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Wealth Distribution Within Couples and Financial Decision Making

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PRELIMINARY DRAFT: Comments are Welcome

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Abstract:

While most previous studies on wealth inequality focus on the inequality between households, this paper examines the distribution of wealth within couples. For this purpose, we make use of unique individual level micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Men in couples possess on average 33,000 Euro more net worth than women. We look at five different sets of factors (demographics, income, labor market, inheritances, financial decision making in the partnership) that might explain this wealth gap. We find that all factors contribute to the explanation of the wealth gap within partnerships, with inheritances and income being particularly relevant. Furthermore, we find that specific characteristics (e.g. self-employment, no migration background, inheritances, high income) that decrease the wealth gap for women increase it for men. For men the respective coefficients are even stronger in absolute terms. When examining intra-partnership financial decision making, we find the gap to be significantly smaller when the female manages the money and larger if the male partner has the last word in financial decisions.

Keywords: Wealth gap, Wealth inequality, Intra-household allocation,Gender, Financial decision making, SOEP

JEL-code: D13**,** D31, D69, I31

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I. Introduction

Welfare-oriented analyses of economic outcome measures such as income and wealth in general rest on the assumption of pooling and equal sharing of resources by all members of the very same household, i.e., all individuals exert similar control over "household resources". Meanwhile, it has been demonstrated that household and individual welfare are not the same (e.g. Phipps & Burton 1995) though examining the distribution of the ownership of income and wealth within the household context is almost always hampered by the lack of individual level data.

Thus, the inability to distinguish between asset ownership within the household constrains many studies to focus on differences among family structures (see for example, Zagorsky (1999), Schmidt and Sevak (2006)) and to rely on the implicit assumption of internal redistribution of wealth across members of the same households. However as shown by Frick, Grabka, Sierminska (2007) this assumption masks the "true" degree of inequality within households: Using households as the aggregation unit and applying a per-capita household wealth to all household members yields a Gini coefficient for net worth of about .70, which is about 8% less than the one obtained from individual wealth information instead (.76). For a more top-sensitive inequality measure like the half squared coefficient of variation this reduction is even much stronger, about 25%.

Most studies of intra-household resource allocation have focused on consumption and income and find that it does matter whether the woman or the man have access and/or control of resources. The more equal the access and control is the more balanced are household decisions and the use of income. As most asset information is recorded at the household level, there have been few studies that examined intra-household allocation in wealth (Lundberg and Ward-Batts 2000,Sunden and Surette 1998, for example) and whether there exists a wealth gap within the household (Sierminska et al. 2010). Meanwhile, wealth affects the possibility of current and future consumption and is therefore central to measuring well-being of households and their members.

Deciding who has control over assets within the household could be meaningful for several reasons. First of all, holding wealth within the households provides a person with a greater share of household resources and gives them a better negotiating position within the household. Second, unlike consumption decisions, which to a large extent could be life-style choices, the decision regarding savings and assets is crucial in protecting women and men against future unexpected events. Finally, it seems that control over assets could potentially be more important than control over income. Income matters when it is received for everyday spending. Accumulated wealth, on the other hand,

potentially influences people's well-being for the entire period it is held, which could be a much longer period than for income. In addition, the way people manage and accumulate wealth will determine how well-off they are during their senior years. Given that women live longer and spend more of their years in retirement it would be reassuring to see more savings and as a result more assets in the hands of women.

In this paper, we examine the distribution of wealth within (married and cohabiting) couples and their determinants by making use of unique individual level micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). We also examine whether intra-partnership financial decision making is an important factor in explaining the within household wealth gap and whether the intra-partnership gap declines with the level of bargaining power within the household.

We find the smallest gap in households with the lowest wealth levels. In these households, the woman is more likely to be the main decision-maker. However, in the richest households, with the biggest within couple gap the man usually has the last say in financial decisions. In over 85% of couples, financial decision-making with respect to income is made jointly and the gap is about 33,000 Euros. We find that some characteristics systematically empower women in financial decision making. More specifically, it seems that in couples where the wife is active in the labor market or has higher education than the partner, she is more likely to be in charge of family finances. The man is more likely to be in charge if the wife is an immigrant and he is self-employed. Couples are more likely to be independent if there is more wealth and are less likely to be independent with the length of marriage.

The paper has the following structure: The next section contains an overview of the literature. This is followed by a section on the empirical strategy and methodology. Section IV provides a description of the data. Section V shows the empirical results and section VI concludes.

II. Literature background and motivation

When looking at gender differences in wealth, some studies compare men and women in one-person-households only, because surveys typically collect wealth information at the household level only. Alternatively, studies focus on single wealth components where data is available at the individual level such as pension wealth (see Warren 2006). These studies face the main problem that in datasets on household wealth it is typically not possible to assign ownership of assets to particular individuals within married couples. Consequently, there has been little attempt to decompose wealth

differentials by gender and there is not much that can be said about the financial well-being of married women (with respect to wealth holdings) even though feminist economics emphasizes the importance of looking at intra-household inequality (e.g. Haddad and Kanbur (1990); Woolley (1993), Allmendinger (2006)).

Few studies have examined the distribution of wealth within the household. Meanwhile, Frick, Grabka and Sierminska (2007) show that inequality is higher when individual level data are used instead of household level data, which implicitly assumes an equal distribution of resources within the household. In addition, their findings indicate that the increase in inequality based on standard inequality measures is higher for wealth than for income. This indicates that by using household level data for wealth we assume an even greater redistribution within the household than when using income measures. Considering that many countries have an equal split of assets in case of divorce, perhaps the issue of within country inequality is not seen as a crucial topic. The question is whether the threat point of individual economic well-being is divorce or perhaps non-cooperation within the household. For the latter case, owning assets and, hence, a lower wealth gap within the household would increase the bargaining situation within the household.

In our paper, we want to identify some of the reasons for the differences in the distribution of assets within the household. The literature on within household *income* variation (e.g. Pahl 2000) puts forward several factors for variation in couples' relative earnings. In the US, race has been a good predictor of higher wives' contribution to family income as Black women have higher labor force attachment compared to White women and Black men are seen as the most disadvantaged group in the labor force. Winslow-Bowe (2006) finds that women with a college education are more likely to have a temporary or persistent earnings advantage over their husband (regardless of his education) then less educated women. On the other hand, more women compared to men concentrate in part-time jobs, where the pay per hour is less than in full-time.

In terms of the gender wealth gap, Sierminska, Frick and Grabka (2010) show–for *all* men and women–that the gap already exists before marriage. Partners enter marriage with different levels of wealth because of age (typically men are 3 years older), men have higher earnings and their labor market participation is stronger. This gives rise to higher wealth accumulation for men than for women. The wealth gap can be attenuated if women and men invest differently (Jianakopolos and Bernasek, 1998); they have different consumption and saving patterns and also inheritances (Edlund and Kopczuk 2009).

We further develop the findings by Sierminska, Frick and Grabka (2010) and focus on the within-partnership wealth differences and examinethe role of intra-partnership financial decision making in the size of the gap.

Phipps and Woolley (2006) examine the effect of women's and men's control over finances on the probability of investing in private pension accounts in Canada. There they find that women do not take control of family finances to save for themselves and find a systematic negative effect between female control and the probability of having own private pension plans as well as the level of these pension plans. Though, the strongest predictor of savings remains income. People with higher incomes save more.

III. Empirical strategy and methodology

First, we focus our empirical analysis on the forces that drive the intra-partnership wealth gap. Current wealth is past period wealth including interest plus current savings. Current savings is the outcome of income and expenditures. Hence, if there are any differences among these three factors we will observe differences in the intra-partnership wealth gap. In the first instance, we suspect that the size of the wealth gap is the result of the accumulation of the established gender wage gap. Since earnings and income are flows, any differences between the partners will accumulate into the current period. In our specification we control for a multitude of labor market characteristics. Winslow-Bowe (2009) finds that relative earnings within the household are also affected by race, life-stage and education. It has been shown that spending patterns differ between men and women and hence *ceteris paribus* the amount saved by each partner will ultimately differ (Ship 1987). This will affect the amount that is saved individually by each partner in the household and ultimately for the households. We expect to capture this to a certain extent by our financial decision variable (last word in decision making). We also control for past inheritance received, which will affect past period wealth. It should be noted that many of these variables are inter-related. For example, the way inheritance is invested will also depend on who makes these types of decisions in the household. Finally, as retired individuals are at a different stage in their life-cycle they will begin decumulating as opposed to accumulating wealth, which will affect the within partnership gap. As a result we control for the number of years being over 65.

In the second stage of the analysis, we examine the financial decision making within the household. As described in the data section we focus on two variables: « last word in financial decisions » and « money management within the couple », which serve as proxies for *implementing power* and

orchestration power (Safilios-Rothschild 1976).The first refers to day-to-day financial decisions such as food shopping and the latter to financial planning and management. It is not exactly clear what these two variables measure, but we can assume the more money "power" one has the more one can use it to her/his advantage in terms of savings.

As outlined in section 2, we first focus on describing the size and determinants of the intra-partnership wealth gap. We perform a stepwise regression with our basic dependent variable being the difference in net worth between the male and the female within a partnership.[1] For regression analysis, we apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Pence 2006) since the wealth difference can take negative values (if the female owns more than the male partner), for which the logarithm is not defined.[2]

We look at five different sets of explanatory variables. These sets include demographics, income, labor market information, inheritances and variables related to power in the partnership. The demographic variables consist of age, difference in age and whether the couple has children, marital status as well as the length of marriage. We also include the immigrant status given that a migrant typically has below average wealth (Bauer et al. 2010), and the geographic region for East and West Germany, given that the wealth accumulation process in the two regions has been dramatically different. In order to control for life events such as previous divorces or widowhoods, which might have effects on individual wealth levels, we add adequate dummy variables. Finally, by considering the (inverse hyperbolic sine) couple's net worth holdings we control for an overall level effect, assuming that the gap increases with higher total household wealth.

Our income measures are the individual 5-year-average total income of the wife and the difference to that of the male partner to proxy permanent income.[3] This income measure consists of individual earnings, self-employment income, unemployment benefits, pensions and private transfers received by each partner.

Variables related to the labor market comprise information for both spouses on the number of years in full time/part time/unemployment as well as on the self-employment status (yes/no) and the civil

[1] In order to mitigate the effect of outliers we apply a 0.1% top and bottom coding for individual net worth.

[2] For robustness tests, we also apply another transformation of the wealth gap: In the alternative transformation, we take the (natural) logarithm for positive wealth gaps, for negative wealth gaps we take the logarithm of the absolute value and multiply this logarithm with "-1", and for zero-difference we do not perform any transformation. The general findings are confirmed.

[3] In the case that the income information is missing for some years, we only use the available years for the computation of the mean. All income information is transformed to 2005 Euros.

servant status (yes/no). We also include her years of education and the difference between the spouses' years of education. The difference in age and education is to control for bargaining power within the household.

The fourth set of explanatory variables covers inheritances and bestowals. These are the main elements of great fortune. The SOEP collects annual inheritance data only at the household level. However, in 2001 the respondents were also asked to provide inheritance information at the individual level. We include two binary variables for each spouse to differentiate past and more recent inheritances (one for inheritances before 1992, the other for the period 1992 to 2001).[4] Furthermore we include dichotomous variables for missing inheritance information as some individuals joined the survey after 2001 and, hence, could not provide this information. The shortcoming of this variable is that it does not consider more recent inheritances and thus the selectivity of such an incident.

The fifth set of explanatory variables includes proxy information for the distribution of power within a partnership. The distribution of power within the household may have a significant impact on the intra-partnership wealth gap. We make use of two variables, which describe the financial decision making process. This is the "last word in financial decisions" and "money management within the couple". These serve as proxies for implementing power and orchestration power as described by Safilios-Rothschild (1976). It can be assumed that the person who has the implementing and orchestration power within a partnership also has control over the financial resources and thus a higher probability of having more wealth then the other. If a joint decision process is arranged, one would assume a rather small intra-partnership wealth gap, which might be the result of wealth differences that already exist before the partners became a twosome. For the financial decision making variables we take advantage of two questions contained in the survey.[5]For the first variable the respondents answer the question "Who has the last word in your relationship when making important financial decisions?" Answers include "Me", "my partner" or "both of us equally". The money management variables are based on the question "How do you and your partner decide what to do with the income that one of you or both receive?" There are five categories: Separate money management, pooled money management, partly pooled and partly separate, I manage and partner

[4] We disregard from considering the amount of an inheritance/bestowal in order to avoid any assumptions about inflation (e.g. inflation differs for property and financial assets) and correction of item-non response.

manages.[6] We only use the information of the female partner on power variables. If the woman does not provide information on the power variables, we utilize the man's answer.[7]

In the second part of the empirical analysis, we estimate multinomial logit models to compare the determinants of financial decision making and money management, the two variables introduced in the last paragraph.

IV. Data

We draw on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative longitudinal survey of individuals living in private households in Germany (Wagner et al. 2007). The survey started in 1984 in West Germany and extended to East Germany in 1990. At present, the survey consists of nine different subsamples with an oversampling of migrants and in particular high income households, which is crucial for this paper. Each household has to fill in a household questionnaire, while all household members over 17 years of age have to respond to an individual questionnaire. We basically use data from 2007, where more than 20,000 individuals in over 10,000 households participated. We restrict the sample to cohabiting couples (independent of their marital status, hereafter couples) and are left with around 7,200 couples.[8]

In 2007 the SOEP questionnaire included a special module focusing on individual wealth data. This rare feature is crucial for our analyses. Information is elicited in eight different wealth and debt components: owner-occupied property (and associated debt), other property (and associated debt), building savings contracts, financial assets, life insurance policy (including private retirement insurance), business assets, valuable assets(including jewelry, gold, arts, etc.) and consumer credits.

However, this data miss some wealth components like durables, vehicles and pension entitlements from public pension schemes, which are mostly unknown by respondents. The SOEP wealth questionnaire also does not survey children below 18, which should not distort our results since we focus on cohabitating couples (and because wealth holdings by children are presumably rather

[6] The original wording of the five answer categories is a) Everyone looks after their own money, b) We put the money together and both of us take what we need, c) We put a share of the money together, and both of us keep a share of it for ourselves, d) I look after the money and provide my partner with a share of it, e) My partner looks after the money and provides me with a share of it.

[7] One cannot assume a perfect match of the answers by both partners. However, there is a large overlap. For robustness purposes we considered different codings of the power variables. We used a) only the male partner's information, b) the woman's answer and an additional dummy variable indicating a deviating answer of the man, and c) only the information of couples without contradictions and an indicator variable for whether the partners disagreed. For all these codings the results did not change meaningfully.

[8] Given our main research interest to analyze the gender wealth gap within couples we refrain from considering homosexual partnerships.

small).

A more serious problem in collecting wealth data at the micro-level is measurement error from various sources such as rounding, misreporting and non-response (see, e.g., Riphahn and Serfling 2005). On the one hand, separately asking all adult household members instead of a single household representative may increase the accuracy of the true wealth holdings of each individual. On the other hand, this increases the probability of item-non response on at least one single wealth component within the household and the risk for inconsistent information (e.g., two partners providing non-matching information on the very same issue such as a commonly owned home). Coping with all these measurement problems is a major task. In the case of the SOEP wealth data, inconsistencies have been taken care of by means of editing on a case-wise basis, while missing data have been corrected for by multiple imputation techniques, explicitly considering the potential selectivity of the underlying missing mechanisms (for a description of these procedures see Frick, Grabka and Marcus 2010). A comparison with corresponding information from national balance sheets however indicates that the SOEP wealth data performs rather well (Frick, Grabka and Hauser 2010).

V. Empirical analysis

This section provides descriptive statistics about the wealth gap within couples (subsection a) and the financial decision-making among couples (b). Furthermore, this section performs multivariate analyses to investigate determinants of these two variables (c and d, respectively).

a) A description of the wealth gap within couples

Our basic dependent variable is the difference in net worth between the male and the female within a partnership. At the mean this figure amounts to about 33,000 Euro in 2007. However, the gender raw gap between *all* men and women in partnerships is by far more pronounced. While mean net worth for all men in partnerships amount to 127,000 Euro the respective figure is only 75,000 Euro for all women. This translates to a gender raw gap of about 52,000 Euro in 2007.[9]

[9]One would assume that the raw gender wealth gap within partnerships should equal to the difference in mean net worth of males and females. However, the two figures are not equal due to a weighting scheme in SOEP which adjust each person's weight individually. All descriptive findings are analyzed from the perspective of the female and weighted with her survey weight.

However, males do not always possess more wealth than females in a partnership. While 19% of all couples have net worth in equal shares–mostly no net worth at all– in at least 29% of the couples the female owns more net worth than her partner. Here the mean intra-partnership wealth gap amounts to more than 48,000 Euro (14,000 at the median) with women having about 104,000 Euro net worth–more than twice as much as their male partner. The remaining share of couples consists of males having more wealth than their female partner with a mean wealth gap of nearly 91,000 Euro (25,000 Euro at the median). Here the mean net worth of male partners sums up to 183,000 Euro, which is also twice as much as the mean net worth of their female counterparts.

The mean value of total net worth is about 156,000 Euro for both the group of couples having equal net worth and the group where the female partner has more wealth than her male partner. . For couples where the male partner has more wealth than his wife, total net worth is about 245,000 Euro. If the female became a widow in those partnerships, she could profit from the higher net worth of her partner. However, during marriage this wealth gap might affect intra-household bargaining.

Following the life-cycles hypothesis (Modigliani 1966) wealth increases over the lifetime up to retirement in order to smooth consumption. Putting aside cohort effects for a moment, in figure 1 we display the couple's net worth for female age groups. We find that up to the 56-65 age group total wealth within a couple continuously rises to more than 250,000 Euro. After the official retirement age of 65 years decumulation in total net worth occurs. For the oldest group of females total net worth is higher, which might be the result of inheritances–most likely from a previous partner–or the social gradient in mortality.[10] More important for our analysis is the share of the mean intra-partnership wealth gap as a percent of total net worth of couples. Here we find clear indication that the relative gap between men and women in a partnership is lower for older individuals.[11] This finding might be the result of different financial decision making across age groups. While men and women at the beginning of a partnership still manage their financial affairs on their own, in a long-term relationship joint financial decision making gains in relevance with females typically gaining more. Hence, the relative wealth gap declines.

[10]Himmelreicher et al. (2008) show that for pensioner's life expectancy increases with income and social status.
[11]However, the absolute value of the intra-partnership wealth gap follows an inverse u-shaped pattern with the highest absolute value of about 46,000 Euro for females in the age group of 46-55 years.

Figure 1: Total net worth of couples and share of mean wealth gap as a percent of total net worth of couples



Source: SOEPv27, only couples and cohabiting partners.

Another relevant demographic variable, which might have an impact on the intra-partnership wealth gap, is the information whether a household has children or not. Having children typically negatively influences the labor market participation of women, thus reducing the chances to accumulate wealth on their own. As expected, couples without children under the age of 16 years have a higher total net worth of about 207,000 Euro than couples with children with roughly 175,000 Euro. However, the findings for the intra-partnership wealth gap do not confirm the stated hypothesis. While this gap is about 36,000 Euro for couples without children, the respective figure for households having children is only about 21,000 Euro. This could again point to a different financial decision making behavior , i.e. having children tend to increase the probability for a joint decision making process or one that reduces the gap within the household

The gender wealth gap might differ when considering cultural differences. Persons who are living in East Germany before the wall came down might have a smaller intra-partnership wealth gap than those living in the western part of Germany. The socialistic German Democratic Republic had a policy of gender equality, thus women had equal rights but also equal obligations, i.e. the share of fulltime employed women was and still is higher in the eastern part of Germany. These cultural differencescould also translate into the gender wealth gap and, in fact, our findings confirm this.For

those living in East Germany at the time of 1989 (the year the wall came down) the mean intra-partnership wealth gap is less than 15,000 Euro, while the respective figure for West Germans is about 40,000 Euro, where a traditional male-breadwinner model was prevalentthus reducing the chances for the wealth accumulation of women.

A further relevant demographic characteristic is family status. Singles show a significant smaller absolute gender wealth gap than married couples; however this is the result of an age bias, given that mean wealth is rather small for young adults. A more interesting finding is that widowhood seems to have a significant impact on the intra-partnership wealth gap. While for female widows with a new partner this gap is only about 10,000 Euro, the gap becomes even bigger when looking at male widowers–with a new partner–with nearly 96,000 Euro. It can be assumed that an inheritance could either lower the wealth gap for women or enlarge in case a man gets an inheritance.

Gender differences in the labor force are well investigated showing that there is a significant difference in labor market participation and a pronounced gender wage gap (e.g. Blau and Kahn 2000). Both impair the possibility to save a relevant amount of money to accumulate wealth for women. Thus, one would assume that even with increased labor market participation of women an intra-partnership wealth gap still remains. This is true for all displayed groups in figure 2. First of all, the longer the labor force participation the more wealth women tend to accrue. However, women who have at least 35 years experience of an occupational career tend to scale down the gap. Here, the differences between the two sexes amounts to 13,000 Euro only, while for those females with e.g. 10 to 19 years of labor force participation this gap is more than 40,000 Euro. The gap for women without any labor force participation is remarkable. These women have below average wealth but the intra-partnership wealth gap amounts to only 25,000 Euro. This finding might be the result of either an age bias towards young females or a bias in terms of low social class of the male partner.

Figure 2: Female labor market experience in years and mean net worth by partner



Source: SOEPv27, only couples and cohabiting partners.

Besides labor force characteristics, inheritances play in general an important role for wealth accumulation (Wolff 2002, Edlund and Kopczuk 2009). Receiving a significant inheritance can lower/enlarge the intra-partnership wealth gap. This can be confirmed when considering recent inheritances, i.e. inheritances since 1992. If a female received an inheritance, the intra-household wealth gap is less than 10,000 Euro. Conversely, if an inheritance has been devolved to a male partner, the mean intra-partnership wealth gap becomes much higher with 62,000 Euro.

b) An overview of the differences in financial decision-making among couples

The intra-partnership wealth gap is the highest if only the man has the last word in financial decisions (figure 3). At the same time these are also the richest households. Here, the mean net worth of the man is about 204,000 Euro, while female partners dispose of only 80,000 Euro. If the woman declares that both partners decide on financial issues, female partners show only a slightly lower net worth of 75,000 Euro. However, the mean net worth of the respective male partner is by far much smaller with only 122,000 Euro. Interestingly, the intra-partnership wealth gap is not the smallest for the group that declares that both decide, but in the group, where she has the last word in financial issues. Here the mean gap amount to only 6,500 Euro. However, this is the group with the lowest mean net worth of about 47,000 Euro for females and 54,000 Euro for males.

The population share of couples where the woman states that she has the last word is only 6%, while equal sharing is found in 85% of all couples. The remaining share of 9% consists of couples, where the female declares that the partner has the last word.[12]

Figure 3: Last word in financial decisions and mean net worth by partner



Source: SOEPv27, only couples and cohabiting partners.

The second question about financial decision making within a couple is "money management" (figure 4). Again about 2/3rdof all females state that money is equally shared, but this does not directly translate into equal wealth holdings. The mean intra-partnership wealth gap is about 33,000 Euro and does not differ from the population mean. A comparable wealth gap is observed for couples that share part of the money and for couples where both manage money on their own. Similarly, to the previously discussed findings for the last word in financial decisions, the intra-partnership wealth gap is again the highest (55,000 Euro) only if the male partner manages the money. Once again, the smallest intra-partnership wealth gap of about 10,000 Euro exists when the female manages the money alone. Total net worth of these couples is, yet again, the smallest for all groups. Based on these results it seems that only if there is little or no wealth (or income), which needs to be managed, females tend to be the ones in charge of looking for economic resources. Another

[12]It should be noted that the partners not fully agree about who have the last word in financial decisions. The highest overlap of about 95% can be found for those stating that both have the last word. If the female answer that the partner has the last word, there is an overlap of at least 70%. While if she declares to have the last word the accordance is about 67%. For the latter two groups about 27% of the male partners have the opinion that a joint decision making process is taking place.

potential explanation might be, that females need to take responsibility for economic resources because there is only small financial scope (see also Pahl 2000).[13]

Figure 4: Money management within couples and mean net worth by partner



Source: SOEPv27, only couples and cohabiting partners.

c) A multivariate examination of the wealth gap within couples

Table 1 shows the results of the multivariate analyses of the wealth gap within a partnership, defined as the inverse hyperbolic sine of the difference between the man and the woman. The column display the coefficients of the five sets of explanatory variables (demographics, income, labor market, inheritances, financial decision making) which we include gradually.

The set of demographic variables we include in specification (1) explains around 5 % of the wealth difference. We find robust results over all 7 specifications. For instance, in line with our descriptive findings we find the older the female the smaller the wealth gap. Having a migration background deepens the intra-partnership wealth gap for women, which are most likely married to men that are better off. For men, the gap is smaller if they are coming from abroad. Migration is associated with costs and those that migrate to Germany are less educated, have higher unemployment rates and below average earnings, which directly translate to lower levels of wealth (Bauer et al. 2011). If the male partner was a citizen of the German Democratic Republic this significantly lowers the wealth gap. This can be explained by overall lower wealth levels in East Germany due to the socialist economic system before the wall came down and bad labor market conditions since then, which perpetuate lower wealth levels.

[13]There is also no full overlap between the answers of both partners with respect to money management. The share of overlaps varies from 76% for part of money is shared to 95% for all money is shared.

If the female is a widow there is a chance that she has received an inheritance from the former spouse and there is an expected negative effect on the wealth gap, but this result is not significant. If the male partner is a widower there is a strong positiveeffect that deepens the intra-partnership wealth gap although the size of the inheritance should be lower for males than for females.

Having children is usually associated with lower levels of wealth for women compared to childless adults. Thus we observe a negative and significant effect on the gap for females without children. This finding though is only significant in our first stepwise regression and disappears already when we controlfor income.

Our basic regression model also considers the total net worth of both partners. As expected the intra-partnership wealth gap significantly increases with higher wealth levels which could be a result e.g. of different risk attitudes and investment decisions. Getting divorced, the length of marriage and also the difference in the age between the partners do not have any significant effect on the wealth gap within partnerships.

Our second factor in explaining the intra-partnership wealth gap is individual female income. Here, we observe a significant negative effect of the woman's proxy for permanent income (mean over 5 years) given that the higher the income the higher the chance to accumulate wealth, the lower is the wealth gap. When controlling for income differences between the two partners, there is also the clear finding that if the female makes more money than her partner, the wealth gap is reduced. These two findings are robust for all stepwise regressions.

The third factor comprises labor market characteristics. Rather strong effects can be found if at least one of the partners is currently self-employed. For women this implies a reduction of the wealth gap, while if the male is self-employed the gap widens. The self-employed are not covered by the statutory pension system in Germany, thus they have to care on their own for old-age provision. This is typically done by investing in private pensions or property, which enforces the gap between partners because our measure of wealth does not include any public pension entitlements. If the male partner experienced longer phases of unemployment or part time employment this reduces the chances to save, thus the gender wealth gap also becomes smaller. Examining the educational level of women–as measured by years spent in education–there is a small but significant effect on the wealth gap, i.e. the longer the time spend in the educational system, the smaller is the gap.

In the fourth stepwise regression we control for inheritances received. Given that this information is surveyed in 2001 in the SOEP, we additionally apply a dummy variable to indicate the population who enter the survey in more recent waves, although this does not show any relevant effect. As expected receiving an inheritance clearly reduces the intra-partnership wealth gap for women–this is robust over all stepwise regressions–while if the man profits from an inheritance the gap becomes bigger.

Our last main driving factor to explain the intra-partnership wealth gap is the decision making process within a couple. We make use of three different approaches. First we consider only the information about who has the last word in financial decisions (reference category is "both decide", column 5). When the female states that she has the last word, then there is an expected negative effect (as could be seen from the descriptive analysis), however it is not significant. Even if the male partner makes the decisions in financial matters we observe a strong positive effect, i.e. the wealth gap becomes bigger relative to those couples with joint decisions. In the second approach, (column 6) we make use of information regarding money management within couples. Compared to the reference category where all money is shared the wealth gap is significantly reduced if the female decides alone. All other combinations show no significant results. The third approach (column 7) considers both aspects of the financial decision making process; however the results differ only slightly.

In terms of the bargaining power, we find the age and education difference to be insignificant and the difference in permanent income between women and men in the couple to have a robust significant effect on the male-female wealth gap.

Robustness checks

For robustness purposes, we restrict the population of interest to couples below the age of 65 years, which is the official retirement age in Germany, to concentrate on the phase of life where typically wealth is accumulated. All in all the findings could be reconfirmed with the two exceptions of the age of the female and the indicators about the time the man spent in part time employment. For the latter one may argue that reduced efficiency lead to this result while the age indicator point to the finding, that the wealth gap is reduced for older females only.

In a further robustness check,we follow the literature on the existence of marriages of equally dependent spouses (Nock 2001) and examine the extent to which this also concerns wealth. We

restrict the sample to equally dependent couples in terms of income, which has to vary only between 40% to 60% of total household income each, given that the individual income is one of the most important factors for saving. The above presented significant findings for demographic characteristics nearly all become insignificant. Only the overall level of total wealth of the couple and the age of the female remain significant. Differences in the labor force experience no longer have a pronounced impact on the wealth gap, however being self-employed is still of relevance and becomes even more important. With respect to inheritances one can still observe the same patterns as for the last stepwise regression for the total population pointing to a significant impact of this factor on the wealth gap. Lastly the variables to capture the financial decision making process within couples no longer play such an important role which seem to be strongly related to equal income level between the two partners.

d) A multivariate examination of financial decision making in the household

In this section, we examine the driving factors of financial decision making. In the first instance, we examine the variable « last word in financial decisions ». The respondent answers « Myself », « Partner » or « Both ». We estimate a multinomial logit model with the reference group « Both ». The coefficients can be interpreted as having a positive or negative effect on the probability that a woman reports that she (in col (1)) or her partner (in col (2)) has the last word in financial decisions compared to when she reports that both members of the family have the last word. First, we look at the demographic variables. Having an immigrant partner has a positive effect on having the last word in financial matters for men. If a woman was living in Eastern Germany in 1989 she will less likely have the last say, but if her partner was living there it will increase the probability for her. There is no effect for men.

The length of a women's presence in the labor market has a positive effect on women's and a negative for men's last word. Men's length of unemployment will also increase the probability for women to have the last word. Their own self-employment empowers both women and men in financial decision making. The length of marriage has a positive effect on both women and men suggesting that once couples are married they are more likely to allow one of the partners to make independent decisions for the family. This is also confirmed when we look at the results of the second variable « financial agreement »in col (4) and (5).

Female's inheritance seems to have a positive effect on the probability she will have the last word. Moving to bargaining and monetary variables we find that the age difference within the couple has a

negative significant effect for women and not men, which just means that an older male partner has more to see in financial matters.

Woman's income and education has a negative effect on the probability for both the woman and man having the last word, but the difference in income (woman having higher income than the man) and education significantly increases the probability she will have the last word and decreases the probability he will have the last word. Household wealth has a dampening effect on the probability for the woman to have the last say and has no effect for men.

Next, we examine the variable « agreement with spouse/partner in dealing with income ». The respondent has five possibilities: money is managed separately, I manage (partner receives a portion), Partner manages (I receive a portion), all money is shared, part of the money is shared (part is separate). The results are in Table 2 columns (3) to (6). The reference group is all money is shared, hence the coefficients can be interpreted as having a positive or negative effect on the probability of the outcome variable in comparison to the « all money is shared » category. In column three we see that women's income and labor market participation, as well as wealth and not being married empowers the couple to make decision independently. With the length of marriage, the presence of immigrant wives, females being self-employed and males being unemployed independence is reduced and couples are more likely to share wealth. The woman is more likely to be in charge with the length of marriage, if she has a higher education level, the man is unemployed or divorced. Less likely with higher wealth and the number of years over 65, which could suggest a cohort effect in financial decision making in the family. The couples are more likely to partly share.

Based on these results it is difficult to generalize, but we do see that some characteristics systematically empower (or not) women in financial decision making. More specifically, it seems that in couples where the wife is active in the labor market or has higher education than the partner, she is more likely to be in charge of family finances. The man is more likely to be in charge if the wife is an immigrant and he is self-employed. Couples are more likely to be independent if there is more wealth and are less likely to be independent with the length of marriage.

VI. Conclusions

In this paper we examine the wealth distribution within partnerships. In 29% of all couples the female owns more net worth than her man, for 19% of all partnerships there is parity between man

and women in their wealth levels and finally in 52% of all couples the male partner has more wealth. Overall the intra-partnership wealth for German couples amount to about 33,000 Euro in 2007.

We provide several groups of explanatory variables (demographic, income, labor market information, inheritances and variables related to the control over money in the partnership). We find the most robust results for immigrants, widowers and the rich. In low wealth households the wealth gap is the smallest and the woman ends up having control over money management. In the richest households the man makes most of the financial decisions. Being self-employed and having received recently an inheritance also has strong effects. If a woman is self-employed or has recently received an inheritance the male-female wealth gap within the household is reduced and vice versa for males.

When we examine the driving forces of financial decision making we find that some characteristics systematically empower (or not) women decision making. Women's presence in the labor make, self-employment, having higher income than her partner and having received an inheritance increases her "power" within the household, as well as man's length of unemployment. The length of marriage increases the probability that only one partner will be making all the decisions.
Should one concerned about these findings? One may argue that even if there exist an intra-partnership wealth gap during marriage, both partners can profit from the usage of real assets and in case of death the whole net worth devolve to the widow/-er. However, given that divorce rates are increasing in a majority of OECD countries one can no longer rely on a long-lasting win-win situation like a marriage. In case of divorce, in many countries, an equal split of assets is performed, i.e. everything which was acquired/saved during marriage is subject to division. However, as shown by Sierminska et al. 2010 men and women already enter marriage with pronounced different levels of wealth. In most cases, females tend to have significant lower levels of net worth. But a divorce is typically associated with costs, which may reduce wealth levels. In this paper we focused on net worth from real and financial assets only. If one would consider pension entitlements from public pension schemes, the observed intra-partnership wealth gap would further increase, given that the labor force participation and earnings are higher for males than for females.

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Table 1 Determinants of the wealth gap within the household (men-women).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age^f	-0.075***	-0.059***	-0.056**	-0.057**	-0.058**	-0.057**	-0.058**	-0.023	-0.127**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.054)
Δ Age	0.043	0.041	0.048	0.050	0.052	0.050	0.051	0.000	0.099
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.068)
Migrant^f	1.599***	1.512***	1.594***	1.388***	1.278**	1.283***	1.206**	1.035*	-0.246
	(0.515)	(0.505)	(0.503)	(0.497)	(0.499)	(0.497)	(0.499)	(0.555)	(1.129)
Migrant^m	-1.946***	-1.640***	-1.715***	-1.529***	-1.532***	-1.549***	-1.550***	-1.422**	-1.084
	(0.526)	(0.519)	(0.517)	(0.512)	(0.513)	(0.510)	(0.511)	(0.574)	(1.171)
East^f	-0.232	0.158	0.209	0.092	0.080	0.046	0.051	0.016	-0.488
	(0.749)	(0.737)	(0.740)	(0.746)	(0.742)	(0.744)	(0.741)	(0.789)	(1.497)
East^m	-1.753**	-1.337*	-1.258*	-1.130	-1.118	-1.109	-1.111	-1.111	0.165
	(0.755)	(0.741)	(0.743)	(0.749)	(0.745)	(0.746)	(0.744)	(0.792)	(1.514)
No kids	-1.516***	-0.633	-0.629	-0.603	-0.618	-0.629	-0.635	-0.495	-0.395
	(0.392)	(0.395)	(0.397)	(0.395)	(0.393)	(0.397)	(0.395)	(0.466)	(0.754)
Divorced^f	0.087	0.227	0.191	0.225	0.243	0.225	0.242	0.158	-0.041
	(0.481)	(0.478)	(0.475)	(0.473)	(0.474)	(0.472)	(0.473)	(0.527)	(0.942)
Divorced^m	-0.603	-0.549	-0.620	-0.735	-0.741	-0.698	-0.707	-0.679	-0.780
	(0.471)	(0.466)	(0.466)	(0.465)	(0.465)	(0.464)	(0.464)	(0.532)	(0.929)
Widowed^f	-1.025	-1.095	-1.347	-1.376	-1.336	-1.308	-1.291	-0.790	-0.057
	(1.068)	(1.055)	(1.058)	(1.047)	(1.048)	(1.046)	(1.046)	(1.432)	(1.930)
Widowed^m	3.406***	3.171***	3.046***	2.914***	2.900***	2.847***	2.845***	2.881**	2.213
	(0.937)	(0.913)	(0.910)	(0.891)	(0.894)	(0.893)	(0.896)	(1.323)	(1.740)
Notmarried	0.287	0.365	0.290	0.412	0.396	0.468	0.455	0.285	1.340
	(0.486)	(0.483)	(0.487)	(0.496)	(0.495)	(0.511)	(0.510)	(0.544)	(0.960)
Marriage (length)	0.026	0.012	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.004	-0.028	0.028
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.040)
Wealth (asinh)	0.275***	0.262***	0.253***	0.250***	0.249***	0.248***	0.248***	0.263***	0.174***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.043)
Income^f		0.046***	0.039***	0.035***	0.035***	0.034***	0.034***	-0.031**	-0.011
		(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.026)
Δ Income		0.034***	0.029***	-0.032***	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.077*
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.044)
Education^f			-0.142**	-0.120*	-0.115*	-0.126*	-0.121*	-0.099	-0.162
(years)			(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.087)	(0.145)
Δ Education			0.027	0.040	0.048	0.052	0.056	-0.004	0.042
			(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.079)	(0.141)
Exp. full-time^f			-0.014	-0.016	-0.012	-0.013	-0.011	-0.016	-0.018
			(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.039)
Exp. full-time^m			0.017	0.016	0.015	0.013	0.012	0.026	0.069
			(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.048)
Exp. part-time^f			-0.025	-0.021	-0.017	-0.018	-0.016	-0.013	-0.019
			(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.053)
Exp. part-time^m			-0.124**	-0.125**	-0.125**	-0.128**	-0.127**	-0.158	0.050
			(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.101)	(0.109)
Exp. unempl.^f			0.011	0.020	0.019	0.023	0.021	0.103	0.053
			(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.121)
Exp. unempl.^m			-0.130**	-0.131**	-0.129**	-0.123**	-0.123**	-0.154**	0.065
			(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.116)
Self employed^f			-1.679***	-1.693***	-1.670***	-1.701***	-1.685***	-2.015***	-4.022***
			(0.633)	(0.632)	(0.630)	(0.632)	(0.630)	(0.661)	(1.371)
Self employeed^m			3.123***	3.084***	3.033***	3.058***	3.024***	2.856***	4.926***
			(0.459)	(0.456)	(0.456)	(0.455)	(0.455)	(0.479)	(1.006)
Civil servant^f			-0.066	-0.098	-0.148	-0.151	-0.183	-0.485	-0.817
			(0.750)	(0.749)	(0.749)	(0.750)	(0.749)	(0.776)	(1.247)
Civil servant^m			0.455	0.461	0.449	0.455	0.440	0.315	2.036*
			(0.575)	(0.574)	(0.575)	(0.575)	(0.575)	(0.592)	(1.204)
Inherit. > 1992^f				-2.900***	-2.890***	-2.908***	-2.901***	-3.086***	-4.558***
				(0.508)	(0.507)	(0.508)	(0.508)	(0.589)	(1.068)
Inherit. > 1992^m				1.103**	1.102**	1.083**	1.082**	0.747	1.201

				(0.489)	(0.488)	(0.490)	(0.489)	(0.574)	(1.053)
Inherit. < 1992^{f}				-2.064***	-2.044***	-2.108***	-2.087***	-1.938**	-2.963**
				(0.604)	(0.603)	(0.604)	(0.603)	(0.878)	(1.238)
Inherit. < 1992^{m}				2.735***	2.719***	2.758***	2.741***	2.405***	3.664***
				(0.481)	(0.480)	(0.482)	(0.481)	(0.662)	(1.025)
Inherit. n.a.^{f}				0.151	0.097	0.125	0.084	0.139	-0.391
				(0.393)	(0.394)	(0.394)	(0.394)	(0.419)	(0.829)
Inherit. n.a.^{m}				-0.627	-0.604	-0.592	-0.581	-0.560	-1.111
				(0.402)	(0.403)	(0.403)	(0.404)	(0.428)	(0.809)
Last word in financial decisions									
- female					-0.635		-0.413	-0.303	0.064
					(0.513)		(0.522)	(0.626)	(0.997)
- male					1.393***		1.305***	1.367***	1.284
					(0.407)		(0.424)	(0.508)	(1.156)
Money management									
- separate						-0.242	-0.266	-0.337	-0.313
						(0.415)	(0.415)	(0.462)	(0.787)
- female						1.472***	1.380***	-1.266**	-1.975*
						(0.482)	(0.490)	(0.594)	(1.110)
- male						0.615	0.251	0.055	0.848
						(0.475)	(0.495)	(0.656)	(1.462)
- part-part						-0.449	-0.447	-0.204	-0.868
						(0.477)	(0.476)	(0.541)	(0.892)
Constant	3.813***	3.001***	4.604***	4.509***	4.498***	4.810***	4.758***	3.112**	6.240***
	(0.718)	(0.733)	(0.995)	(0.990)	(0.994)	(0.996)	(0.998)	(1.315)	(2.156)
N	5846	5846	5846	5846	5846	5846	5846	4367	1405
R2	0.053	0.075	0.087	0.099	0.101	0.101	0.102	0.107	0.083
R2_a	0.050	0.072	0.082	0.094	0.095	0.095	0.096	0.099	0.056

Source: SOEPv27, only couples and cohabiting partners.

Note: The table presents the coefficients of OLS regressions and their robust standard errors, where the outcome is the (inverse hyperbolic sine of the)difference between the wealth of the male and the wealth of the female. Specifications (1)-(7) stepwisely include control variables, specification (8) considers only couples where both are 65 or below, and specification (9) only considers equally dependent spouses (in terms of income, 40-60 %).“ *f*” [“ *m* ”] means that the variable applies to the female [male], Δ denotes the difference between his and her value of the specific variable. $^{*}p< 0.1$, $^{**}p< 0.05$, $^{***}p< 0.01$

Table 2.Multinomial logit of last word in financial decisions and in money management.

	Last word (RF: both)		Money management (RF: equal sharing)			
	Myself	**Partner**	**Each separately**	**I manage**	**Partner manages**	**Partly**
Δ Age	-0.032**	-0.019	-0.011	0.006	-0.039**	0.000
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Income^{f}	-0.013**	-0.010*	0.010**	-0.001	-0.058***	0.010**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Δ Income	0.015***	-0.006***	0.004**	0.003	-0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education (yrs)	-0.107***	-0.073***	0.030	-0.134***	-0.042	0.044
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Δ Education^{f}	0.133***	-0.028	-0.029	0.141***	-0.058**	-0.026
	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Wealth (asinh)	-0.021**	0.004	0.021***	-0.016*	0.009	0.017*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Years over65^{f}	0.011	-0.033	0.073**	-0.114***	0.020	0.119***
	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Years over65^{m}	-0.015	0.020	0.012	0.036	-0.037	0.019
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Migrant^{f}	-0.334	0.685***	-0.470**	-0.758***	0.573**	-0.164
	(0.248)	(0.187)	(0.205)	(0.260)	(0.224)	(0.228)
Migrant^{m}	0.156	-0.012	-0.165	-0.028	0.029	-0.446*
	(0.238)	(0.197)	(0.199)	(0.248)	(0.231)	(0.242)
East^{f}	-0.927***	-0.398	0.151	-0.831*	0.221	0.134
	(0.340)	(0.355)	(0.218)	(0.424)	(0.467)	(0.254)
East^{m}	0.695**	0.193	-0.285	0.493	-0.494	-0.107
	(0.333)	(0.353)	(0.222)	(0.417)	(0.472)	(0.257)
Nokids	-0.001	0.105	0.474***	-0.470**	0.282	0.144
	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.122)	(0.237)	(0.224)	(0.147)
Exp. full-time^{f}	0.015**	-0.019***	0.020***	-0.002	-0.013*	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Exp. full-time^{m}	-0.025***	0.005	0.001	-0.021**	0.013	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Exp. part-time^{f}	0.007	-0.026***	0.024***	-0.008	-0.025***	0.020**
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Exp. part-time^{m}	-0.045	-0.016	0.010	-0.044	-0.007	0.029
	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Exp. unemped^{f}	0.026	0.026	0.004	-0.001	-0.033	-0.012
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Exp. unemped^{m}	0.047*	0.032	-0.056*	0.056**	0.030	0.014
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.034)
Selfemployed^{f}	0.411*	-0.081	-0.502**	0.025	-0.043	-0.066
	(0.242)	(0.257)	(0.210)	(0.271)	(0.324)	(0.215)
Selfemployed^{m}	0.004	0.436***	0.169	0.002	0.633***	0.076
	(0.225)	(0.161)	(0.144)	(0.225)	(0.197)	(0.171)
Divorced^{f}	0.218	-0.084	-0.015	0.199	0.467*	-0.251
	(0.199)	(0.205)	(0.149)	(0.212)	(0.241)	(0.179)

Divorced^{m}	-0.043	-0.033	-0.078	0.465**	-0.085	0.059
	(0.202)	(0.200)	(0.152)	(0.206)	(0.253)	(0.179)
Widowed^{f}	0.410	-0.098	-0.329	0.592	0.225	0.127
	(0.386)	(0.449)	(0.339)	(0.447)	(0.525)	(0.373)
Widowed^{m}	0.311	0.241	-0.386	-0.434	0.725**	-0.573
	(0.372)	(0.358)	(0.316)	(0.548)	(0.350)	(0.399)
Notmarried^{f}	0.221	0.258	1.434***	0.105	0.177	0.792***
	(0.210)	(0.230)	(0.150)	(0.335)	(0.433)	(0.178)
Civil serv.^{f}	-0.720	0.381	-0.112	-0.653	0.947**	-0.303
	(0.482)	(0.316)	(0.219)	(0.485)	(0.466)	(0.261)
Civil serv.^{m}	0.138	0.061	-0.163	-0.225	-0.340	0.075
	(0.289)	(0.229)	(0.188)	(0.304)	(0.323)	(0.207)
Marriage (length in yrs)	0.013*	0.017**	-0.063***	0.030***	0.023***	-0.058***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Inherit. >1992^{f}	0.379*	0.003	0.140	-0.114	-0.044	-0.015
	(0.201)	(0.198)	(0.167)	(0.216)	(0.234)	(0.200)
Inherit. >1992^{m}	0.149	0.149	-0.114	-0.286	0.031	0.152
	(0.233)	(0.196)	(0.183)	(0.243)	(0.229)	(0.201)
Inherit. <1992^{f}	-0.331	-0.342	0.103	-0.534*	-0.199	-0.383
	(0.302)	(0.241)	(0.216)	(0.277)	(0.254)	(0.288)
Inherit. <1992^{m}	-0.138	0.095	0.303	0.106	-0.163	0.297
	(0.256)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.211)	(0.223)	(0.218)
Inheri. n.a.^{f}	-0.208	0.263	-0.106	-0.373	0.230	-0.102
	(0.186)	(0.172)	(0.127)	(0.237)	(0.251)	(0.147)
Inheri. n.a.^{m}	0.677***	0.177	0.608***	0.281	-0.131	0.613***
	(0.170)	(0.175)	(0.121)	(0.224)	(0.268)	(0.140)
Constant	-0.851*	-2.045***	-1.913***	-0.289	-2.516***	-2.212***
	(0.439)	(0.374)	(0.324)	(0.447)	(0.460)	(0.365)
r2_p	0.065		0.146			
N	5674.000		5677.000			
ll	-2759.203		-5408.966			

Source: SOEPv27, only couples and cohabiting partners.

Note: " f" [" m "] means that the variable applies to the female [male], Δ denotes the difference between his and her value of the specific variable. *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01