman: this measure includes males and females living in (fe)male-headed households. Second, almost two thirds (63%) of all households with at least one member between 25 and 59 years-old in the region are male-headed (population-weighted average) and most of the female-headed ones are single-parent or unipersonal.<sup>11</sup> This suggests that the household composition is intimately related with the head of household's sex. Finally, the concept of female or male headship remains contentious, as it comes from the judgment and declaration of family members and may have different implicit meanings in different contexts and countries (see Budlender, 2003; Randall et al, 2011).<sup>12</sup>

Poverty rates by the sex of the head of the household do not show sizeable differences in most of countries of the region. The average rates do not differ greatly from the ones considered previously either: in the region 23.1% and 22.2% of people between 25 and 59 living in male and female-headed households respectively are poor. In almost every country, poverty rates in female-headed households are lower than the proportion of woman living in poor households, and the opposite occurs for men. Even more, in Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and the region average, poverty rates are higher in male-headed households than in female-headed ones. However, the differences are not statistically significant for Ecuador, Honduras, Panamá and Venezuela, and only weakly significant for Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay. The fact that male-headed households may be poorer than femaleheaded ones may be due to the household composition, that is determined jointly with household income and may be related to the head of household's sex. This is an obviously important limitation of this approach (Bennett et al, 2014; Klasen et al, 2015), which refers to the endogeneity of the female headship condition. Some women may be able to form female headed households because they have access to enough economic resources that allow them to live independently. It is particularly interesting to note that in Bolivia and Peru, countries where female-headed households represent a small share of total households compared to the region average<sup>13</sup>, poverty in female-headed households is significantly lower than poverty in male-headed ones. This strengthens the idea thatfemale household headship is mainly possible in the presence of sufficient economic resources, at least in these countries.

Up to our knowledge, there are not studies comparing monetary poverty in male and female-headed households in Latin-American countries. Liu et al (2017) estimate deprivation in living conditions (housing conditions, assets, etc.) and find that there is a statistically significant difference between the living conditions of female and male-headed households in 10 out of 14 countries. In eight countries, female-headed households are in worse conditions, whereas in two countries there are better off, and in the remaining four no statistically significant difference is found. The inclusion of controls in their model is crucial: the relationship between female headship and poor living conditions cannot be generalized, and when it exists it can be attributable to the family circumstances of female or male head of the household. On line with that evidence, our results also suggest that, in general terms, Latin-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Figures go from 74% of male headed households in Ecuador to 54% in Uruguay.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Moreover, both changes in the wording of questions about household headship and, probably more importantly, changes in attitudes towards gender equality, may affect the definition of headship.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Around 27% of total households in these two countries, and 37% for the regional average

American female-headed households are not more vulnerable to monetary poverty than male-headed ones.



Figure 1. Traditional poverty incidence by sex and poverty incidence by sex of the head of household. People aged 25-59. Latin America. 16 countries. Circa 2016

Source: based on household surveys

An alternative approach undertaken in the literature is to consider only those households composed by one adult in our age group. This measure implies a large restriction to the sample. Households with one (and only one) adult aged 25-59 represent 19% of households with adults in this age group for the region, with variations between 12% in Honduras and 27% in Dominican Republic. Also, 60% of the adults considered are female. In this case, for the restricted sample, the household and individual characteristics overlap as there is just one person that generates income. For this reason, we compare the measure of poverty for single adults (based on this restricted sample) with the measure of traditional poverty (based on total adults in our age group). To reflect this, the size of the bubbles of Figure 2 depend on the sample size. The gender-related differences are more evident. In all countries poverty rates for women who are not sharing their household with other adults are higher than for men. Moreover, in most cases single-adult male households are less poor than the male average, whereas poverty for single-adult female households is higher than traditional female poverty. Considering the weighted average for the 16 countries, 11.5% of males and 30.9% of females living with no other adult

are poor. The most important difference with the consideration of the full sample is the reduction of male poverty (10 percentage points).

The kind of households that are being considered in this measure are atypical: those with just one male adult are in general households of single men while the one-adult female households are divided into single-parent and single women. In effect, among households integrated by only one male adult 85% are single-person and 11% are single-parent households. In the case of female headed households with one adult, 35% are formed by only one adult, and 60% are single-parent households. This implies that the average household size is higher for female headed households even when the sample is restricted to households with one adult (2.56 vs. 1.55), and partially explains the higher level of female poverty under this sample restriction. Also, there are important differences in the average income received by these households. For instance, the average personal income (region average in PPP dollars) of men who live with no other adults is 75% higher than that for women in the same condition. Considering per capita household income, this difference reaches 36%. As in the case of the head of household, this indicator shows the problem of considering simultaneously the households by composition and gender. Moreover, this measurement is excluding a mayor percentage of the population, and the differences it reflects may be mainly due to demographic factors.





The figures shown in this section reflect the limitations of the traditional measure, defined at the household-level, to identify individual differences of wellbeing. Gender differences only become visible when specific restrictions on the sample are imposed, and even then, it is impossible to separate the household composition from gender and income generation. This illustrates the need of exploring other poverty measures, defined at the individual-level, to analyse gendered poverty.

# 4. Exploring the individual-level poverty measures

In this section we explore the magnitude of the potential gender differences in wellbeing through the analysis of different pooling and sharing assumptions. The results presented below should be mainly analyzed in terms of gender gaps instead of focusing on the obtained poverty levels, as they are extreme boundaries for these assumptions.

Figure 3 (Earned-income poverty) and Figure 4 (Minimal-pooling poverty) show the results of these measures for men and woman for the 16 analyzed countries, compared to the proportion of men and woman who live in poor households (Traditional measure). They illustrate the dramatic differences in poverty levels that this change in perspective implicates.

In both cases the region-average poverty for men decreases slightly, from 21.6% in the traditional measure to 20 and 17.2% in the earned-income and minimal-pooling respectively. It is noticeable that in the low-poverty countries, poverty increases for men when an individual approach is considered. On the other hand, female figures increase significantly in all the countries. For instance, for the region average the increase is around 25 percentage points, with 50% of woman of the region controlling resources under the poverty line. It is also interesting to note that the dispersion between countries is considerably lower under these alternative measures when compared to the traditional one.





Traditional measure Poverty in earned income





The relevant changes in poverty incidence under these measures are mainly the result of women being over-represented among those without any income. Figure 5 indicates that 25% percent of woman between 25 and 59 years-old of the region have no income of their own at all, whereas the figure is 8% for men. There are significant differences between countries, ranging, in the case of woman, from 12.5% in Uruguay to 37.7% in Bolivia. This lack of economic autonomy is a very important aspect of women's reality in Latin America and is the core of gender inequalities in the region. It is closely tied to the functioning of the labor market and to the weakness of public care systems that may potentially incentive female labor force participation. Consistently, previous evidence underlines a shared fact across many Latin American countries: the correlation between labor market adscription (participation, informality, hours of work) and hours devoted to unpaid work is always statistically significant and sizeable for women, but this does not hold for men (Amarante and Rossel, 2018).



Figure 5. Percentage of people without any personal income. People aged 25-59. Latin America. 16 countries. Circa 2016

This interplay between the female role as family caregiver and their weak labor market adscription, in a context of fragile and incomplete social protection systems, derives in significant lower access to labor market income for women, leaving them with less opportunities than men in the event of couple's separations. The traditional measure of poverty hinders this lack of female autonomy and this crucial shortcoming alerts about the importance of addressing individual constraints through more comprehensive measures that reflect each person's well being.

In sum, for Latin America as a whole (and also for each country), poverty incidence differs depending on the measure we use, but more importantly, gender poverty gaps are also significantly different depending on the methodological approach (see Figure 6). Individual measures, even with the limitations discussed above, tend to make visible gender differences that may be hidden when only considering household measures.



Figure 6. Poverty according to different measures. People aged 25-59. Latin America. 16 countries. Circa 2016

## 5. Robustness in country ranking and identification consistency

To assess the potential importance of the re-ranking of countries due to different poverty measures, we calculated the correlation between country rankings under different poverty measures, computing Kendall and Spearman sex-specific ranking correlations (see for example Santos and Villatoro, 2018).<sup>14</sup> These rankings, for male and female poverty, are presented in in Table 2. When comparing the ranking arising from the traditional measure with that of poverty by headship, the ordering remains almost unchanged for men and women, as reflected by the high correlation coefficients. The major re-rankings in relation to the traditional poverty measure are found under the earned income poverty measure. In this case, not only the incidence of poverty changes for male and females as discussed in the previous section, but also the ordering of countries changes markedly. This may be relevant in the process of targeting financial aid to developing countries.

Table 2. Correlations between country rankings under different poverty measures. Comparison with the traditional measure.

Spearman coe	efficient	Kendall coef	ficient
Women	Men	Women	Men

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This are two traditional measures of non-parametric rank correlations. The Spearman's correlation is based on deviations whereas the Kendall's correlation is based on concordant and discordant pairs and tends to be smaller than the Spearman's correlation and more accurate with small sample sizes.

Poverty by headship	0,98	0,99	0,92	0,97
Poverty for single adults	0,94	0,65	0,82	0,52
Earned income poverty	0,61	0,56	0,48	0,43
Poverty minimal pooling	0,87	0,89	0,75	0,75

Besides the re-ranking of countries, the set of people classified as poor may change significantly under different poverty measures, and this may also have relevant implications, this time in terms of targeting social policies within each country. In the remaining of this section we evaluate the correlation and overlapping of individual and household poverty. First, we calculate the Cramer V correlation between both types of measure (see Santos and Villatoro, 2018) and redundancy coefficients proposed by Alkire and Ballon (2012).

Given two poverty measures, j and j', the Cramer's V coefficient is calculated as:

Cramer's V = 
$$\frac{\left(p_{00}^{jj'} * p_{11}^{jj'}\right) - \left(p_{10}^{jj'} * p_{01}^{jj'}\right)}{\left[p_{+1}^{j'} * p_{1+}^{j} * p_{+0}^{j'} * p_{0+}^{j}\right]^{1/2}}$$

Where  $p_{00}^{jj'}$  is the proportion of people non poor in both j and j',  $p_{11}^{jj'}$  is the proportion of people poor in both j and j',  $p_{10}^{jj'}$  is the proportion of people poor in j but not in j', and  $p_{01}^{jj'}$  is the proportion of people poor in j' but not in j.  $p_{+1}^{j'}$  and  $p_{1+}^{j}$  are the proportion of people poor in j' and j correspondingly, whereas  $p_{+0}^{j'}$  and  $p_{0+}^{j}$  are the proportions of people non poor in j' and j respectively.

The redundancy measure  $R^0$  is a more precise indicator showing the matches between deprivations in both measures, as a proportion of the minimum of the two poverty measures.

$$R^{0} = p_{11}^{jj'} / \min(p_{+1}^{j'}, p_{+1}^{j}), \qquad 0 \le R^{0} \le 1$$

The Cramer V coefficient shows a relatively low correlation between the traditional poverty measure and individual poverty measures (Table 3), with higher correlation of the household poverty with the minimal pooling, compared to earned income. The results are confirmed by the redundancy measure. In both cases, the overlap in the classification is higher for women than for men. There is considerable variation among countries and the overlapping tends to be lower in countries with lower poverty levels (see table A.3). As the redundancy measure shows, 69% of people who are deprived in the traditional poverty measure are also deprived in the minimal pooling measure, and the figure is 64% for earned income poverty. There is considerable variation in the redundancy indicator among countries.

Cramer's V correlation								
	A		Woi	men	Men			
	Earned income poverty	Poverty minimal pooling	Earned income poverty	Poverty minimal pooling	Earned income poverty	Poverty minimal pooling		
Traditional measure	32%	44%	35%	45%	29%	45%		
Earned income poverty		78%		77%		72%		
		Redundancy	measure R <sup>0</sup>					
	A		Woi	men	M	en		
	Earned income poverty	Poverty minimal pooling	Earned income poverty	Poverty minimal pooling	Earned income poverty	Poverty minimal pooling		
Traditional measure	64%	69%	82%	84%	46%	62%		
Earned income poverty		92%		95%		84%		

Table 3. Cramer's V correlation measure and Redundancy measure  $R^0$ . Latin America (weighted average). Circa 2016.

Source: based on household surveys

The overlapping and divergence between the traditional measure based on per capita income and measures based on individual approaches (earned income poverty and minimal pooling) is illustrated for the region in Figure 7. The black dots reflects individuals which are classified as poor or non poor in both measures. Missclassification of men appear in blue dots, whereas misclassification of women appear in red dots. Non consistently poor men tend to be concentrated among those non poor under the individual measure but poor under the household measures. Non consistently poor under the household measures. Non consistently poor under the household measures among those non poor under the individual measure but poor under the household measures. Non consistently poor under the household measures.



Figure 7. Poverty according to different measures. People aged 25-59. Latin America. 16 countries. Circa 2016



Source: based on household surveys

In aggregate terms, while 40% of woman identified as poor under the minimal pooling measure live in poor households according to the traditional criteria, 56% of men are in this situation (Table A.4). The figures are smaller for earned income poor but the gender differences remain. On the other hand, the overlap between the non-poor is clearly higher for women than for men. In general terms, non poor earned income women live in non poor households, while over 10% of men that have personal income over the poverty line live in poor households. This implies that woman with low personal income (or no personal income at all) tend to live with higher income men and take advantage of the pooling and sharing of household income. This does not apply for men: for them the poverty condition tends to overlap more.

Finally, the incidence of poverty estimated using individual measures is clearly differential between men and women along the distribution of income (Figure 8). Both minimal pooling or earned income poverty are decreasing for men and women by per capita income percentile, but the slope of the lines are clearly differential. Men's poverty decreases much more steadily, whereas female poverty incidence is above 50% almost for half of the distribution of income.

Figure 8. Male and female poverty rate under minimal pooling (MP) and earned income (EI), by veintiles of per capita income. People aged 25-59. Latin America. 16 countries. Circa 2016



Source: based on household surveys

These missclassifications are rooted in the diffent labor profiles of personal and household poverty of men and woman. In every case, most poor men are employed, while most poor woman are inactive. These patterns are more acute in the case of personal measures. Also, age differentials in poverty are much larger using individual based measures instead of household based ones (see figure A.1), a fact already noticed by World Bank (2018).

#### 6. Final comments

This paper presents a detailed analysis of gendered monetary poverty, arguing that the genderblindness of the traditional poverty measure undermines its utility and value to analyze female poverty. In order to advance in our knowledge of wellbeing and gender, research should be based on individuals as the unit of analysis, rather than households.

The choice between household or individual based measures implies significant differences in terms of the size of poverty, the gender gap in poverty incidence, and even in the ranking of Latin American countries. While in Latin America no significant differences between men and women are found under the traditional poverty measure or the female headed measure, the restriction of the sample to one adult household results in higher female poverty rates, bringing to the surface the importance of household composition. Under individual poverty measures, female poverty multiplies by two or more in all countries, whereas male poverty is, in most countries, reduced. The overlapping between different poverty measures is quite reduced, and this implies important differences in poverty profiles depending on the methodological approach chosen.

Although better information is required to understand pooling and sharing strategies within households in Latin America, this exercise illustrate about the significant differences in resource controlling between

male and female adults. Our results suggest that households are crucial venues for income support for low income partnered women and for women with no access to any income. This last group still represents around a quarter of Latin American women, whose autonomy is seriously. Access to adequalte levels of personal income is a crucial step for female wellbeing, and this opens a wide scope of policy intervention. Labor market policies that support equal employment opportunities and access to adequate income are crucial to progress in terms of female empowerment. For women to be able to take these labor market opportunities, they must be combined with strengthened public care systems, a policy that the region is still far from implementing. Social and gender norms are relevant for the shape and organization of care systems in the region, and care regimes in Latin America remain based on market and family strategies. These strategies should be replaced by state led mechanisms in order to foster female economic autonomy and well being.

The construction of better individualized data is a necessary condition to make an accurate analysis of gendered poverty and construct robust and comparable poverty profiles. This data should reflect women's control over household resources, which implies important investments in survey data collection and previous analysis about the appropriate methodological tools. Such a strategy probably implies interviewing all adult household members. Ideally, this data should measure time, asset, power and income poverty of adult women and men within households. Undoubtedly, it will better inform policies to reach potentially poor individuals, but also to understand the complexities behind the poverty condition.

Taking the individual as the unit of analysis seems a reasonable step to advance in our knowledge of wellbeing and gender. If we want to stay within the boundaries of income, we need to develop better tools to understand the mechanisms of decision making at the household level and to generate new empirical evidence to allow us to monitor the situation of women in different places and across time. Collective decision-making models may contribute to make assumptions about the sharing rules within households in the region, but there is a lot of room for theoretical and empirical developments in this area in Latin America.

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#### Annex

	CEPAL	National	BM
	threshold	threshold	threshold
Argentina	532	476	165
Bolivia	202	192	165
Brazil	184	0	165
Chile	269	203	165
Colombia	183	170	165
Costa Rica	193	247	165
Dom. Republic	208	208	165
Ecuador	161	136	165
El Salvador	198	-	165
Honduras	179	207	165
Mexico	241	272	165
Panama	182	-	165
Paraguay	170	209	165
Peru	158	183	165
Uruguay	206	335	165
Venezuela	271	-	165

# Table A.1. Poverty thresholds

Source: household surveys, official national statistics & World Bank

					Observa	itions			Population	represented
Country	Year	Coverage	Total household	Total observations	Households with people between 25 and 59	People between 25 and 59	Male	Female	Households with people between 25 and 59	People between 25 and 59
Argentina	2016	Urban	18.372	58.154	14.419	25.506	47%	53%	6.773.368	11.946.102
Bolivia	2016	National	11.062	38.549	8.874	15.289	48%	52%	2.550.906	4.369.043
Brazil	2016	National	151.284	459.718	125.701	219.623	48%	52%	57.664.691	100.788.309
Chile	2015	National	83.887	266.968	67.448	120.281	47%	53%	4.452.014	8.002.312
Colombia	2016	National	231.178	778.238	197.546	350.395	46%	54%	11.993.809	21.037.870
Costa Rica	2016	National	11.335	37.006	9.642	17.284	48%	52%	1.274.772	2.295.796
Dominican Republic	2016	National	8.007	26.326	6.640	10.974	50%	50%	2.603.360	4.377.543
Ecuador	2016	National	30.338	114.086	25.458	46.277	48%	52%	3.810.555	7.005.764
El Salvador	2016	National	20.609	76.264	17.384	30.595	45%	55%	1.518.196	2.685.778
Honduras	2016	National	6.211	27.297	5.428	10.106	45%	55%	1.734.950	3.221.660
Mexico	2016	National	70.311	257.805	60.008	111.471	47%	53%	28.846.288	53.991.921
Panama	2016	National	11.610	42.233	9.700	17.306	48%	52%	933.933	1.692.264
Paraguay	2016	National	10.219	37.814	8.574	15.317	50%	50%	1.516.642	2.770.078
Peru	2016	National	35.785	131.280	29.511	54.542	48%	52%	7.216.852	13.719.426
Uruguay	2016	National	45.158	118.591	31.814	51.786	47%	53%	933.676	1.557.115
Venezuela	2014	National	33.675	133.097	29.964	58.277	48%	52%	6.708.029	13.698.890

Table A.2. Houeshold surveys

	Total population							
		Cramer's V		R	edundancy R	0		
	Traditional - Earned income	Traditional -Minimal sharing	Earned income - Minimal sharing	Traditional - Earned income	Traditional -Minimal sharing	Earned income - Minimal sharing		
Argentina	32,9%	41,6%	79,1%	67,6%	69,4%	92,8%		
Bolivia	34,1%	39,7%	88,6%	62,5%	64,0%	95,6%		
Brasil	33,0%	45,5%	76,9%	70,0%	73,9%	93,5%		
Chile	25,4%	29,6%	78,2%	65,3%	59,1%	97,3%		
Colombia	30,0%	46,1%	76,7%	59,5%	71,2%	86,3%		
Costa Rica	29,7%	36,7%	77,6%	73,0%	69,7%	96,8%		
Dominican Rep.	26,9%	44,1%	75,1%	56,0%	69,0%	85,1%		
Ecuador	24,1%	31,1%	83,9%	58,2%	61,9%	92,7%		
El Salvador	30,9%	44,6%	74,9%	61,3%	69,2%	86,1%		
Honduras	34,4%	43,1%	82,1%	67,6%	70,9%	92,1%		
Mexico	29,5%	41,8%	75,9%	62,9%	65,3%	91,1%		
Panama	34,5%	38,8%	83,7%	74,5%	70,3%	98,5%		
Paraguay	31,8%	34,2%	85,2%	63,6%	60,4%	96,1%		
Peru	26,4%	37,9%	80,1%	61,7%	70,3%	90,4%		
Uruguay	16,2%	18,0%	65,3%	65,7%	49,3%	96,6%		
Venezuela	29,2%	41,7%	82,1%	54,2%	64,0%	88,2%		
Latin America	31,6%	43,6%	77,9%	64,3%	68,6%	91,7%		

Table A.3. Cramer's V correlations and redundancy by country

	Minimal nealing								
	Con	sistently poc	or (1)	Consistently non-poor (2)					
	Total	Men	Woman	Total	Men	Woman			
Argentina	40,4%	49,4%	36,8%	94,2%	92,8%	96,2%			
Bolivia	50,1%	62,9%	46,1%	83,7%	80,5%	88,7%			
Brazil	45,9%	58,4%	40,2%	93,7%	92,3%	95,4%			
Chile	26,3%	33,5%	24,2%	93,6%	93,2%	94,2%			
Colombia	47,9%	57,4%	44,8%	89,7%	86,7%	93,6%			
Costa Rica	31,4%	47,5%	26,7%	94,3%	93,6%	95,3%			
Dominican Rep.	53,0%	64,8%	48,7%	87,9%	85,9%	91,6%			
Ecuador	41,2%	57,2%	36,6%	88,5%	85,8%	92,9%			
El Salvador	60,5%	70,9%	56,1%	79,7%	76,0%	85,1%			
Honduras	68,9%	78,2%	64,8%	74,3%	69,7%	81,2%			
Mexico	58,1%	71,8%	53,3%	79,3%	75,5%	86,3%			
Panama	34,1%	53,8%	29,2%	93,9%	92,6%	95,8%			
Paraguay	44,3%	60,6%	38,4%	88,4%	87,0%	90,7%			
Peru	37,5%	53,0%	32,3%	93,1%	90,8%	96,8%			
Uruguay	8,4%	15,7%	6,7%	98,8%	98,9%	98,7%			
Venezuela	49,5%	58,1%	46,4%	89,3%	86,8%	92,9%			
Latin America	43,6%	55,8%	39,5%	88,9%	86,8%	92,2%			

Table A.4. Poverty consistency between measures. Comparisons with traditional poverty.	People aged
25-59. Latin America. 16 countries. Circa 2016	

	Earned income							
	Con	sistently poo	or (1)	Consis	stently non-p	oor (2)		
	Total	Men	Woman	Total	Men	Woman		
Argentina	35,0%	37,3%	34,3%	90,3%	88,1%	93,4%		
Bolivia	47,5%	57,8%	44,4%	82,2%	79,2%	87,1%		
Brazil	36,6%	42,8%	33,9%	90,9%	88,8%	93,9%		
Chile	24,1%	27,3%	23,1%	93,7%	92,9%	94,8%		
Colombia	40,0%	41,8%	39,5%	85,1%	82,4%	88,7%		
Costa Rica	28,0%	39,1%	24,8%	94,0%	92,8%	96,0%		
Dominican Rep.	44,4%	47,8%	43,4%	81,4%	79,9%	84,1%		
Ecuador	37,1%	46,9%	34,7%	86,1%	83,1%	91,2%		
El Salvador	57,2%	63,1%	54,8%	73,9%	70,8%	78,1%		
Honduras	65,1%	72,5%	62,4%	68,8%	63,5%	77,9%		
Mexico	52,5%	59,0%	50,3%	75,3%	71,4%	82,6%		
Panama	31,0%	42,9%	27,9%	93,9%	91,8%	97,3%		
Paraguay	41,2%	54,0%	36,9%	88,0%	85,9%	91,6%		
Peru	32,7%	39,1%	31,0%	89,3%	86,0%	94,6%		
Uruguay	6,8%	7,2%	6,7%	99,0%	98,7%	99,3%		
Venezuela	42,2%	44,0%	41,6%	84,6%	82,3%	88,1%		
Latin America	38.8%	45.2%	36.9%	86.0%	83.6%	89.9%		

- (1) The proportion of people identified as poor by the individual indicator (earned-income poverty or minimal-pooling poverty) that also live in poor households (traditional measure).
- (2) The proportion of people identified as not poor by the individual indicator (earned-income poverty or minimal-pooling poverty) that also live in not poor households (traditional measure).





