Equalization of Opportunity: Definitions, Implementable Conditions, and Application to Early-childhood Policy Evaluation

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Equalization of opportunity:
Definitions, implementable conditions and application to early-childhood policy evaluation *

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Abstract

This paper develops a criterion to assess equalization of opportunity, that is consistent with theoretical views of equality of opportunity. We characterize inequality of opportunity as a situation where some groups in society enjoy an illegitimate advantage. In this context, equalization of opportunity requires that the extent of the illegitimate advantage enjoyed by the privileged groups falls. Robustness requires that this judgement be supported by the broadest class of individual preferences. We formalize this criterion in a decision theoretic framework and derive an empirical condition for equalization of opportunity based on observed opportunity distributions. This criterion is used to assess the effectiveness of early child care at equalizing opportunity, using quantile treatment effects estimates of policy intervention in Norway.

Keywords: Equality of opportunity, public policy, inverse stochastic dominance, economic distance, income distribution.

JEL Codes: D63, J62, C14.

1 Introduction

An important goal for public policy is to promote equality of opportunity and let individual success be determined by merit rather than by social background. For instance, US President Barack Obama emphasized in his 2013 State of the Union-address the need to "make sure none of our children start the race of life already behind", in the context of policies to promote early childhood education.[1] Assessing whether public intervention succeeds at levelling the playing field among citizens thus represents a key issue for policy evaluation. But what criterion should be used to conduct such an evaluation? Unfortunately, while an abundant literature has been devoted to define *equality* of opportunity, it offers little guidance for assessing how far a given distribution is from the equality of opportunity goal. The contribution of this paper is to define a theoretical criterion of *equalization* of opportunity, understood as a reduction in the extent of inequality of opportunity. This criterion is both consistent with equality of opportunity theories and empirically implementable. We apply this criterion to the evaluation of early-childhood policy in Norway.

Theories of equality of opportunity (EOP) draw a distinction between fair inequality, arising from differences in individual *effort*, and unfair inequality originating in *circumstances*, i.e. the determinants of success for which society deems the individual not to be responsible.[2] Define a *type* as a given set of circumstances, and an *opportunity set* as the set of feasible outcomes for each type. The EOP-principle requires that no type is advantaged compared to other types in the sense of having access to a more favorable opportunity set. This principle allows to assess whether a given distribution satisfies equality of opportunity. However, it does not allow to compare two societies where equality of opportunity is not satisfied. This is obviously an important limitation in various context such as policy evaluation, or inequality comparisons over time and space.

To alleviate this shortcoming, some authors have relied on indices of inequality of opportunity.[3] This approach typically seeks to produce a scalar measure of inequality between types.[4] While consistent with the EOP principles, this approach raises concerns

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[1] State of the Union Address, February 12, 2013.

[2] For a comprehensive discussion, see Dworkin (1981), Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey (2008).

[3] See the discussion in Ramos and Van de gaer (2012), and examples in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), Checchi and Peragine (2010), Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menendez (2007), Almås, Cappelen, Lind, Sørensen and Tungodden (2011), and Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008).

[4] Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ramos and Van de gaer (2012) discuss a dual approach where inequality of opportunity is measured by the difference between total inequality and fair inequality. The two limitations discussed here also apply to the dual approach.

of robustness as it relies on two restrictive assumptions. First, it requires summarizing the advantage enjoyed by a type in a scalar measure. Usually the mean income conditional on circumstances is used to summarize the opportunity sets faced by each type, which may mask important features of the distribution of opportunity.[5] Second, as with all inequality indices, it relies on a specific welfare function used to aggregate differences in advantage between types. Such index representations are, thus, fragile to the precise specification of the welfare function.

In this paper, we develop a robust criterion for *equalization of opportunity* (EZOP) that allows to make statements such as: "Inequality of opportunity is higher in social state 0 than in social state 1", where different states might correspond to different countries, time periods or policy regimes. Our criterion has an appealing interpretation, and is readily implementable in policy evaluation. This criterion requires that individuals, regardless of their preferences, agree that the advantage enjoyed by the "privileged" types is lower in policy state 0 than in policy state 1.

Contrary to the index approach, our criterion does not rely on a priori value functions to assess the advantage enjoyed by each type. Instead, we use the preferences over opportunity sets of individuals in society and allow for heterogeneity in these preferences. Robustness requires a consensus across individuals in their comparison of social states. A key question in this respect is whether such a a consensus can be reached. When consensus cannot be reached, an important issue is to characterize the subset of preferences over which individuals unanimously agree that equalization of opportunity is achieved.[6] The equalization of opportunity criterion is also demanding in the sense that it requires that the unfair advantage of "privileged" types falls for any pairwise comparison of types. We discuss how this criterion can be relaxed by allowing the advantage of each type to be aggregated within society, for given individual preferences.

Our criterion also raises an important issue of identification. In practice, we only observe (at best) the opportunity sets of each type but we do not observe individual preferences. Hence it is not possible, for each particular preference, to verify whether the adavantage of privileged types is lower in one particular state. Instead, we would like to define a tractable condition, involving only the distribution of opportunity sets, that

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[5]This amounts to assume that individuals are risk neutral, with respect to within type uncertainty. Lefranc et al. (2008) assume risk aversion but rely on specific preferences.

[6]This issue is also examined in Aaberge (2009) and Aaberge and Mogstad (2011).

would imply that our equalization criterion is satisfied. We show that such a condition can be formulated provided that individuals agree in the ranking of types in each social state. On the contrary, when individuals disagree on the ranking of types, they cannot unanimously agree on equalization of opportunity. However, in this case, it is possible to identify subclasses of preferences within which individuals agree on the ranking of types in each state and to single out a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization within this subclass of preferences. This can only be performed within a restricted class of preferences. In this paper, we mainly focus on the class of rank-dependent preferences (Yaari 1987), although the analysis can be adapted to other classes. Another important issue, in empirical applications, is that some relevant determinants of individual outcomes might not be fully observed. For instance, circumstances or effort might only be partially observed. We discuss the consequences of imperfectly observing the relevant determinants of outcome for the implementation of our equalization criterion.

Last, we provide an application of our equalization criterion to the evaluation of child care expansion in Norway. Using quantile treatment effects estimates based on a difference-in-difference identification strategy, we recover the impact of kindergarten expansion on the distribution of earnings of children, conditional on the family background. Implementing our criterion, we show that the child care expansion in Norway significantly equalized opportunities across children with different family backgrounds. This arises from heterogeneity in the effect of the child care expansion in Norway across family background, with greater benefits to children from disadvantaged families. Our results emphasize that early intervention may be an important tool for promote equal life chances.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the principle of equalization of opportunity, and provides a tractable condition in simplified setting with two types. In section 3, we next consider the general case with multiple types, effort and circumstances. Finally, section 4 applies our framework in the context of a major expansion in child care in Norway. As an addendum, we also develop a statistical framework for testing our equalization condition, which is included in appendix B.

2 Equalization of opportunity: a simplified setting

In this section, we define equality of opportunity and provide a formal statement of our equalization criterion, in a simplified setting. Next, we discuss identification conditions that guarantee that this criterion is satisfied.

2.1 Definition of equality of opportunity

Our analysis builds upon the framework of Roemer (1998) and Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009). Let y denote an individual outcome, and let the determinants of the outcome be partitioned into four groups: *Circumstances* capture determinants that are not considered legitimate sources of inequality, and are denoted by c. *Effort* captures determinants that are considered legitimate sources of inequality, and is denoted by e. *Luck* captures factors that are considered legitimate sources of inequality as long as they affect individual outcomes in a neutral way given circumstances and effort, and is denoted by l. Finally, outcomes are contingent on a binary social state, denoted π. All individuals in a society share the social state, but may be affected differently. For instance, $\pi = 0$ may denote society without a specific policy intervention, while $\pi = 1$ denotes society with the policy, or π may indicate different periods or countries that one would like to compare.

Let a *type* define a given set of circumstances. Given their type, level of effort and the social state, the outcome prospects offered to individuals can be summarized by the cumulative distribution function $F_\pi(y|c,e)$. We define $F_\pi^{-1}(p|c,e)$ as the conditional quantile function associated with $F_\pi(\cdot|c,e)$, for all population shares p in [0,1].[7]

EOP theories emphasize that inequality due to differences in circumstances are morally or politically objectionable, while inequality originating from differences in effort are legitimate. Based on these two principles, *equality of opportunity* requires that the opportunity sets of individuals with similar effort be *identical* regardless of circumstances. Hence, for a given social state π, EOP requires that, for any effort e, and for any pair of circumstances (c, c'), we have:

$$F_\pi(.|c,e) \;=\; F_\pi(.|c',e) \tag{1}$$

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[7]If the cumulative distribution function is only left continuous, we define F_π^{-1} by the left continuous inverse distribution of F_π: $F_\pi^{-1}(p|c,e) = \inf\{y \in \mathbb{R}_+ : \; F_\pi(y|c,e) \geq p\}$, with $p \in [0,1]$.

2.2 A criterion for equalization of opportunity

Ranking social states   The previous definition can be used to rank social states. However, it only distinguishes states where EOP is satisfied and states where EOP is not satisfied. Since the strict equality of condition in equation (1) is rarely satisfied in empirical applications[8] this leads to a very partial ranking.

Our objective is to provide a criterion that allows to compare and rank social states in situations where EOP is not satisfied. If EOP is not satisfied, then individuals are not indifferent between the opportunity sets offered to different types. Behind a thin veil of ignorance, where individuals know their effort and have preferences over opportunity sets, everyone should indeed be able to rank circumstances according to the economic advantage or disadvantage they confer. Our criterion for ranking social states is based on the evaluation of the extent of the economic advantage enjoyed by the advantaged types in society. It posits that social state 1 is better than social state 0, from the point of equality of opportunity, if the unfair advantage attached to favorable circumstances is lower in state 1 than in state 0. When preferences are heterogenous, individuals might not agree on the ranking of social states. To ensure robustness, our equalization of opportunity criterion (EZOP) requires unanimity *for all possible preferences in society*, in assessing that the unfair advantage attached to more favorable circumstances decreases.

For expositional purposes, we start by formalizing the equalization criterion in a simplified setting with only two types, c and c', who exert a common effort level e. To simplify notations, we let $F_\pi(.)$ (resp. $F'_\pi(.)$) denote the c.d.f. of y for type c (resp. c') at effort e in policy state π, *i.e.* $F_\pi(.|c,e)$ (resp. $F_\pi(.|c',e)$). Section 3 provides a generalization with many types and effort levels.

Our criterion   We assume that each individual is endowed with cardinal preferences over risky outcomes and we let $W(F)$ denote the utility of a lottery with cumulative distribution F. For an individual with preferences W, the economic advantage or disadvantage of type c relative to type c', in social state π is denoted $\Delta_W(F_\pi, F'_\pi)$ and is given by $\Delta_W(F_\pi, F'_\pi) = W(F_\pi) - W(F'_\pi)$. This quantity is positive if the individual with preferences W prefers F_π to F'_π, while it is equal to zero if EOP holds between types c and c'. We refer to the absolute value of the welfare gap as the *economic distance between types* according to

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[8]For a survey of the empirical evidence, see Roemer and Trannoy (2014).

preferences W.[9]

The equalization of opportunity criterion rests on the difference in economic advantage across social states. Let $\mathcal{P}$ denote the class of individual preferences. The following definition summarizes our notion of equalization of opportunity:

Definition 1 (EZOP: equalization of opportunity between two types) *Moving from policy state $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$ equalizes opportunity between circumstances c and c' at effort e on the set of preferences $\mathcal{P}$ if and only if for all preferences $W \in \mathcal{P}$, we have:*
$$|\Delta_W(F_0, F_0')| \geq |\Delta_W(F_1, F_1')|.$$

This notion has three key properties. First, in line with the theory of EOP, to rank state 1 above state 0, we require that the unfair economic advantage enjoyed by the privileged type be smaller in state 1 than in state 0. Second, our criterion satisfies an anonymity condition with respect of the identity of the advantaged type: Only the absolute value of the economic advantage, but not its sign should matter for assessing equalization of opportunity. Third, we require that the ranking is robust to a broad class of individual preferences.

2.3 Identification under the rank-dependent utility model

The identification problem The EZOP criterion is contingent on the choice of the class of preferences $\mathcal{P}$. If the set of individual preferences W in society were known, the economic distance between types, Δ_W, could be directly computed for both social states and it would be easy to check whether the equalization condition holds. In practice, it will not be the case and the condition in definition 1 cannot be directly assessed for all relevant preferences.

Hence, the equalization condition previously defined will only be relevant if it can be reformulated in terms of a restriction that only involves the outcome distributions of the different types under the different policy states.

This cannot be achieved in the most general case where no restriction is imposed on the class $\mathcal{P}$ of individual preferences. Two possible alternative representations of preferences under risk have been widely studied and adopted in decision theory: the *expected utility* model and the Yaari's (1987) *rank-dependent* model. In the rest of the paper, we focus

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[9]For a discussion of the welfare gap and related measures of economic distance between distributions, see in particular Shorrocks (1982), Ebert (1984) and Chakravarty and Dutta (1987).

on the rank-dependent expected utility class, which we denote by $\mathcal{R}$. In the rest of this section we concentrate on the following question: What minimal conditions need to be imposed on the set of distributions F_0, F'_0, F_1, F'_1 to ensure that equalization is satisfied for all preferences in $\mathcal{R}$?

The rank-dependent expected utility model assumes that the welfare derived from a risky distribution F can be written as a weighted average of all possible realizations where the weights are a function of the rank of the realization in the distribution of outcome. Formally, let $w(p) \geq 0$ denote the weight assigned to the outcome at percentile p, the welfare derived from F can be written as[10]:

$$W(F) = \int_0^1 w(p) F^{-1}(p) dp,$$

Under the rank-dependent expected utility representation, the economic distance between types is given by:

$$|\Delta_W(F, F')| = |\int_0^1 w(p)\Gamma(F, F', p)dp|. \tag{2}$$

where $\Gamma(F, F', p) = F^{-1}(p) - F'^{-1}(p)$ is the *cumulative distribution gap* between F and F'. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the graph of $\Gamma(F, F', p)$ as the *gap curve* and to the graph of $|\Gamma(F, F', p)|$ as the *absolute gap curve.*

Necessary condition for EZOP When assessing EZOP, only the distribution curves under the two policy states are observed, but not individual preferences. Our objective is to provide a condition on these observables warranting that EZOP holds for all preferences in the class of rank-dependent utility functions. From equation (2), a necessary condition for EZOP is that the cumulative distribution gap should be smaller, in absolute value, at any percentile, under $\pi = 1$ than under $\pi = 0$.

Proposition 1 *EZOP is satisfied on the set of preferences $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \forall p \in [0, 1], |\Gamma(F_1, F'_1, p)| \leq |\Gamma(F_0, F'_0, p)|$.*

Proof. See appendix A.2. ∎

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[10]Formally, one requires that $w(p) \geq 0$ $\forall p \in [0, 1]$ and $\widetilde{w}(p) = \int_0^p w(t)dt \in [0, 1]$ is such that $\widetilde{w}(1) = 1$. For a discussion, see Zoli (2002).

This proposition shows that a necessary condition for EZOP is that the absolute gap curve under $\pi = 0$ is always above the absolute gap curve under $\pi = 1$. We will refer to this as absolute gap curve dominance of $\pi = 0$ over $\pi = 1$.

Note that absolute gap curve dominance is *not* a *sufficient* condition for EZOP.[11] Whether a reduction in the gap between type c and c' amounts to a reduction in advantage, will depend on which of the two groups is considered to be advantaged. Because the assessment of which type is advantaged may differ over the set of possible preferences, the requirement for EZOP over all possible preferences must be stronger than what is imposed by absolute gap curve dominance. For instance, assume that the distribution of type c dominates the distribution of type c' over some interval. It does not imply, in the general case, that type c dominates c' over the entire support of the distribution. Henceforth, some preferences might rank c' better than c. Now assume that gap curve dominance is satisfied over this interval and that gap curves are similar in both social states otherwise. In this case, preferences that ranked c' better than c will conclude that the cardinal advantage of c' has increased. This contradicts EZOP.

Necessary and sufficient condition under stochastic dominance A corollary of the previous discussion is that if individuals agree on the ranking of types, then they should also agree in their assessment of gap curve dominance. We now examine this specific case.

As discussed in Muliere and Scarsini (1989), among others, unanimity in ranking distributions F_π better than F'_π will be achieved for all preferences in $\mathcal{R}$ if and only if distribution F_π dominates distribution F'_π for order-one inverse stochastic dominance (which we denote $F_\pi \succ_{ISD1} F'_\pi$), *i.e.* whenever the graph of F_π^{-1} lies above the graph of F'^{-1}_π.[12]

Within this section, we shall assume that this condition is satisfied.[13] If so, all preferences unanimously rank type c better than type c'. In this contect, a fall in the cumulative distribution gap has unambiguous consequences for the change in the economic distance between types. In fact, since the sign of the cumulative distribution gap is constant over all percentiles, the economic distance can be expressed as an increasing function of the

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[11] Appendix A.2 provides a detailed counter-example.

[12] The ISD1 is equivalent to stochastic dominance. The major difference is that the dominance condition is expressed in the space of realizations (through the quantile function) rather than on the space of probabilities (through the cdf).

[13] Since c and c' play a symmetric role in the definition of EZOP, which type dominates the other is irrelevant. Hence we make the neutral assumption that the distribution of type c dominates the distribution of type c', under both policy regimes.

absolute income gap: $|\Delta_W(F, F')| = \int_0^1 w(p)|\Gamma(F, F', p)|dp$. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 2 *If $\forall \pi \ F_\pi \succ_{ISD1} F'_\pi$ then: EZOP over the set of preferences $\mathcal{R} \ \Leftrightarrow \ \forall p \in [0, 1], \ \Gamma(F_0, F'_0, p) \geq \Gamma(F_1, F'_1, p)$.*

Proof. See appendix A.3. ■

This proposition establishes that when agents agree on the ranking of types, gap curve dominance provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity. This contrasts with the situation where agents do not agree on the ranking of types, in which case gap curve dominance provides only a necessary condition for EZOP. In order to evaluate EZOP in such situations, we next consider refinements on the admissible set of preferences.

Restricted consensus on EZOP We now focus on cases where types cannot be ranked unambiguously, i.e. according to first-order stochastic dominance. As we have seen, the cumulative distribution gap is then no longer sufficient to infer EZOP. Our objective is to identify the minimal refinement on the set of admissible preferences that allow unambiguous assessments of equalization of opportunity. We show that it is always possible to find a subset of $\mathcal{R}$ over which individuals agree on the ranking of types. Furthermore, on this subset, one can establish a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity.

Let us first consider the special case where F_π *second-order* inverse stochastic dominates F'_π for all $\pi \in \{0, 1\}$ (which we denote $F_\pi \succ_{ISD2} F'_\pi$), *i.e.* whenever the graph of the integral of F_π^{-1} with respect to p (the Generalized Lorenz curve) lies above the graph of the corresponding integral of F'^{-1}_π.[14] Define $\mathcal{R}^2 \subset \mathcal{R}$ as the set of risk-averse rank-dependent preferences.[15] As is well known, all risk averse preferences rank distribution functions consistently with second-order dominance. It follows that all preferences in $\mathcal{R}^2$ will rank type c as better than c' in both states. Furthermore, the advantage of c over c' can be expressed as an increasing function of *the integral* of the cumulative distribution gap. Analogous

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[14]The ISD2 criterion is equivalent to second-order stochastic dominance, and both to generalized Lorenz dominance. If two distributions with equal means are ordered by one of these three criteria, then the two distributions must be ordered according to the remaining two, since the dominant distribution can be obtained from the dominated one by a sequence of progressive transfers. Again, the fundamental difference between the three criteria is in the space where these dominance conditions are expressed.

[15]This set contains all evaluation functions with decreasing weights as outcomes increase.

to the above, a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP over the set of preferences $\mathcal{R}^2$ is then that the integrated cumulative distribution gap falls at all percentiles. This is established in the following proposition:

Proposition 3 *If $\forall \pi \ F_\pi \succ_{ISD2} F'_\pi$ then: EZOP over the set of preferences $\mathcal{R}^2 \ \Leftrightarrow \ \forall p \in [0,1], \int_0^p \Gamma(F_0, F'_0, t)dt \ \geq \int_0^p \Gamma(F_1, F'_1, t)dt$*

Proof. See appendix A.4. ∎

Finally, consider the general case where distributions cannot be ranked by second-order stochastic dominance. In this case, consensus over the ranking of types cannot be reached in the class $\mathcal{R}^2$. However, it is possible to refine the set of preferences to where they agree on the ranking of types. Following Aaberge (2009), consider the subset of preferences $\mathcal{R}^k$ defined by:

$$\mathcal{R}^k \ = \ \left\{ W \in \mathcal{R} \mid (-1)^{i-1} \cdot \frac{d^i \widetilde{w}(p)}{dp^i} \geq 0, \ \ \frac{d^i \widetilde{w}(1)}{dp^i} = 0 \ \forall p \in [0,1] \text{ and } i = 1, \ldots, k \right\},$$

where $\widetilde{w}(p) = \int_0^p w(t)dt$ is the cumulative weighting scheme. The sequence of subsets of the type $\mathcal{R}^k$ defines a nested partition of $\mathcal{R}$ where $\mathcal{R}^k \subset \mathcal{R}^{k-1} \subset ... \subset \mathcal{R}$.[16]

As discussed in appendix A.1, when F_π inverse stochastic dominates F'_π of order k, all preferences in $\mathcal{R}^k$ will prefer F_π over F'_π. Furthermore, any pair of distribution can always be ranked by inverse stochastic dominance, for a sufficiently high order. Define κ as the *minimal order* at which F_π and F'_π can be ranked using inverse stochastic dominance, and denote kth order inverse stochastic dominance by $\succ_{ISDk}$. Without loss of generality, assume that $F_\pi \succ_{ISD\kappa} F'_\pi$ for all $\pi \in \{0,1\}$, such that preferences in $\mathcal{R}^\kappa$ agree on the ranking of types in both states.

To proceed, it is helpful to introduce the following notation:

$$\Lambda_\pi^2(p) = \int_0^p F_\pi^{-1}(u)du \quad \text{and} \quad \Lambda_\pi^k(p) = \int_0^p \Lambda_\pi^{k-1}(u)du, \text{ for } k = 3, 4, \ldots$$

For notational simplicity, we let $\Lambda_\pi'^k$ denote Λ_π^k evaluated over the distribution F'_π rather than F_π. In line with the notation above, also define $\Gamma^k(F_\pi, F'^k_\pi, p) = \Lambda_\pi^k(p) - \Lambda_\pi'^k(p)$ as the cumulative distribution gap integrated at order $k - 1$.

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[16]Note that k is a measure of the effect of a precise sequence of restrictions on all possible cumulative weighting schemes $\widetilde{w}(p)$ defined on $\mathcal{R}$. Hence, k indicates the risk attitude of preferences contained in the class $\mathcal{R}^k$.

If for all $\pi \in \{0, 1\}$, $F_\pi \succ_{ISD\kappa} F'_\pi$, then for all preferences $W \in \mathcal{R}^\kappa$, the advantage of type c over type c' under policy π is an increasing function of $\Gamma^\kappa(F_\pi, F'_\pi, p)$. As a consequence, EZOP will be satisfied in the set $\mathcal{R}^\kappa$ if and only if $\Gamma^\kappa(F_\pi, F'_\pi, p)$ is smaller under $\pi = 1$ than under $\pi = 0$. This is established in the following proposition:

Proposition 4 *If $\forall \pi \ F_\pi \succ_{ISD\kappa} F'_\pi$ then: EZOP over the set of preferences $\mathcal{R}^\kappa \ \Leftrightarrow \ \forall p \in [0, 1], \ \left| \Gamma^\kappa(F_0, F'_0, p) \right| \geq \left| \Gamma^\kappa(F_1, F'_1, p) \right|$.*

Proof. See appendix A.5. ∎

Proposition 4 establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP under a less stringent dominance condition than in propositions 2 and 3. At the same time, the set of preferences over which it allows to identify EZOP is more restrictive. Finally, since there always exists an integer κ that allows ranking of types, proposition 4 establishes a necessary condition for EZOP over the entire class $\mathcal{R}$.

2.4   Discussion

Several features of our equalization criterion are worth discussing further. First, the criterion presented in definition 1 does not resort to an external social welfare function in order to evaluate the opportunity sets offered to the different types in society. On the contrary, the criterion relies on the individuals' *own* preferences in order to assess whether equalization of opportunity is achieved. The degree of heterogeneity of preferences distributions across the population is clearly unobservable, so that here the focus is on the class of potential preferences these individuals can take. Second, the criterion itself is general, in the sense that it does not place any restriction on the preferences of individuals. Third, the criterion does not in itself require that individuals agree in the ranking of types, only that they agree on the reduction in the absolute gap between the different types. In other words, our criterion requires a consensus on the reduction of the advantage but not on the identity of the advantaged type. Finally, the criterion does not require one to summarize the opportunity sets of the different types by a scalar measure, such as the mean income, as is often done in the literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity.

Of course, while the generality of the criterion leads to a robust assessment of equalization of opportunity, this robustness comes at the cost of tractability. As we noted, it is not possible, in practice, to verify whether the condition of equalization is satisfied without

considering a restricted set of preferences. In the rest of our analysis, we considered the family of rank-dependent expected utility functions and showed that it is possible to derive equalization conditions that only depend on the distribution functions of the lotteries offered to the various types in society. However, our framework is not confined to the rank-dependent family and could be extended to other families of preferences. For instance, in the same spirit, equalization conditions could be derived for preferences within the Von Neumann expected utility framework.

The results obtained under the rank-dependent assumption also call for further comments. They lead to distinguish between two cases: the case where individuals agree in the ranking of types under each social state, and the case where they do not agree. When individuals agree on the ranking of types, assessing equalization of opportunity is straightforward, as proposition 2 provides a necessary and sufficient condition.

The case where individuals do not agree on the ranking of types does not allow such a clear cut judgment on equalization. Proposition 1 provides a necessary condition of equalization. Violation of this condition rules out equalization of opportunity. If not, proposition 4 allows to endogenously identify a restricted set of preferences over which unanimity might be reached regarding equalization of opportunity. Of course, this only provides a partial judgment over equalization of opportunity. In fact, the higher the order of restriction κ that must be placed, the less general the judgement will be.

However, the extent of the restrictions on preferences that need to be placed to achieve a consensus on the ranking of types is, in itself, informative. When few restrictions need to be placed to achieve a consistent ranking, then most individuals should agree on which type is advantaged. On the contrary, when strong restrictions need to be placed, there is widespread disagreement on which type is advantaged. In this case, one might argue that a weak form of equality of opportunity already prevails. Lefranc et al. (2009) introduce the notion of *weak equality of opportunity* to single out situations where the opportunity sets differ across types but cannot be ranked according to second-order stochastic dominance. In this case, there is no consensus on the advantaged type among agents with risk-averse preferences. By capturing the degree of consensus on the advantaged type, κ helps generalize the notion of weak equality of opportunity introduced in Lefranc et al. (2009).

To summarize, when there is a large disagreement on which type is advantaged (high

κ), our criterion provides a very partial condition for consensus on equalization of opportunity, although this admittedly corresponds to a case of weak inequality of opportunity. On the contrary, when there is large agreement on which type is advantaged (low κ), our equalization condition becomes least partial and turns into a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP in the case where there is full consensus on identifying the advantaged type ($\kappa = 1$).

3 Equalization of opportunity: generalization

In the general case, opportunity equalization has to be assessed with more than two circumstances across many effort levels. When effort is observable, one possibility is to extend the EZOP comparisons on all pairs of circumstances at every effort level, or to study meaningful aggregations of these judgements. Identification criteria when effort is not observable are also discussed, in order to provide relevant notions of equalization that can still be used in applied analysis, under observability constraints.

3.1 Extending the EZOP criterion to multiple circumstances

We consider the case in which there are T types. Let $C = \{c_1, ..., c_i, ...c_T\}$ denote the set of possible circumstances. For simplicity, we assume a single effort level e. The results of this section can be easily extended to multiple effort levels by requiring that equalization holds for every effort level.

A straightforward extension of definition 1 to multiple circumstances is to require that for every possible pair of circumstances, the distance falls when moving from social state $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$. This is given by the following definition:

Definition 2 (Non-anonymous EZOP between multiple types) *Moving from state $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$ equalizes opportunity over the set of circumstances C at effort e on the set of preferences $\mathcal{P}$ if and only if for all preferences $W \in \mathcal{P}$, for all $(i,j) \in \{1, \ldots, T\}$, we have:* $|\Delta_W(F_0(.|c_i, e), F_0(.|c_j, e))| \geq |\Delta_W(F_1(.|c_i, e), F_1(.|c_j, e))|.$

Again, this generalized form of EZOP cannot be verified, in practice, without resorting to a specific class of preferences. In the class $\mathcal{R}$, the results of propositions 2 and 4 generalize easily to the multivariate case. For every pair (i,j), let κ_{ij} denote the *minimal order* at which $F_\pi(.|c_i, e)$ and $F_\pi(.|c_j, e)$ can be ranked according to inverse stochastic dominance,

for all π. According to proposition 4, integrated gap curve dominance for each pair of types c_i and c_j provides a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP between the two types over the subclass $\mathcal{R}^{\kappa_{ij}}$. This condition is, however, only necessary when looking at the whole class $\mathcal{R}$.

Proposition 5 *EZOP between multiple types over the set of preferences* $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \forall (i,j) \in \{1,\ldots,T\}$, $\forall p \in [0,1]$, $\left| \Gamma^{\kappa_{ij}} \left(F_0(.|c_i,e), F_0(.|c_j,e), p \right) \right| \geq \left| \Gamma^{\kappa_{ij}} \left(F_1(.|c_i,e), F_1(.|c_j,e), p \right) \right|$.

The proof is based on the same arguments used in the proof of proposition 4.

Definition 2 makes the "identity" of each type relevant for defining equalization of opportunity, since the extent of advantaged between any pair c_i, c_j under $\pi = 0$ is confronted with the extent of advantage between the same two types under $\pi = 1$. One may challenge this view and claim that only the magnitude of the gaps (and not the identity of the types involved) is relevant for defining equalization of opportunity. Consider a simple example in which there are three types c_1, c_2 and c_3. Assume that there is only one effort level and luck plays no role. Under each of the three states $\pi = A, B, C$, each type is assigned with an outcome given by the following table:

	Outcomes		
	$\pi = A$	$\pi = B$	$\pi = C$
c_1	6	6	6
c_2	3	4	2.5
c_3	1	2.5	4

When moving from state A to B, the gap between each type and the other two falls (the gap between c_1 and c_2 shrinks from $6-3$ to $6-4$) and the condition in definition 2 is satisfied. On the contrary, when moving from state A to C, the gap between c_1 and c_2 increases and equalization is not satisfied, although state C is obtained from state B only by permuting the outcomes of groups c_2 and c_3. This inconsistency arises from the fact that the assessment of equalization of opportunity in definition 2 is sensitive to the identity of the groups associated to a given opportunity gap.

This counterexample echoes a well-know *anonymity principle* used in the assessment of inequality. According to this principle, the measurement of inequality of outcome should be unsensitive to a permutation of the outcomes of individuals within the distribution. This principle can be incorporated to our definition of equalization of opportunity by making it unsensitive to a permutation of the opportunity sets across types.

Let us introduce some additional notation. Let $r_\pi^W(c)$ be the *rank function* assigning to circumstance c its rank, $r(.) \in \{1, \dots, T\}$ in the ranking of types, in social state π, according to preferences W. Given W, all circumstances can be ranked, but the rank of a specific circumstance c might change across social states and differs across preferences.

The anonymous principle of equalization of opportunity between multiple types requires that the opportunity gap between two types sitting at given ranks falls when moving from social state 0 to 1. This should hold for every pair of ranks and every utility function in $\mathcal{P}$.

Definition 3 (Anonymous EZOP between multiple types) *Moving from state $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$ equalizes opportunity over the set of circumstances C at effort e on the set of preferences $\mathcal{P}$ if and only if for all preferences $W \in \mathcal{P}$, for all $(i, j, h, \ell) \in \{1, \dots, T\}^4$ such that $r_0^W(c_i) = r_1^W(c_h)$ and $r_0^W(c_j) = r_1^W(c_\ell)$ we have:*
$$|\Delta_W(F_0(.|c_i, e), F_0(.|c_j, e))| \geq |\Delta_W(F_1(.|c_h, e), F_1(.|c_\ell, e))|.$$

Implementation of anonymous equalization requires first to define a class of preferences $\mathcal{P}$ where agreement is reached on the rank of types according to the advantage they confer, and, second, to check if the advantage between circumstances occupying a similar rank is reduced when changing state. Within the class $\mathcal{R}$, agreement on this ranking of circumstances is reached only for the evaluation functions in the intersection of all the sets $\mathcal{R}^{\kappa_{ij}}$, for all pairs (i, j). The intersection is denoted by $\mathcal{R}^{\kappa_{\max}}$, where $\kappa_{\max} = \max_{i,j \in \{1,\dots,T\}} \{\kappa_{ij}\}$. Once this set is identified, gap curve dominance can be tested. It only provides, however, a necessary condition for agreement over $\mathcal{R}$.

Proposition 6 *EZOP between multiple types over the set of preferences $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \forall p \in [0, 1]$, $\forall (i, j, h, \ell) \in \{1, \dots, T\}^4$ such that $r_0^W(c_i) = r_1^W(c_h)$ and $r_0^W(c_j) = r_1^W(c_\ell)$,*
$$\left| \Gamma^{\kappa_{\max}}(F_0(.|c_i, e), F_0(.|c_j, e), p) \right| \geq \left| \Gamma^{\kappa_{\max}}(F_1(.|c_h, e), F_1(.|c_\ell, e), p) \right|.$$

The proof is based on the same arguments used in the proof of proposition 4. Propositions 5 and 6 require that advantage gaps fall for all possible pairs of circumstances. However, some gaps might be more worth compensating than others. For instance, one might assign priority to the bottom of the distribution of types (i.e. reduce the gap between the bottom type and other types) or to the top of the distribution. This would amount, in definition 2, to restrict the scope of inter-type comparisons to pairs involving either the bottom type or the top type. This criterion remains, nevertheless, disaggregated and demanding:

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it requires to perform a large number of comparisons of pairs of types that must be all validated by all preferences in a sufficiently heterogeneous class.

3.2 Aggregation across circumstances

It might be argued that a small increase in the opportunity gap between two types might be compensated by a fall in the opportunity gap between another pair of types. This view suggests aggregating welfare gaps $|W(F_\pi(.|c_i, e)) - W(F_\pi(.|c_j, e))|$ across pairs of circumstances. This leads to a scalar measure of inequality of opportunity. Of course, implementing such a scalar measure requires to select a particular preference function W. It also requires to take into account the size of the various types when aggregating welfare gaps. Define p_c the relative frequency of type c in the population. One can define, for a function W, an *Inequality of Opportunity Indicator* (IO):

$$IO(\pi) = \sum_{i=1}^{T} \sum_{j=i+1}^{T} p_{c_i} \, p_{c_j} \big| W(F_\pi(.|c_i, e)) - W(F_\pi(.|c_j, e)) \big|$$

IO equals the average absolute welfare gap, across all pairs of circumstances, computed for function W. This appears as a generalization of several inequality of opportunity indices suggested in the literature.[17] Lefranc et al. (2008) introduce the *Gini Opportunity* index defined as:

$$GO(\pi) = \frac{1}{\mu} \sum_{i=1}^{T} \sum_{j=i+1}^{T} p_{c_i} \, p_{c_j} \big| \mu_{c_i}(1 - G_{c_i}) - \mu_{c_j}(1 - G_{c_j}) \big|.$$

This amounts to take in the evaluation of IO, the function:

$$W(F_\pi(.|c, e)) = \frac{\mu_c}{\mu}(1 - G_c),$$

where μ_c/μ is the ratio between the average outcome associated to the distribution conditional on circumstance c and the population average, while G_c is the Gini coefficient of

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[17]Checchi and Peragine (2010) undertake a similar approach. They define, in a ex-post setting with degenerate luck, indicators of inequality of opportunity. Their indicators measure relative inequality among individual realizations, under the assumption that all individuals in a type exerting similar effort receive similar outcomes. Their indicator aggregates outcome differentials not only across types, but also across effort levels, something that is not necessarily imposed in the $IO(\pi)$ index. A different approach is instead undertaken in Peragine (2002, 2004), where the objects of interest are social evaluation functions and types are ordered. Overall welfare depends on the evaluation of how much dispersed are the average realizations associated to every type.

circumstance c's distribution.[18]

For every W, the IO index always allows to rank social states, although the conclusion on changes in equality of opportunity is not robust with respect to the evaluation of advantage. Yet, the index is consistent with an anonymous opportunity equalization criterion: if anonymous EZOP is satisfied, one should have $IO(0) \geq IO(1)$ for all preferences W.

3.3 Aggregation in the effort dimension

Let us now consider a situation where effort can be summarized by a scalar indicator $e \in \mathbb{R}^+$. We refer to the distribution of effort within a type by $G(e|c, \pi)$.

Consider the anonymous or non-anonymous equalization principles. Assume first that effort is realized and observable. This corresponds to what has been referred to in the EOP literature as an *ex post* situation.[19] A straightforward extension of definitions 2 and 3 to the multiple effort setting can be made by requiring equalization to hold at every effort level. With ideal data, the anonymous or non-anonymous equalization criteria can be implemented and separately tested at every effort level.

In most existing data sets, however, information on effort is missing. In this context, it is only possible to observe for each type its outcome distribution, given by:

$$F_\pi(y|c) \quad = \quad \int_E F_\pi(y|c, e) dG(e|c, \pi). \tag{3}$$

In the presence of luck, the distribution of outcome of a given type arises from a *mixture of luck and effort* factors. Hence, contrary to Roemer (1998), it is not possible to identify effort with the quantiles of this distribution.

The ex-ante approach Although the distributions $F_\pi(.|c)$ do not allow to assess ex post equalization, they are interesting in their own right and relevant for opportunity equalization. Each distribution captures the opportunity sets associated to different types in an *ex ante* perspective, i.e. before the effort choices are made. If equalization judgements are made without knowing in advance what individual effort choices will be, the ex post level of effort could be treated as luck. This amounts to assume that all individuals in a type exert similar effort. One may further assume that effort levels are comparable across

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[18]For a complete survey of Gini-type indices for Equality of Opportunity sets, see Weymark (2003).

[19]See for instance Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013)

types, as discussed below. This comes close in spirit to the analysis of Van de gaer (1993). In this case, equalization should be decided on the basis of the outcome distributions of each type, $F_\pi(y|c)$. We refer to this criterion as ex ante equalization, defined by:

Definition 4 (Ex ante non-anonymous EZOP between multiple types) *Moving from state $\pi = 0$ to $\pi = 1$ equalizes opportunity ex ante over the set of circumstances C on the set of preferences $\mathcal{P}$ if and only if for all preferences $W \in \mathcal{P}$, for all $(i, j) \in \{1, \ldots, T\}$, we have: $|\Delta_W(F_0(.|c_i), F_0(.|c_j))| \geq |\Delta_W(F_1(.|c_i), F_1(.|c_j))|$.*

According to this definition, opportunities are equalized if every preference agrees that the gap between the expected opportunity sets associated to every pair of circumstances falls by effect of the change in social state. Here, opportunity sets are "expected" in the sense that they are evaluated before individuals make their effort choice.

When $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{R}$, proposition 5 can be used to identify ex ante non-anonymous EZOP. The same approach can be used to identify the anonymous approach.

The Roemerian setting We now consider the special case of the Roemerian setting[20] where luck plays no role: individual outcome only depends on circumstances and effort. Individuals with circumstances c and effort e in state π are assigned with a single value of outcome $Y_\pi(c, e)$. Since luck plays no role, ex post equalization amounts to require that for all (c, c') and all e: $|Y_0(c, e) - Y_0(c', e)| \geq |Y_1(c, e) - Y_1(c', e)|$.

Roemer's view of equality of opportunity further requires, on a priori grounds, that effort be defined in such a way that its distribution is independent of type. The argument is that since individuals cannot be held responsible for their type, they should not be held accountable for the association between their "effort" and their type. One may push the argument further and require that the distribution of effort be also independent of the state. In this case, we have that for all c and π, $G(e|c, \pi) = G(e)$. Furthermore, under the assumption that the outcome function $Y(c, e)$ is strictly increasing in e, the individual effort within a type can be identified by the rank in the type-specific outcome distribution: hence, an individual with outcome y and circumstances c in state π will have exerted effort $F_\pi(y|c)$.

In the Roemerian setting, the effort is normalized so that its distribution is uniform

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[20]For a complete discussion of the conditions of identification of equality of opportunity in Roemer's model, see O'Neill, Sweetman and Van De Gaer (2000) and Lefranc et al. (2009)

over the interval $[0, 1]$, and $Y_\pi(c, e)$ is simply given by $F_\pi^{-1}(e|c)$. Thus requiring ex post EZOP in this setting amounts to require that, for all $p \in [0, 1]$: $|F_0^{-1}(p|c) - F_0^{-1}(p|c')| \geq |F_1^{-1}(p|c) - F_1^{-1}(p|c')|$. This shows that the absolute gap curve dominance condition, defined in proposition 1, turns out to be a necessary and sufficient condition for ex post EZOP in the Roemerian setting. Furthermore, as a consequence of proposition 1, this condition is necessary for ex ante EZOP. As a result, ex ante EZOP implies ex post EZOP in the Roemerian setting.

The general case In the general case where luck and effort distributions are not degenerate, the relationship between ex ante and ex post equalization cannot be established without further assumptions. This can be illustrated by a simple example. Consider two circumstances, c and c', and many effort levels. Assume that for all effort levels, type c dominates c' at the first order. In this case, ex post EZOP requires that for all e, $|F_0(y|c, e) - F_0(y|c', e)| \geq |F_1(y|c, e) - F_1(y|c', e)|$. Assume further that effort is distributed independently of type and state. Under these two assumptions, we have, using (3): $|F_\pi(Y|c) - F_\pi(y|c')| = \int |F_\pi(y|c, e) - F_\pi(y|c', e)| dG(e)$. This allows to establish that ex post EZOP implies ex ante EZOP. However, this is only valid under the two maintained assumption. Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot be tested empirically, without observing effort.

This shows that in the general case, ex post equalization cannot be identified using ex ante comparisons. Furthermore, failing to accept ex ante equalization provides little guidance on the fact that the ex post criteria also fails to be accepted, unless one is willing to make non-testable assumption of monotonicity of the ranking of circumstances with respect to effort.

4 Empirical application: Child care expansion and equalization of opportunity in Norway

Recently, policymakers both in the US and in Europe are pushing for expanding access to child care, in an effort to alleviate early life differences across socioeconomic groups. Indeed, early childhood investments are often seen as the means *par excellence* to equalize life chances (Blau and Currie 2006, Heckman and Masterov 2007). To illustrate the usefulness

of our framework for policy evaluations, we now apply it to evaluate the long term impact of a large scale child care reform in Norway.

The Kindergarten Act passed the Norwegian parliament in June 1975. It assigned responsibility for child care to local municipalities and was followed by large increases in federal funding. The reform constituted a substantial positive shock to the supply of subsidized child care, which had been severely constrained by limited public funds. The child care coverage rate for 3 to 6 year olds increased from less than 10 % in 1975 to over 28 % by 1979.[21]

Our objective is to assess whether the expansion of child care equalized opportunity among Norwegian children. The outcome variable we focus on is individual earnings at age 30–36. Our circumstance variable is parental earnings during early childhood. Specifically, we examine to what extent the expansion of child care equalized children's earnings distributions as adults, conditional on parental earnings deciles.

4.1   Empirical implementation

Assessing whether the Kindergarten Act equalized opportunities across Norwegian children requires two sets of the outcome distributions : the conditional distributions of observed outcome among children who have experienced the childcare expansion and the counterfactual distributions that would have prevailed in absence of the reform. Following Havnes and Mogstad (2012), we apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, exploiting the fact that the supply shocks to subsidized child care were larger in some areas than others. Specifically, we compare the adult earnings of children aged 3 to 6 years old before and after the reform, from municipalities where child care expanded a lot (i.e. the treatment group) and municipalities with little or no increase in child care coverage (i.e. the comparison group). We focus on the early expansion, which likely reflects the abrupt slackening of constraints on the supply side caused by the reform, rather than a spike in the local demand. We consider the period 1976–1979 as the child care expansion period. To define the treatment and comparison group, we order municipalities according to the percentage point increase in child care coverage rates over the expansion period. We then separate the sample at the median, the upper half constituting the treatment municipalities and the lower half the comparison municipalities. To define the pre-reform and post-reform

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[21]For detailed information about the program and for descriptive statistics, we refer the reader to Havnes and Mogstad (2011).

groups, we exploit that children born 1967–69 enter school before the expansion period starts, while children born 1973–76 are in child care age after the expansion period has ended. Havnes and Mogstad (2014) show that the expansion of child care is exogenous to a large range of observable characteristics.

To estimate the impact of the reform on the distribution of children's earnings, conditional on parental earnings, we estimate the following equation:

$$\mathbb{1}\{y_{it} \geq y\} = \gamma_t(y) + [\beta_0(y) + \beta_1(y)P_t + \beta_2(y)T_i + \beta_3(y)T_i \cdot P_t] \cdot g(x_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}(y) \qquad (4)$$

where $\mathbb{1}\{\cdot\}$ is the indicator function, y_{it} are average earnings in 2006–2009 of child i born in year t, and y is a threshold value of earnings discussed below. T_i is a dummy equal to one if the child is from a treatment municipality and zero otherwise, and P_t is a dummy equal to one for post-reform cohorts and zero otherwise. γ_t is a birth cohort fixed effect, and ϵ is the error term. The function $g(x_{it})$ is a fourth-order polynomial in the average yearly earnings of the child's parents when the child was in child care age, denoted x_{it}.[22]

The vector $\beta_3(y)$ provides DID-estimates of how the reform affected the earnings distribution of affected children. In the spirit of standard DiD, the estimator uses the observed change *in the distribution* around the value y, from before to after treatment, as an estimate of the change that would have occurred in the treatment group over this period in the absence of treatment.[23] The identifying assumption underlying the RIF-DiD estimator is that *the change in population shares* from before to after treatment around a given *level of earnings* would be the same in the treatment group as in the comparison group, in the absence of the treatment.

Note that equation (4) allows for heterogeneity in the effect of the reform on the distribution of earnings along two dimensions. First, $\beta_3(y)$ is a function of the threshold earnings so the effect of the reform is allowed to vary along the earnings distribution. Second, since $\beta_3(y)$ is interacted with a polynomial function of parental earnings, $g(x_{it})$, the effect of the reform is allowed to vary according to family background.

Equation (4) provides estimates defined in terms of changes in probability mass at each value y. From these, we can compute the change in earnings induced by the reform

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[22]We tested alternative polynomial specifications without any impact on our results.

[23]See Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) for a discussion of the RIF-estimator, and Athey and Imbens (2006) or Havnes and Mogstad (2014) for a discussion of non-linear difference-in-differences methods.

by rescaling with an estimate of the density at y (Firpo et al. 2009). When y is a quantile, this yields an estimate of the quantile treatment effect (QTE).

Our EZOP criterion rests on the comparison of the effects of the reform at quantiles of the earnings distribution conditional on circumstances. For each circumstance c and each quantile $p \in [0, 1]$, define $Q_1(p|c) = F(y|c, T = 1, P = 1)$ as the value of the pth quantile in the actual distribution of earnings among treated children, conditional on circumstances. The estimated QTE at quantile p for children with circumstances c can then be defined as:

$$QTE(p|c) = \frac{\mathrm{E}\left[\beta_3(Q_1(p|c)).g\left(x_{it}\right)|C_{it} = c\right]}{f\left(Q_1(p|c)|C_{it} = c\right)} \tag{5}$$

where C_{it} denotes the circumstances of individual i born in cohort t, and $f(\cdot|\cdot)$ denotes the density of the earnings distribution $F(\cdot|\cdot)$. Because $QTE(p|c)$ estimates the impact of the treatment, we readily construct an estimate of the counterfactual quantile in the absence of treatment as $Q_0(p|c) = Q_1(p|c) - QTE(p|c)$.

In the empirical application, we use the earnings decile of the child's parents to define circumstances, and estimate equation (4) using OLS at each percentile of the earnings distribution conditional on circumstances. We then use a kernel estimate of the density from this distribution to construct our estimate of $QTE(p|c)$. Our estimation sample is based on Norwegian registry data, and covers the population of Norwegian children born to married mothers in the relevant cohorts, as discussed in Havnes and Mogstad (2014). Standard errors are obtained using a non-parametric bootstrap with 300 replications. Based on our estimates of the actual and counterfactual outcome distributions and on the bootstrapped covariances, we implement stochastic dominance tests as discussed in appendix B.

4.2 Results for three classes

To evaluate how the child care expansion affected inequality of opportunity, we now apply our EZOP framework, defining children's circumstances from parental earnings deciles. This involves a large number of pairwise comparison, to which we return below. To clarify the intuition behind the comparisons, and to illustrate graphically the implementation of our framework and the effect of the reform, however, we first focus on three types in the population: Children whose parents had earnings in the second, the fifth and the ninth decile, respectively. For expositional simplicity, we will usually refer to these simply as

lower class, middle class and upper class children.

We start by analyzing the extent of inequality of opportunity before the implementation of the child care expansion. Panel (a) in figure 1 presents the counterfactual distributions $Q_0(p|c)$ that would have been observed in the absence of the policy ($\pi = 0$). The figure shows first order stochastic dominance when we compare any pair of distributions. This indicates that equality of opportunity is clearly violated. Furthermore, for all preferences under risk, there is a clear ordering of family types, with upper class children doing better than middle class children, and middle class children doing better than lower class children.

Panel (b) in figure 1 shows the impact of the child care expansion on the earnings distribution of children in these three groups. The dashed line presents the QTE for middle class children. Overall, the effect of the child care expansion in this group are relatively modest. However, there is significant heterogeneity in the impact of the policy: *within* the middle class, effects are positive for children sitting in the bottom of the earnings distribution, and turn negative in the upper end of the distribution. The dotted line gives the effect on upper class children. In this group, the reform has a modest positive impact for children in the bottom of the conditional distribution but had large and negative impact in the top of the distribution. Lastly, the solid line provides estimates of the effect of the child care expansion for lower class children. On average, lower class children seem to benefit more from the child care expansion than children from middle and upper class. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the effect of child care stands in marked contrast with what was observed in the other two groups: among lower class children, the reform had a small positive effect in the bottom of the distribution but had increasingly large and positive effect as we move up the conditional earnings distribution. This suggests two main conclusions. First, on average child care appears substitutable to parental resources, captured here by the class of origin. Second, the impact of the child care seems complementary to child's idiosyncratic resources, within the lower class, while the opposite seems to hold in the middle and upper class.

Panel (c) of figure 1 presents the conditional distribution of earnings after the policiy implementation ($\pi = 1$). The figure shows first order stochastic dominance when we compare any pair of distributions. Hence, equality of opportunity does not prevail, even after the implementation of the reform. However, compared to panel (a), the gap between any pair of curves seems to have fallen, at almost every quantile of the earnings distribu-

A - Child earnings distributions and conditional QTEs

(a) Counterfactual distributions ($\pi = 0$)

(b) Quantile treatment effects

(c) Actual distributions($\pi = 1$)

B - Gap curves

(d) Lower vs middle class

(e) Lower vs upper class

(f) Middle vs upper class

Figure 1: Child earnings distributions, quantile treatment effects and gap curves

Note: The lower, middle and upper classes refer to selected family labor income deciles. Gap curves are defined as the vertical distance between the conditional cdfs of the different classes. Since the cdfs are ordered, the gap curves are always positive. Gap curves differences correspond to the vertical gap between the gap curves in the actual and the counterfactual states. Confidence intervals for the difference in gap curves at every conditional quantile are bootstrapped.

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tion, which suggests that the implementation of the child care policy might have partially equalized opportunities across the three classes.

To implement our EZOP procedure, we present in panels (d)–(f) the estimated gap curves from pairwise comparisons of children from different family types under both social states, alongside gap curve differences between these states with a 99% confidence interval.[24] One should note that since the conditional distribution can be ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance, we may then invoke proposition 2: Gap curve dominance provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity.

Two main features stand out. First, in both social states, gap curves are virtually always positive. This reflects the stochastic dominance between all groups both with and without the child care reform. Second, the actual gap ($\pi = 1$) curve is almost always below the counterfactual gap curve ($\pi = 0$). This indicates that the reform reduced inequality of opportunity between all pairs of types. This fact is clarified by looking at the gap curve differences: While the difference is small and not statistically significant at the bottom of the distribution, the difference becomes positive and strongly statistically significant as we move up in the distribution.

The graphs in figure 1 are based on estimated quantiles. An informed conclusion about whether the child care reform led to equalization of opportunity should rest on a joint test of stochastic dominance in each pairwise comparison (i) for the actual distribution, (ii) for the counterfactual distributions and (iii) for the gap curves. Results of these tests are presented in Table 1.[25] Panel A and B present test statistics from the counterfactual and actual setting, respectively. Note that the bootstrapped covariances are used to account for the QTE estimation error. We perform three tests. First, the null hypothesis is that the two distributions are equal. This is strongly rejected in all comparisons. Second, the null hypothesis is that the distribution of the underprivileged group first order stochastic dominates the distribution of the privileged group, i.e. lower class over middle class over upper class. Not surprisingly, the hypothesis is strongly rejected in all comparisons.[26] Third, we test for the reverse relation: That the underprivileged are dominated by the privileged. In this case, the hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the comparison, with

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[24]Remember from section 2.2 that gap curves are constructed by taking differences between inverse cdf's at each percentile.

[25]Details of the statistical tests are discussed in appendix B.

[26]Both in panels A and B of table 1, the values of the tests statistics taken under the null hypothesis of equality and dominance coincide. This result is a consequence of the definition of the test statistics presented in the appendix.

Table 1: Joint dominance and equality tests for actual and counterfactual children earning distributions and gap curves, for selected parental earnings deciles: Wald-test statistics and associated p-values (in brackets) for various null hypothesis

| | Pairwise comparisons of social classes: | | | | | |
	Lower vs middle		Lower vs upper		Middle vs upper	
A - Cdfs, counterfactual setting ($\pi = 0$)						
$H_0 : \sim$	72.9	[0.000]	659.4	[0.000]	384.2	[0.000]
$H_0 : \succcurlyeq$	72.9	[0.000]	659.4	[0.000]	384.2	[0.000]
$H_0 : \preccurlyeq$	0.0	[0.944]	0.0	[0.949]	0.0	[0.947]
B - Cdfs, actual setting ($\pi = 1$)						
$H_0 : \sim$	40.1	[0.003]	423.7	[0.000]	266.3	[0.000]
$H_0 : \succcurlyeq$	40.1	[0.000]	423.7	[0.000]	266.3	[0.000]
$H_0 : \preccurlyeq$	0.0	[0.949]	0.0	[0.952]	0.0	[0.948]
C - Gap curves ($\pi = 0$ vs $\pi = 1$)						
$H_0 :$ Neutrality	84.2	[0.000]	266.4	[0.000]	125.0	[0.000]
$H_0 :$ Equalization	4.8	[0.672]	11.2	[0.381]	9.1	[0.468]
$H_0 :$ Disequalization	76.0	[0.000]	248.4	[0.000]	112.0	[0.000]

Note: The lower, middle and upper classes refer to selected parental earnings deciles groups. In panels A and B, for each of the three pairs of classes, we test the following three null hypothesis: equality of the cdfs($\sim$), first-order stochastic dominance of the worse-off class over the well-off class ($\succcurlyeq$) and first-order stochastic dominance of the well-off class over the worse-off class ($\preccurlyeq$). In panel C, for each pair of classes, we compare gap curves under the actual and counterfactual states and test three null hypothesis: the gap curves are statistically equal (neutrality); the gap curve in the counterfactual policy state is everywhere larger than in the actual policy state (equalization); the gap curve in the counterfactual policy state is everywhere smaller than in the actual policy regime (disequalization). Gap curves are defined according to the order of groups estimated from panels A and B. Covariances are bootstrapped. Joint tests are performed on ventiles of child earnings distributions.

p-values always above 0.94.

Finally, panel C presents the main tests of equalization of opportunity. First, the null hypothesis is that the reform had no impact on inequality of opportunity (*neutrality*). This hypothesis is strongly rejected by the data. Second, the null hypothesis is that the reform equalized outcomes across children from different classes (*equalization*). This hypothesis cannot be rejected by the data, with *p*-values above 0.38. Third, the null hypothesis is that the reform disequalized outcomes, increasing inequality of opportunity. In this case, we can again strongly reject the hypothesis in all comparisons.

To summarize, the analysis shows first that the ordering between children from different classes in terms of their labor market performance is quite clear in Norway: Upper class children do better than middle class children, and middle class children do better than lower class children. Second, the analysis shows that the child care reform in 1975 did indeed equalize substantially the opportunities across children from different classes. Using the Gini-type evaluation function, we can also assess how the policy affected the value of the opportunity sets of each type. For the bottom two classes, results indicate that the reform had a positive effect: The opportunities of the lower and middle class children increased by

4.3% and 3% respectively. In contrast, the value of the opportunity set of the upper class only increased by a modest 1%, which turns out to be statistically non significant. This differential in growth rates indicates that the lower and middle classes benefited from the polic reform, both in absolute terms, and in relative terms, in the sense that they caught up with the upper class.[27] Third, the QTE estimates show that this equalization came both from positive impacts at the lower end of the distribution and from negative impacts at the upper end for many children. This raises a concern about the universal design of the child care expansion, as discussed in Havnes and Mogstad (2014).

4.3 Results for all parental earnings deciles

We now extend the analysis to consider children in groups based on each decile of the parental earnings distribution. The analysis follows the same format as above: For each group of children, we estimate QTE's, actual cdf's and counterfactual cdf's, and test for stochastic dominance and gap curve dominance. For brevity, we omit the specific results for each group. The final results from the dominance tests are summarized graphically in figure 2. Above the diagonal, we test dominance of column groups over row groups, i.e. of the disadvantaged group over the advantaged group. Below the diagonal, we test dominance of row over column, i.e. of the advantaged group over the disadvantaged group. We use the shading of the block to indicate the p-value on rejection of the null hypothesis of dominance, with darker blocks indicating higher p-values. Dark blocks indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of dominance, while light blocks indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected. Finally, we also test for equality of the earnings distributions across types, and indicate failure to reject equality with a black bullet inside the block.

To clarify, compare to the analysis with the three classes above. The squares in row 2, column 9, and in row 9, column 2 compare children from lower class (D2) to children from upper class (D9). This essentially summarizes the findings from the second column of table 1. Consider Panel A of figure 2, where we test for dominance in the actual setting. The dark color in row 9, column 2 indicates the failure to reject dominance in the third line of panel A in table 1. Similarly, the light color in row 2, column 9 indicates the rejection

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[27]We bootstrapped 300 times the differences across policy states of the difference in Gini evaluation function attributed to lower, middle and upper classes. These differences (t-statistics) between lower and middle classes are 0.0073 (3.091), between lower and upper classes are 0.0206 (3.185) and between middle and upper classes are 0.0133 (2.693).

Figure 2: Joint dominance and equality tests for actual and counterfactual children earning distributions and gap curves, conditional on parental earnings decile

Note: The groups D1–D10 refer to parental earnings deciles. Panels A and B reports p-values of joint tests of first-order stochastic dominance and equality of cdfs for pairs of groups, in the counterfactual and actual regime. Each square in the matrix compares the distribution of the type on the horizontal axis with the type on the vertical axis. Squares above the 45° line correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the type on vertical axis is dominated by the type on the horizontal axis. Squares below the 45° line correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the type on vertical axis dominates the type on the horizontal axis. Panel C reports p-value of joint tests of dominance and equality for gap curves performed through QTE comparisons across groups (see appendix B.5 for details). Squares below the 45° line correspond to tests of the null hypothesis that the gap curve under $\pi = 1$ is below the gap curve under $\pi = 0$, indicating that the disadvantaged group gains more from the policy than the advantaged group. Squares above the 45° line correspond to tests of the opposite hypothesis. The color of the square indicates the p-value for the rejection of the null hypothesis. Black squares indicate rejection of the null. Dots in the figure indicate when equality between the distribution of the two types cannot be rejected at conventional level. Joint dominance tests are based on children earnings ventiles. Covariances are bootstrapped.

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of dominance in the third line of panel A in table 1.[28]

Return now to the overall evaluation of whether the child care expansion equalized opportunity across family types. Panels A and B of figure 2 report the results of first-order stochastic dominance tests in the actual and the counterfactual state. In both states, the results suggest a strong monotonic relation between parental earnings and the earnings advantage of children. Above the diagonal, we universally fail to reject the hypothesis that the earnings distribution of more advantaged children dominates that of less advantaged children. In contrast, below the diagonal, we can reject that the earnings distribution of less advantaged children dominates that of more advantaged children virtually everywhere. The only exceptions are three central comparisons around the diagonal, where the differences in parental earnings across groups is rather small, and equality cannot be rejected and/or we reject dominance in both directions. Overall, these tests provide clear evidence of inequality of opportunity for earnings among Norwegian children in both states. Moreover, the ordering of groups is highly stable across policy regimes, so that anonymous and non-anonymous EZOP comparisons are the same.

We now turn to the test of equalization of opportunity. Panel C of figure 2 reports the results of gap curve dominance tests for all pairs. In most cases, the estimates suggest that the implementation of the policy significantly decreases the opportunity gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged type. Below the diagonal, we almost never reject an improvement in the position of the less advantaged children compared to more advantaged children. Above the diagonal, we almost always reject an improvement in the position of the more advantaged children compared to less advantaged children. In other words, at all ranks, children raised in less advantaged families seem to benefit more (or lose less) from the child care expansion than do children raised in more advantaged families.

Overall this equalization of opportunity can be quantified by resorting to a specific inequality of opportunity index. Using the Gini Opportunity index of Lefranc et al. (2008) previously defined, we find that unfair inequality decreased by 8.8% as a result of the expansion in kindergarten provision.[29]

There are however, some exceptions to this equalization of opportunity. These exceptions are again mostly along the diagonal, where parental earnings differences are less

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[28]The absence of bullets in both squares indicates that we reject equality of the earnings distributions, as in the first line of panel A in table 1.

[29]The Gini Opportunity indices (standard error) are $GO(0) = 0.0358$ (0.0013) and $GO(1) = 0.0326$ (0.001). The p-value for $H_0: GO(0) = GO(1)$, based on bootstrapped standard errors, is 0.029.

Figure 3: Equalization of opportunity across family labor income deciles types.

Note: The figure reports, for every percentile of the sons earnings distribution, the differences in QTE associated to pairs of different groups, i.e. the difference between the gap curves of the two types. Disjoint tests of equality of the QTE are performed using bootstrapped standard errors. Differences in QTE that are not significantly different form zero are reported in gray. Groups are ordered according to ISD at order one. Out of 10 groups of parental earnings, 45 pairs of comparisons are performed at every percentiles of the sons earnings distribution.

pronounced. Here, we usually fail to reject equality between gap curves, and fail to reject equalization in either direction. Another important exception is the group of children with parental earnings in the first decile. For these children, we reject equalization when we compare to children from deciles 4–9 in the parental earnings distribution. This suggests that the child care reform partly failed to equalize opportunity for the most disadvantaged group.

The analysis above shows clearly the change in the pattern between parental earnings and children's advantage following the child care expansion. It does not, however, discriminate between a homogeneous narrowing of the gap across all ranks of the children's earnings distribution, and an overall narrowing where some parts of the distribution contribute more than others. To clarify this point, figure 3 reports the difference between gap curves in the actual and counterfactual state, for each percentile of the children's earnings distribution. At each percentile, we report the difference between the gap curves at that percentile from each of the 45 comparisons below the diagonal in panel C of figure 2. We restrict to these 45 comparisons since the order of the groups is completely determined

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in panel A and B of figure 2. In the figure, we indicate by a dark color the gap curve differences that are statistically significant at the 1% level.

Figure 3 shows that equalization among most of the groups is driven not by a reduction in the gap between children from poor families, but rather by a convergence in the earnings distributions between the median and the top of the distribution. This is driven partly by the fact that estimated effects are rather homogenous across groups at the lower end of the distribution, and partly by the fact that the negative QTE-estimates at the upper end of the distribution are particularly large for advantaged groups.

5 Conclusions

The first contribution of this paper is theoretical. We develop a new criterion for ranking social states from the equality of opportunity perspective. Our equalization of opportunity criterion entails a difference-in-differences comparison of earnings distribution conditional on circumstance. In a first stage, differences are taken across types *within* each social state separately, to assess the direction and distribution of unfair advantage across all possible pairs of types. This is done by imposing sequential restrictions on a class of evaluation preferences until agreement is reached in assessing the disadvantaged circumstance and it is implemented making use of stochastic orderings. In a second stage, differences are taken *between* social states to assess changes in the extent and distribution of unfair advantage. We propose an innovative model based on comparisons of the changes in the distance between pairs of distributions, which incorporates unanimity in the evaluation of the fall in the illegitimate advantage enjoyed by one circumstance. We study identification procedures and implementation issues, showing the equivalence of distance comparisons with gap curves dominance. Inference procedures are also provided.

Our second contribution pertains to the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of early-childhood intervention at equalizing life chances. Growing evidence on the role of parental background resources on lifelong earnings potential (Björklund and Salvanes 2011, Black and Devereux 2010) has questioned the role of educational policies in reshaping children opportunities. In fact, the process of formation of those abilities that manly explain success at studying takes place quite early in a child life (Cunha and Heckman 2007), and is accountable for the causes of later inequalities emerging in the labor market. Kindergarten

expansion policies are expected to have major effects on equalizing opportunities patterns for the treated children, lowering the dependence between background of origin and children earnings profiles. This is indeed what the test of opportunity equalization shows for the Norwegian experience.

Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we identify conditional quantile treatment effects of the Kindergarten Act in Norway. We are able to show that the treatment is highly heterogenous across child family backgrounds, defined by parental economic resources. Children coming from economically deprived families are also the most disadvantaged when they enter the labor market, but they are also those who face substantially higher gains from the implementation of the policy. This means that the gaps across children opportunities would have been larger without the policy than they actually are, thus showing that kindergarten implementations potential mostly lies in its ability to equalize opportunities. Our analysis is distributional, and allows us to show that the opportunity equalization outcome is mainly driven by those children scoring higher in their reference group earnings distribution and that would have done relatively well even without the policy being implemented. We conclude that, although there is strong agreement on opportunity equalization for the large majority of groups in an ex-ante setting, it is not possible to conclude in favor of ex-ante EZOP. In fact, the policy seems to increase the gap between the poorest children in the most disadvantaged group, compared to the rest. This results indicates that the Kindergarten Act might have produced sufficiently low returns for these children to be left behind in the process of convergence in groups conditional distributions, attributable to the policy. This finding, which threatens the effectiveness of early intervention on life-long outcomes of the neediest children, deserves further investigations.

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A   Definitions and proofs

A.1   Notions of stochastic dominance

Consider the following transformation of the inverse cumulative distribution function $F^{-1}(p)$, indexed by the natural number k:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Lambda^k(p) &:= \int_0^p \Lambda^{k-1}(t)\,dt \\
\Lambda^2(p) &:= \int_0^p F^{-1}(t)\,dt
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\Lambda^2(p)$ is the *generalized Lorenz curve* introduced by Gastwirth (1971). The distribution $F(y)$ *Inverse Stochastic Dominates* $F'(y)$ at order k, denoted $F(y) \succcurlyeq_{ISDk} F'(y)$, if and only if $\Lambda^k(p) \geq \Lambda'^k(p)$ for all $p \in [0,1]$, where the inequality holds strict at least for some values of p. At order $k = 1$, ISD1 and stochastic dominance coincide. In both cases, the dominant distribution can be obtained from the dominated only through increments of incomes. At order $k = 2$, ISD2 and generalized Lorenz dominance coincide. In both cases, the dominant distribution can be obtained from the dominated trough increments and progressive transfers on incomes. For $k \geq 3$, inverse and direct stochastic dominance orders differ. The ISDk induces a partial ranking of distributions: when the curves representing $\Lambda^k(p)$ and $\Lambda'^k(p)$ cross in at least one point, the two distributions F and F' cannot be ordered.

Muliere and Scarsini (1989) show that ISDk is a necessary and sufficient condition for agreement among all preferences in $\mathcal{R}^k$ over the preferred distribution. Furthermore, Maccheroni, Muliere and Zoli (2005) show that if $F_\pi(y|c,e) \succcurlyeq_{ISDk} F_\pi(y|c',e)$ then $F_\pi(y|c,e) \succcurlyeq_{ISDl} F_\pi(y|c',e)$, for all $l > k$.[30]

We now show that there always exists a degree k at which any pair of distributions can be compared according to ISD. The dominating distribution is the one that grants higher incomes to the poorest quantiles.

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[30]It is well known (e.g. Muliere and Scarsini 1989) that first and second order inverse stochastic dominance are equivalent to direct first and second order stochastic dominance, which is in turn equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance for incomes distributions with different means (Shorrocks 1983). Atkinson (1970) showed the logical relation between GL dominance with fixed means and an the utilitarian social welfare function, later generalized to all S-concave social welfare functions and to income distributions with different means.

Figure 4: Proof of Proposition 7. The curves $\Gamma(p)$ (solid black) and $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p)$ (dashed red)

Proposition 7 *For any pair of distributions with bounded support, with inverse cumulative distribution functions denoted by $F^{-1}(.)$ and $F'^{-1}(.)$, if $\exists p_\beta > 0 | \forall p \in [0, p_\beta)$ $F^{-1}(p) \geq F'^{-1}(p)$ and the strict inequality holds on a positive mass interval $[p_\beta - \epsilon, p_\beta)$ with $\epsilon > 0$, we have:*

$\exists k^* \in \mathbb{R}_+$ *and finite such that* $F \succ_{ISDk} F' \ \forall k \in \mathbb{N}_+$ *such that* $k > k^*$.

Proof. Using the gap curve notation, we define $\Gamma^k(p) := \Gamma^k(F, F', p) = \Lambda^k(p) - \Lambda'^k(p)$ and $\Gamma(p) := F^{-1}(p) - F'^{-1}(p)$ at any $p \in [0, 1]$. Integrating by parts the function $\Gamma^k(p)$, up to $k - 2$ times, gives:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Gamma^k(p) &= \int_0^p \Gamma^{k-1}(t)dt = -\int_0^p t \cdot \Gamma^{k-2}(t)dt + \left[t\Gamma^{k-1}(t)\right]_0^p \\
&= \int_0^p (p-t)\Gamma^{k-2}(t)dt \\
&= \int_0^p \frac{1}{2}(p-t)^2\Gamma^{k-3}(t)dt + \left[\frac{1}{2}(p-t)^2\Gamma^{k-2}(t)\right]_0^p \\
&= \int_0^p \frac{1}{(k-2)!}(p-t)^{k-2}\Gamma(t)dt \quad\quad (6)
\end{aligned}
$$

The result in (6) follows from the fact that $\Lambda^k(0) = 0$ and therefore $\Gamma^k(0) = 0$ for any k, and that $\Gamma^2(p) = \int_0^p \Gamma(t)dt$.

Let assume from the outset that F should be the dominating distribution. If it is the case, there must exist a point $p_\beta \in [0, 1]$ such that $\Gamma(p) \geq 0$ for all $p \in [0, p_\beta]$ with possibly some strong inequalities. Moreover, in the worst case $\Gamma(p) \leq 0$ for all $p \in (p_\beta, 1]$. If $\Gamma(p) = 0$ for all $p \in [0, p_\beta]$, then by definition $F' \succcurlyeq_{ISD1} F$. Furthermore, since F and F' are left continuous and bounded, then $\Gamma(p)$ is well behaved and takes only finite values on $p = 1$ and $p = 0$. Though not necessary, this assumption simplifies some technicalities.

This discussion clarifies that the upper bound (denoted $\overline{\alpha} > 0$) and lower bound (denoted $-\beta > 0$) of $\Gamma(p)$ should exists, as illustrated in figure 4. Formally: $\overline{\alpha} := \sup\{\Gamma(p) : p \in [0, p_\beta)\} > 0$ and $-\beta := \inf\{\Gamma(p) : p \in (p_\beta, 1]\} < 0$.

Consider a scalar $\alpha \in (0, \overline{\alpha}]$ defining *at least* two points $p_\alpha, p'_\alpha \in [0, p_\beta)$, such that $\Gamma(p) > 0$ for all $p \in [p_\alpha, p'_\alpha]$. This allows to define a new curve, denoted $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p)$ and repre-

sented by a dashed red line in figure 4. This curve equation is:

$$\widetilde{\Gamma}(p) := \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p \in [0, p_\alpha) \\ \alpha & \text{if } p \in [p_\alpha, p'_\alpha] \\ 0 & \text{if } p \in (p'_\alpha, p_\beta) \\ -\beta & \text{if } p \in [p_\beta, 1] \end{cases}$$

The points α and $-\beta$ are identified by a given gap curve $\Gamma(p)$, so it always holds by construction that $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p) \leq \Gamma(p)$ for all $p \in [0, 1]$. This is because $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p)$ reduces to the minimum the positive part of $\Gamma(p)$ while it magnifies the part where the curve takes on negative values. As a consequence, any recursive integral of $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p)$ will always lie above the corresponding integral of $\Gamma(p)$. To prove the proposition, it is therefore sufficient to show that, given the premises, there exists an order of integration of $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p)$ for which the resulting curve is always non-negative for any $p \in [0, 1]$. Denote a real positive $\widetilde{k}^*$ such that $\forall k > \widetilde{k}^*$:

$$\int_0^p \frac{1}{(k-2)!}(p-t)^{k-2}\widetilde{\Gamma}(t)dt \geq 0 \quad \forall p \in [0, 1], \tag{7}$$

then, there must exists also a real positive value k^* for which the proposition is true.

Noticing that the expression in (7) can take on non-zero values only on the interval $[p_\alpha, p'_\alpha]$ and negative on the interval $[p_\beta, 1]$, it can be simplified as follows:

$$\int_0^p \frac{(p-t)^{k-2}}{(k-2)!}\widetilde{\Gamma}(t)dt = \frac{1}{(k-2)!}\left[\int_{p_\alpha}^{p'_\alpha}(p-t)^{k-2}\alpha dt + \int_{p_\beta}^p (p-t)^{k-2}(-\beta)dt\right]$$

$$= \frac{\left\{\alpha\left[(p-p_\alpha)^{k-1} - (p-p'_\alpha)^{k-1}\right] - \beta(p-p_\beta)^{k-1}\right\}}{(k-2)!} \geq 0.$$

To check the validity of the proposition, it is necessary to verify that the above expression is true for any $p \geq p_\beta$ only. To show this, it is sufficient to show that there exists a $\widetilde{k}^*$ such that:

$$\frac{(p-p_\alpha)^{k-1} - (p-p'_\alpha)^{k-1}}{(p-p_\beta)^{k-1}} \geq \frac{\beta}{\alpha}, \quad \forall p \geq p_\beta. \tag{8}$$

By construction of $\widetilde{\Gamma}(p)$, if the condition holds for $p = 1$, then it must hold for all $p < 1$, because the differential takes only negative values for $p \geq p_\beta$. Note that the numerator and denominator of the left hand side of (8) are positive, but the ratio is not said to be greater than one. Nevertheless, one can always pick up a value of $\alpha < \overline{\alpha}$ such that $(p - p'_\alpha) \approx (p - p_\beta)$ and (8) is therefore satisfied if and only if the following holds:

$$\left(\frac{1 - p_\alpha}{1 - p_\beta}\right)^{k-1} \geq 1 + \frac{\beta}{\alpha}. \tag{9}$$

Both sides of (9) are positives and greater than one. Thus, by taking logs on the left and right side, it is easy to show that the integral condition in (6) is satisfied if and only if the integration order $\widetilde{k}^*$ is large enough to verify:

$$\widetilde{k}^* \geq 1 + \frac{\ln(1 + \beta/\alpha)}{\ln(1 - p_\alpha) - \ln(1 - p_\beta)}.$$

Figure 5: The curves $G(F_0, F_0', p)$ (solid line) and the perturbation generating $G(F_1, F_1', p)$ (dashed line).

Note that $\widetilde{k}^*$ is positive and greater than one and it always exists *finite* for any $0 < p_\alpha < p_\beta < 1$ and for $\alpha, \beta > 0$. Therefore the value k^* exists as well, which concludes the proof. ■

A.2   Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. By contradiction.

Assume $\exists \tilde{p} \in]0, 1[$ such that $|\Gamma(F_1, F_1', \tilde{p})| > |\Gamma(F_0, F_0', \tilde{p})|$. For $\pi = 0, 1$, $\Gamma(F_\pi, F_\pi', p)$ is left continuous since F_π and F_π' are left continuous. Hence, $\exists \epsilon > 0$ such that $\forall p \in [\tilde{p} - 2\epsilon, \tilde{p}]$, $|\Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)| > |\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p)|$ and $\text{sign}(\Gamma(F_\pi, F_\pi', p)) = \text{sign}(\Gamma(F_\pi, F_\pi', \tilde{p}))$.

Consider the individual preferences $\tilde{W}$ given by the triangular weighting scheme over the interval $[\tilde{p} - 2\epsilon, \tilde{p}]$: $\forall p \in [0, 1]$, $\tilde{w}(p) = [(\epsilon - |p - (\tilde{p} - \epsilon)|)/\epsilon^2] \cdot \mathbb{1}_{p \in [\tilde{p} - 2\epsilon, \tilde{p}]}$, where $\mathbb{1}$ denotes the indicator function. For preferences $\tilde{W}$, the economic distance in social state π is given by: $|\Delta_{\tilde{W}}(F, F')| = \int_{\tilde{p} - 2\epsilon}^{\tilde{p}} \tilde{w}(p) |\Gamma(F, F', p)| dp$. Henceforth $|\Delta_{\tilde{W}}|(F_1, F_1') > |\Delta_{\tilde{W}}(F_0, F_0')|$ which violates equalization. ■

The reciprocal is not true. Figure 5 provides a counter-example. The plain line gives the gap curve under $\pi = 0$. At value $\bar{p}$, the curve crosses the horizontal axis. Hence, under $\pi = 0$, type c receives higher outcomes than type c' in the bottom of the distribution but lower outcomes in the top. Define the areas $A = \int_0^{p^*} \Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) dp$ and $B = -\int_{p^*}^1 \Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) dp > 0$. Now consider the weighting scheme that gives weight $\alpha \geq 0$ for percentiles below p^* and $\beta \geq 0$ above.[31] The economic distance for this weighting scheme is $|\alpha A - \beta B|$. For α close enough to zero, type c' is preferred to type c and the distance is given by $\beta B - \alpha A$. Under $\pi = 1$, the gap curve is given by the dashed line, which is similar to the plain line except that the advantage of type c has been reduced by a small cumulative amount ϵ in the bottom part of the distribution, so that $\int_0^{p^*} \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p) dp = A - \epsilon < A$. Gap curve dominance is obviously satisfied.[32] At the same time, individuals who initially preferred the distribution of type c' to that of type c will agree that the economic distance between type c and c' has increased and EZOP is

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[31]This weighting scheme is given by $w(p) = \alpha + (\beta - \alpha).\mathbb{1}_{p > p^*}$, with $\alpha, \beta \geq 0$ and $\alpha p^* + \beta(1 - p^*) = 1$.

[32]The same result would obtain even in cases where $A < B$ and the weighting scheme is coherent with risk aversion, i.e. when $\alpha > \beta$.

thus violated.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. For the *sufficiency* part, assume that $F_0 \succeq_{ISD1} F_0'$ and $F_1 \succeq_{ISD1} F_1'$. As a consequence:

$$\forall W \in \mathcal{R}, \forall \pi \int_0^1 w(p)F_\pi^{-1}(p)dp > \int_0^1 w(p)F_\pi'^{-1}(p)dp.$$

Consequently, for all $W \in \mathcal{R}$, we can write:

$$\Delta_W(F_\pi, F_\pi') = \int_0^1 w(p)\Gamma(F_\pi, F_\pi', p)dp.$$

Hence, we have:

$$\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') = \int_0^1 w(p)[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)]dp. \tag{10}$$

If $[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)] \geq 0$ for all p, since the weights $w(p)$ are non-negative, the integrand in equation (10) is positive for all p and the integral is positive.

For the *necessity* part, note that if $[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)]$ is negative in the neighborhood of a quantile p_0, we can find a weight profile $w(p)$ that is arbitrarily small outside this neighborhood and it makes the integral negative. ∎

A.4 Proof of Proposition 3

Proof. We use the same type of proof argument as in Aaberge (2009). As a consequence of the dominance hypothesis, we have:

$$\forall W \in \mathcal{R}^2, \forall \pi \int_0^1 w(p)F_\pi^{-1}(p)dp > \int_0^1 w(p)F_\pi'^{-1}(p)dp.$$

Consequently, for all $W \in \mathcal{R}^2$, we can write:

$$\Delta_W(F_\pi, F_\pi') = \int_0^1 w(p)\Gamma(F_\pi, F_\pi', p)dp.$$

Hence, $\forall W \in \mathcal{R}^2$ we have:

$$\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') = \int_0^1 w(p)[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)]dp. \tag{11}$$

It is possible to integrate (11) by parts once,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') &= w(1)\int_0^1 \left[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)\right] \\
&\quad + \int_0^1 (-1)w'(p)\int_0^p \left[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', t) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', t)\right]dtdp
\end{aligned}$$

By $W \in \mathcal{R}^2$ then $w(1) = 0$ and the first term disappears. By $w'(p) \leq 0$ for all p makes $\int_0^p \left[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', t) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', t)\right]dt \geq 0 \; \forall p \in [0,1]$ sufficient for $\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') \geq 0$

in (11), which gives the EZOP condition. Moreover, Lemma 1 in Aaberge (2009) gives the necessary part. ∎

A.5 Proof of Proposition 4

Proof. We use the same type of proof argument as in Aaberge (2009). As a consequence of the dominance hypothesis, we have:

$$\forall W \in \mathcal{R}^k, \forall \pi \quad \int_0^1 w(p) F_\pi^{-1}(p) dp > \int_0^1 w(p) F_\pi'^{-1}(p) dp.$$

Consequently, for all $W \in \mathcal{R}^k$, we can write:

$$\Delta_W(F_\pi, F_\pi') = \int_0^1 w(p) \Gamma(F_\pi, F_\pi', p) dp.$$

Hence, $\forall W \in \mathcal{R}^k$ we have:

$$\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') = \int_0^1 w(p)[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p)] dp. \tag{12}$$

It is possible to integrate (12) by parts k times,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') &= w(1) \int_0^1 \left[\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p) \right] \\
&\quad + \sum_{j=1}^i (-1)^j \frac{d^j w(1)}{dp^j} \left[\Gamma^k(F_0, F_0', 1) - \Gamma^k(F_1, F_1', 1) \right] \\
&\quad + (-1)^i \int_0^1 \frac{d^i w(p)}{dp^i} \left[\Gamma^k(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma^k(F_1, F_1', p) \right] dp.
\end{aligned}$$

By $W \in \mathcal{R}^k$ then $w(1) = 0$ and $\frac{d^j w(1)}{dp^j} = 0$ for all $j \leq i$ and the first and second terms above disappear. The fact that the sign of $(-1)^i \frac{d^i w(p)}{dp^i}$ is always positive by construction makes the conditions $\left[\Gamma^k(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma^k(F_1, F_1', p) \right] \geq 0 \; \forall p \in [0, 1]$ sufficient for $\Delta_W(F_0, F_0') - \Delta_W(F_1, F_1') \geq 0$ as in (12), which defines the EZOP condition. Moreover, Lemma 1 in Aaberge (2009) gives the necessary part. ∎

B Statistical inference for gap curve dominance

B.1 Setting and null hypothesis

Consider a sample $y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n$ of n draws from a random variable Y with distribution F. Let assume for simplicity that $y_1 \leq y_2 \leq \ldots \leq y_n$, so that y_i refers to the observation in position i in the ranking. The empirical distribution for the sample is denoted $\widehat{F}(y) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}(y_i \leq y)$ while the empirical quantile function is denoted $\widehat{F}^{-1}(p) = \inf\{y : \widehat{F}(y) \geq p\}$. If $\widehat{F}$ is a consistent estimator for F, then $\widehat{\Lambda}^k$ is a consistent estimator for Λ^k.

The empirical counterparts of the distributions F_1 and F_1', corresponding to circumstances c and c', are denoted $\widehat{F_1}$ and $\widehat{F'}_1$ respectively, where in general $n_{c,1} \neq n_{c',1}$. These

distributions can be obtained from random samples drawn from a well defined population. In the policy evaluation case, in particular, the actual distributions are estimated from the sample of treated units. In the application, we look more specifically at the sample of children born in post reform cohorts in treated municipalities to infer these distributions. In many cases, also $\widehat{F}_0$ and $\widehat{F'}_0$ can be obtained from well defined random samples. In these situations, standard ISDk inference procedures can be adopted to determine the dominating distribution.[33] In the policy evaluation setting, however, $\pi = 0$ represents a counterfactual setting where sample data are not available. The two distributions $\widehat{F}_0$ and $\widehat{F'}_0$ can be estimated by applying to $\widehat{F}_1^{-1}(p)$ and to $\widehat{F'}_1^{-1}(p)$ the corresponding conditional QTE estimates $\hat{QTE}(p|c)$ and $\hat{QTE}(p|c')$ at every $p \in [0,1]$. In this case, inference procedures can be based on bootstrapped covariances and standard errors.

Whenever $F_\pi \succ_{ISDk} F_\pi$ for all π, the gap curves differences are well defined and gap curves dominance and equality null hypothesis can be stated by setting conditions on $\Lambda_\pi^k(p)$ and $\Lambda_\pi'^k(p)$ in every state π.

$$H_0^k: \quad \Lambda_0^k(p) - \Lambda_0'^k(p) \geq \Lambda_1^k(p) - \Lambda_1'^k(p) \quad \text{for all } p \in [0,1];$$
$$H_1^k: \quad \Lambda_0^k(p) - \Lambda_0'^k(p) < \Lambda_1^k(p) - \Lambda_1'^k(p) \quad \text{for some } p \in [0,1].$$

The random process $\Lambda^k(p)$ is, in general, continuous. However, it is more convenient to express equality and dominance null hypothesis as linear equality and inequality constraints on a finite number m of abscissae $p \in \{p_1, \ldots, p_m\}$. The estimates of $\widehat{\Lambda}^k(p)$ corresponding to these abscissae are organized in a column vector of coordinates:

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Lambda}}^k = \left(\widehat{\Lambda}^k(p_1), \ldots, \widehat{\Lambda}^k(p_m) \right)^t,$$

with $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}^k$ being the corresponding vector in the population. Within the discrete setting it can be shown that:

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Lambda}}^k \text{ is asymptotically distributed as } \quad \mathcal{N}\left(\boldsymbol{\Lambda}^k, \frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^k}{n} \right), \tag{13}$$

where we use $\frac{\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^k}{n}$ as the estimator of the asymptotic $m \times m$ covariance matrix of $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Lambda}}^k$. As a consequence of asymptotic normality, test statistics for ISDk and gap curve dominance relations have well known distributional properties.

Asymptotic normality results from applying virtually all estimators proposed in the literature. We retain asymptotic normality also for cases in which the covariances are bootstrapped. A bootstrap estimator consists in randomly sampling from the original sample a sufficiently large amount of time, and to obtain from each bootstrapped sample a set of estimates of the desired coefficients that are stored aside. The bootstrapped coefficients and covariances are the empirical average and covariances obtained from the set of bootstrapped coefficients.

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[33]See Beach and Davidson (1983) and Zheng (2002) for estimators of quantile functions and generalized Lorenz functions coordinates, while see Andreoli (2013) for extensions of inference on ISD at orders higher than the second. See also Davidson and Duclos (2000) for inference procedures of direct stochastic dominance analysis.

B.2 Application to Gap curves dominance

We estimate dominance conditions for discrete processes, summarized by vectors of coordinates $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_\pi^k$ and $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_\pi^{\prime k}$, corresponding respectively to the population distributions F_π and $F_\pi^\prime$ in both $\pi = 0$ and $\pi = 1$. We define $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_\Gamma^k$ the $4m \times 1$ vector obtained by staking the vectors $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_0^k$, $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_0^{\prime k}$, $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_1^k$ and $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_1^{\prime k}$ in this precise order. The corresponding estimates are collected in the $4m \times 1$ vector $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Lambda}}_\Gamma^k$, and we use $n = n_{c,0} + n_{c^\prime,0} + n_{c,1} + n_{c^\prime,1}$ to denote the overall sample size, gathering together all observations in the sub-samples delimited by circumstances c and $c^\prime$ under $\pi = 0$ and $\pi = 1$, while $r_{c,\pi} = n_{c,\pi}/n$ is the relative size of each sub-sample. In the case of bootstrapped estimators, as in the policy evaluation application, it is sufficient to set $n_{c,\pi} = 1$.

The hypothesis of gap curve dominance can be reformulated as a sequence of m linear constraints on the vector $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_\Gamma^k$. Let $\mathbf{R}_\Gamma = (\mathbf{R}, -\mathbf{R})$ be the $m \times 4m$ *difference-in-differences* matrix, where $\mathbf{R} = (\mathbf{I}, -\mathbf{I})$ and $\mathbf{I}$ is an identity matrix of size m. Define the parametric vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_k = \mathbf{R}_\Gamma \boldsymbol{\Lambda}_\Gamma^k$.

We make two (non-testable) assumptions: (i) F_π and $F_\pi^\prime$ are independent processes for all π; (ii) the independence extends also across policy regimes. This latter assumption is verified when the sampling scheme is based upon randomized assignment to treatment and control groups. Under the two assumptions of independence and using the result in (13), it holds that:

$$\sqrt{n}\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k = \sqrt{n}\,\mathbf{R}_\Gamma\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Lambda}}_\Gamma^k \quad \text{is asymptotically distributed as} \quad \mathcal{N}\left(\sqrt{n}\,\mathbf{R}_\Gamma\,\boldsymbol{\Lambda}_\Gamma^k,\ \boldsymbol{\Phi}\right), \qquad (14)$$

where $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k$ denotes the sample estimate of $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_k$, and

$$\boldsymbol{\Phi} = \mathbf{R}_\Gamma \operatorname{diag}\left(\frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{c,0}^k}{r_{c,0}}, \frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{c^\prime,0}^k}{r_{c^\prime,0}}, \frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{c,1}^k}{r_{c,1}}, \frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{c^\prime,1}^k}{r_{c^\prime,1}}\right) \mathbf{R}_\Gamma^t.$$

The empirical estimator of the asymptotic variance, $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$, is obtained by plugging $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}_{c,\pi}^k$ in the previous formula. We now discuss, within this framework, the test statistics associated to equality and dominance null hypothesis for pairs of gap cures. We conclude the section by showing that the procedure can be simplified by using conditional QTE bootstrapped estimates, as proposed in the empirical session.

B.3 Testing equality in gap curves

The null and alternative hypothesis for equality in gap curves coordinates associated to the set of abscissae $\{p_1, \ldots, p_m\}$ are:

$$H_0^k: \ \boldsymbol{\gamma}_k = \mathbf{0} \qquad H_1^k: \ \boldsymbol{\gamma}_k \neq \mathbf{0}.$$

Under the null hypothesis, it is possible to resort to a Wald test static T_1^k:

$$T_1^k = n\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k^t\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}^{-1}\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k.$$

Given the convergence results in (14), the asymptotic distribution of the test T_1^k is χ_m^2. The p-value tabulation follows the usual rules.

B.4 Testing dominance in gap curves

The null and alternative hypothesis for dominance in gap curves can be reformulated as a sequence of positivity constraints on the vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_k$:

$$H_0^k: \ \boldsymbol{\gamma}_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^m \qquad H_1^k: \ \boldsymbol{\gamma}_k \not\subset \mathbb{R}_+^m$$

The Wald test statistics with inequality constraints has been developed by Kodde and Palm (1986). For this set of hypothesis, the test statistics T_2^k is defined as:

$$T_2^k = \min_{\boldsymbol{\gamma}_k \in \mathbb{R}_+^m} \left\{ n \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k - \boldsymbol{\gamma}_k \right)^t \widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}^{-1} \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k - \boldsymbol{\gamma}_k \right) \right\}.$$

Kodde and Palm (1986) have shown that the statistic T_2^k is asymptotically distributed as a mixture of χ^2 distributions, provided that (14) holds:

$$T_2^k \ \sim \ \overline{\chi}^2 \ = \ \sum_{j=0}^{m} w\left(m, m-j, \widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}\right) \Pr\left(\chi_j^2 \geq c\right),$$

with $w\left(m, m-j, \widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}\right)$ the probability that $m-j$ elements of $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_k$ are strictly positive.[34]

To test the reverse dominance order, that is $\Gamma(\Lambda_1^k, \Lambda_1'^k, p) \geq \Gamma(\Lambda_0^k, \Lambda_0'^k, p)$ for all $p \in [0, 1]$, it is sufficient to replace $-\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_k$ and $-\boldsymbol{\gamma}_k$ for their positive counterparts.

B.5 Testing equality and dominance using QTE

We propose to assess gap curves dominance for any pair of types $c \neq c'$ by comparing the full distribution of QTE associated to conditional distributions of these two types. When $F_\pi \succcurlyeq_{ISD1} F_\pi'$ for $\pi = 0, 1$, the gap curves dominance condition rewrites:

$$\Gamma(F_0, F_0', p) - \Gamma(F_1, F_1', p) \ = \ QTE(p|c') - QTE(p|c) \quad \forall p \in [0, 1].$$

Gap curves dominance is equivalently assessed by checking if the conditional QTE distribution of the type which is disadvantaged in every policy regime is larger than the corresponding conditional QTE distribution of the advantaged type. This means that the advantaged type gains less from the policy compared to the disadvantaged type. Since this hold at every conditional quantile of the two types distributions, the disadvantaged type catches up the advantaged one and opportunities are equalized for this pair. The baseline econometric models provides estimates of the QTE at different quantiles of the conditional outcomes distributions, along with their covariances. In the application, these estimators are obtained through bootstrap methods.

Let denote the vector of conditional QTE on the conditional distribution of type c and calculated for a finite number of intercepts $p \in \{p_1, \ldots, p_m\}$ as $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_c = \left(Q\hat{T}E(p_1|c), \ldots, Q\hat{T}E(p_m|c)\right)$. The covariance matrix of this estimator is denoted $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{QTE|c}$ and is estimated by the empirical covariance of sequence of coefficient estimates bootstrapped on resampled data. In analogy with the previous notation, let $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ be the vector obtained by staking the QTE distributions $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_c$ and $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_{c'}$ associated to the pair of circumstances c, c'. The m-variate vector

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[34]To estimate $w\left(m, m-j, \widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}\right)$, we draw 10,000 multivariate normal vectors with covariance matrix $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\Phi}}$, provided it is positive definite. Then, we compute the proportion of vectors with $m-j$ positive entries.

of parameters of interest is denoted $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_{QTE} = \mathbf{R}\,\widehat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$. In analogy with (14), the covariance of $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}_{QTE}$ is denoted $\boldsymbol{\Phi}_{QTE}$ and defined as:

$$\boldsymbol{\Phi}_{QTE} \;=\; n\,\mathbf{R}\mathrm{diag}\left(\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{QTE|c}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{QTE|c'}\right)\mathbf{R}^{t}.$$

The underlying assumption is that the QTE estimates associated to different groups are independent.

In this setting, the hypothesis of equality of QTE, as well as the hypothesis that the QTE distribution of the disadvantage type dominates the QTE distribution of the advantage groups, can be tested as shown in the previous sections, using the test statistics T_1 and T_2. This procedure might not be appropriate in cases where F_π and F'_π are not ordered in the same way according to ISD1 under all policy regimes.

Supporting online appendix

C   Empirical implementation

This section develops an algorithm that allows to test whether the ex ante EZOP condition is satisfied. Assume that individual outcome and circumstances are observed for a representative sample of the population. The following algorithm operationalizes the ex-ante EZOP criterion. The algorithm proposes null hypothesis for conditional outcome distribution and for gap curves, focussing in particular on equality and dominance null hypothesis. The appropriate inference procedure, tests statistics and their distributions that must be used to test these null hypothesis are treated in appendix B. Valid alternatives to equality and dominance are described in Dardanoni and Forcina (1999).

The algorithm defines a procedure for comparing *pairs of distributions* made conditional on circumstances $c_i, c_j \in C$ with $i, j \in \{1, \ldots, T\}$ the set of population types. In the application, types are defined by intervals of parental resources bounded by deciles of the family labor income, with $T = 10$. Hereby, the algorithm develops a procedure for assessing the most demanding non-anonymous ex-ante opportunity equalization criterion. It can be easily adapted to check equalization with anonymity, or with respect to some reference type. We denote with the scalar $\kappa_{ij}(\pi)$ the minimal degree of ISD at which the two distributions can be ranked in a given social state π. The algorithm establishes the steps that must be iterated to determine empirically $\kappa_{ij}(\pi)$. Inference on this scalar remains beyond the scope of this work.

Algorithm 1 (Implementable ex ante EZOP for two types) *The following sequence of estimations and tests implements EZOP:*

(i) *$\forall c_i \in C$, $\forall \pi$, estimate $F_\pi^{-1}(p|c_i)$ and its integrals $\Lambda_\pi^k(p|c_i)$.*

(ii) *For each (c_i, c_j, π) with $i, j \in \{1, \ldots, T\}$ compute $\kappa_{ij}(\pi)$ as follows:*

  (a) *Consider $k \in \mathbb{N}_{++}$, with $k = 1$ for the first iteration;*

  (b) *Given k, define and test the following pair of null hypothesis:*
  $\{H_0 : F_\pi(y|c_i) \succ_{ISDk} F_\pi(y|c_j)$ vs. $H_a : F_\pi(y|c_i) \nsucc_{ISDk} F_\pi(y|c_j)\}$
  and
  $\{H_0 : F_\pi(y|c_j) \succ_{ISDk} F_\pi(y|c_i)$ vs. $H_a : F_\pi(y|c_j) \nsucc_{ISDk} F_\pi(y|c_i)\}$.

  (c) *Define $I_k = (a, b)$ the result of this pair of tests, where a, b is equal to 1 if the null hypothesis is rejected and 0 otherwise, respectively for both null hypothesis.*

  (d) *Compute I_k:*
    - *if $I_k = (0, 0)$: $\kappa_{ij}(\pi) = \infty$ - **stop**.*
    - *if $I_k = (0, 1)$ or if $I_k = (1, 0)$: $\kappa_{ij}(\pi) = k$ - **stop**.*
    - *if $I_k = (1, 1)$: let $k = k + 1$ and **iterate** from step (b).*

(iii) *Define $\kappa_{ij} := \max_\pi \{\kappa_{ij}(0), \kappa_{ij}(1)\}$.*

(iv) *Verify gap curve dominance at order κ_{ij}, where c and c' represent respectively the dominating and dominated distribution out of the pair c_i, c_j:*
  $\{H_0 : \Gamma(\Lambda_0^{\kappa_{ij}}(p|c), \Lambda_0^{\kappa_{ij}}(p|c')) \geq \Gamma(\Lambda_1^{\kappa_{ij}}(p|c), \Lambda_1^{\kappa_{ij}}(p|c)) \ \forall p \in [0, 1]$ and $H_a : H_0 is false\}$.

    - *If $\kappa = 1$:*

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- *If H_0 accepted: EZOP is verified.*
- *If H_0 accepted with equality: neutrality is verified.*
- *If H_0 rejected: inconclusive, EZOP is rejected.*

- *If $\kappa \geq 2$:*
    - *If H_0 accepted: Necessary conditions for equalization are satisfied.*
    - *If H_0 accepted with equality: neutrality is verified.*
    - *If H_0 rejected: inconclusive, EZOP is rejected.*

When $k = 1$, gap curve dominance can be inferred from comparisons of QTE. Provided that $F_\pi(y|c) \succcurlyeq_{ISD1} F_\pi(y|c')$, then the gap curve dominance relation

$$\Gamma(F_0(y|c), F_0(y|c'), p) - \Gamma(F_1(y|c), F_1(y|c'), p) = F_1^{-1}(p|c') - F_0^{-1}(p|c') - \left(F_1^{-1}(p|c) - F_0^{-1}(p|c)\right)$$

is, by definition of the QTE on conditional types distribution, equivalent to verify that $QTE(p|c') \geq QTE(p|c)$ for every conditional quantile $p \in [0, 1]$. This result allows to use more precise estimators of the gap curves, although the equivalence is valid exclusively in the case $k = 1$.

D   Additional material for the empirical application

D.1   Support analysis for QTE estimation

The data used in this paper have been presented in detail by Havnes and Mogstad (2011, 2014). We address the reader to these paper to gather explanations for: (i) the sample composition; (ii) the effects of the Kindergarten Act on child participation in early education and on the effect of the policy on the labor supply of the mothers; (iii) the similarity between treated and control groups in terms of the characteristics of the municipalities they are associated to; (iv) the validity of the DiD identification strategy; (v) the computation of QTE of the policy using RIF-DiD, OLS and change-in-changes estimators; (vi) the definition and distribution of family earnings, along with the effect of the policy on intergenerational earnings elasticity.

Figure 6 reports a non-parametric estimates of the joint distribution of child earnings and family labor incomes. The high symmetry of the cumulative distribution function ensure that there is enough support for the estimation of QTE for high quantiles of earnings even for the groups coming from less advantaged backgrounds, when running RIF-DiD estimations. The support requirements are satisfied at the bottom of the children earnings distribution, where the density of family labor incomes is sufficiently high for all groups, as confirmed by panel (a) of figure 7 for selected family labor income decile groups. The issues related to lack of support at the top of the children earnings distributions are of marginal relevance. Panel (b) of figure 7 shows in fact that, although the share of group D10 (10th family labor income decile) is proportionally higher than the one of groups D1 or of D5 for top percentiles of the children earnings distributions, still each of these two groups represents half of the group D10 share at that specific percentile. Furthermore, we run conditional QTE models, so the estimates of the parameters $\beta_3 \cdot g(\cdot)$ in (5) for very high income thresholds are mostly associated to top family labor income deciles groups.

Figure 6: Joint distribution of child earnings and family labor income.

Note: Distribution is estimated using an epanechnikov kernel with Silverman ROT bandwidth, multiplied by 10e10 for notational simplicity.

(a) Density of child earnings

(b) Population shares by child earnings

Figure 7: Distribution of child earnings by selected family labor income deciles groups.

Note: D1, D5 and D10 refer to children with parental earnings in the first, fifth, and tenth decile, respectively. Density estimates are calculated using an epanechnikov kernel with Silverman ROT bandwidth. Panel (b) refers to shares in the population of children in these three deciles, estimated as the fraction of estimated kernel density to the sum of estimated kernel densities.

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D.2   EzOP test: higher order comparisons for selected decile groups

The tests reported in figure 2 show that equalization cannot be rejected for a large majority of the groups involved in the gap curve dominance comparisons. This is because the QTE associated to groups that are relatively advantaged (both in actual and counterfactual settings) are nowhere higher than the QTE of groups that are always relatively disadvantaged.

In *one* out of the 45 cases, involving groups D3 and D5, it is not possible to establish the direction of this dominance relation, since both equalization and disequalization cannot be rejected, while this is not the case for equality of gap curves is rejected. In other *six* cases involving the comparisons of groups D1 versus D4-D9, the joint dominance test rejects that the gap curve in the counterfactual setting lies either above or below the gap curve in the actual setting. In these situations, there are high chances that gaps curves at higher orders are statistically similar and neutrality cannot be rejected.

To complete the equalization of opportunity test, we now apply tests at higher orders of dominance for conditional cdfs and gap curves to a selected number of groups identified by the graphs in figure 2. We test ISD2 relations first, by looking at dominance relations between generalized Lorenz dominance across groups in the actual and counterfactual settings. Results are reported in panels A and B of table 2. For most of the groups considered here, it is possible to conclude with Lorenz curves that group D1 is substantially disadvantaged compared to the others. The generalized Lorenz curves of groups D3 and D5, instead, coincide in the actual setting. In the actual setting, some of the p-values cannot be computed. We rely nevertheless on the fact that the estimated tests statistics are quite large to conclude that some of the null hypothesis are rejected by the data.

Panel C of the figure elaborated equalization tests. The null hypothesis of neutrality of the policy should be accepted at 1% in comparisons involving groups D1 and D4, while both equalization and disequalization between groups D3 and D5 must be accepted, indicating that higher order dominance analysis is needed.

The equalization tests for some of the comparisons involving group D1 are not conclusive, while for many of these comparisons it is not possible to obtain reliable measure of the p-values associated to joint dominance tests. We conclude that within the set of preferences $\mathcal{R}^2$ it is not possible to assess if the gap between groups D1-D5, D1-D6, D1-D7, D1-D8 and D1-D9 has been reduced by the Kindergarten Act. A better tailored inference procedure is needed to tackle cases such as this.

By further restricting consensus on equalization to the class $\mathcal{R}^3$, implemented through dominance tests for Λ^3 curves and their associated gap curve, results are more clearcut. The joint tests reported in table 3 allow to conclude in favor of neutrality of the policy with respect to the gap between groups D3 and D5. Though the analysis of p-values remains not reliable, the Wald joint tests for disequalization of the opportunity profiles between group D1 and the rest, are all zero. Figure 8 motivates that in large part these results are lead by disequalization of opportunity taking place at the bottom of the group D1 children earnings distributions.

Table 2: Equalization of opportunity for selected family labor income deciles groups

| | Pairwise groups comparisons: | | | | | | D3 vs. |
| | D1 vs. | | | | | | |
	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D5
A - Counterfactual generalized Lorenz, dominance relations ($\pi = 0$)							
$H_0 : \sim$	118.9	155.8	280.4	423.9	702.0	851.7	44.4
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
$H_0 : \succcurlyeq$	118.9	155.8	280.4	423.9	702.0	851.7	43.9
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
$H_0 : \preccurlyeq$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.4
	[0.769]	[0.781]	[0.778]	[0.776]	[0.782]	[0.781]	[0.600]
B - Actual generalized Lorenz, dominance relations ($\pi = 1$)							
$H_0 : \sim$	129.1	112.3	213.4	261.3	481.0	494.1	21.7
	[.]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[0.549]
$H_0 : \succcurlyeq$	129.1	112.3	213.4	261.3	481.0	494.1	21.7
	[.]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[0.318]
$H_0 : \preccurlyeq$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	[0.880]	[0.880]	[0.880]	[0.883]	[0.885]	[0.882]	[0.883]
C - Gap curve equality and dominance tests at order ISD2 ($\pi = 0$ vs $\pi = 1$)							
$H_0 : $ Neutrality	43.1	58.2	87.1	110.4	163.0	193.0	60.9
	[0.036]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[0.002]
$H_0 : $ Equalization	49.4	59.0	75.4	134.4	104.8	125.7	0.5
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[.]	[0.000]	[.]	[0.858]
$H_0 : $ Disequalization	65.4	99.4	134.4	217.4	226.0	279.8	61.3
	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[.]	[0.000]	[.]	[0.857]

Note: generalized Lorenz dominance joint tests on ventiles of children earnings under the counterfactual (panel A) and the actual (panel B) settings, along with gap curve dominance at order 2. Gap cures are defined according to the order of groups defined in panel A and B. Covariances are bootstrapped.


Figure 8: Comparisons of generalized Lorenz curves through gap curves at order 2 for selected pairs of groups

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors.

Table 3: Equalization of opportunity for selected family labor income deciles groups

	Pairwise groups comparisons:						D3 vs.
	D1 vs.						
	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	D5
A - Counterfactual Λ^3 curves, dominance relations ($\pi = 0$)							
$H_0 : \sim$	111.3	149.9	287.9	407.8	660.5	787.1	34.1
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.018]
$H_0 : \succcurlyeq$	111.3	149.9	287.9	407.8	660.5	787.1	37,016.7
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
$H_0 : \preccurlyeq$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	37,208.1
	[0.666]	[0.672]	[0.673]	[0.675]	[0.671]	[0.670]	[0.000]
B - Actual Λ^3 curves, dominance relations ($\pi = 1$)							
$H_0 : \sim$	127.1	98.9	225.8	253.2	426.8	479.5	18.4
	[.]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[0.705]
$H_0 : \succcurlyeq$	127.1	98.9	225.8	253.2	426.8	479.5	18.4
	[.]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[.]	[0.451]
$H_0 : \preccurlyeq$	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	[0.816]	[0.816]	[0.816]	[0.819]	[0.820]	[0.819]	[0.819]
C - Gap curve equality and dominance tests at $k = 3$ ($\pi = 0$ vs $\pi = 1$)							
$H_0 :$ Neutrality	36.3	49.2	74.7	96.7	128.9	159.8	6.5
	[0.098]	[0.013]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[0.998]
$H_0 :$ Equalization	36.3	49.2	74.7	96.7	128.9	159.8	0.0
	[0.059]	[0.008]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[0.813]
$H_0 :$ Disequalization	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5
	[0.060]	[0.008]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[.]	[.]	[0.814]

Note: Λ^3 dominance joint tests on ventiles of children earnings under the counterfactual (panel A) and the actual (panel B) settings, along with gap curve dominance at order 3. Gap cures are defined according to the order of groups defined in panel A and B. Covariances are bootstrapped.